SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS
draft-dukhovni-smtp-opportunistic-tls-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Viktor Dukhovni , Wes Hardaker | ||
| Last updated | 2014-01-16 (Latest revision 2013-07-15) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This memo describes a protocol for opportunistic TLS security based on the DANE TLSA DNS record. The design goal is an incremental transition of the Internet email backbone (MTA to MTA SMTP traffic) from today's unauthenticated and unencrypted connections to TLS encrypted and authenticated delivery when the client is DANE TLSA aware and the server domain publishes DANE TLSA records for its MX hosts.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)