Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
draft-dseomn-sidr-slurm-00

Secure Inter-Domain Routing                                D. Mandelberg
Internet-Draft                                          BBN Technologies
Intended status: Best Current Practice                 February 10, 2014
Expires: August 14, 2014

   Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
                       draft-dseomn-sidr-slurm-00

Abstract

   The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
   authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
   Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
   resources.  Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can use the RPKI to
   validate BGP route origination assertions.  Some ISPs locally use BGP
   with private address space or private AS numbers (see RFC6890).
   These local BGP routes cannot be verified by the global RPKI, and
   SHOULD be considered invalid based on the global RPKI (see RFC6491).
   The mechanisms described below provide ISPs with a way to make local
   assertions about private (reserved) INRs while using the RPKI's
   assertions about all other INRs.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 14, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Validation Output Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Locally Adding Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Configuring SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Combining Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     9.1.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     9.2.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Example SLURM File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
   authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
   Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
   resources.  For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)
   addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482]
   to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
   block.

   Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to validate
   BGP routes.  However, some ISPs locally use BGP with private address
   space ([RFC1918], [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers
   ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]).  These local BGP routes cannot be verified by
   the global RPKI, and SHOULD be considered invalid when using the
   RPKI.  For example, [RFC6491] recommends the creation of ROAs that
   would invalidate routes for reserved and unallocated address space.

   This document specifies two new mechanisms to enable ISPs to make
   local assertions about private INRs while using the RPKI's assertions
   about all other INRs.  Both mechanisms are specified in terms of
   abstract sets of assertions.  For Origin Validation [RFC6483], an
   assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS
   number} as used by rpki-rtr [RFC6810].  Output Filtering, described

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   in Section 2, filters out any assertions by the RPKI about locally
   reserved INRs.  Locally Adding Assertions, described in Section 3,
   adds local assertions about locally reserved INRs.  Note that both of
   these mechanisms can later be extended to cover any assertions made
   by the RPKI for use in BGPSEC [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].

   In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data
   it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol.  The rpki-rtr
   protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all Origin
   Validation assertions it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update
   of only the changes in Origin Validation assertions (Serial Query).
   The mechanisms specified in this document are to be applied to the
   result set for a Reset Query, and to both the old and new sets that
   are compared for a Serial Query.  Relying party software MAY modify
   other forms of output in comparable ways, but that is outside the
   scope of this document.

   This document is intended to supersede [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt] while
   focusing only on local management of private INRs.  Another draft
   [I-D.kent-sidr-suspenders] focuses on the other aspects of local
   management.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Validation Output Filtering

   To prevent the global RPKI from affecting routes with locally
   reserved INRs, a relying party is locally configured with a list of
   IP prefixes and/or AS numbers that are used locally, and taken from
   the reserved INR spaces.  Any Origin Validation assertions where the
   IP prefix is equal to or subsumed by a locally reserved IP prefix,
   are removed from the relying party's output.  Any Origin Validation
   assertions where the IP prefix contains a locally reserved IP prefix
   are removed and the relying party software SHOULD issue a warning.

3.  Locally Adding Assertions

   Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) list
   of Origin Validation assertions.  This list is added to the relying
   party's output.

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4.  Configuring SLURM

   Relying party software SHOULD support the following configuration
   format for Validation Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions.
   The format is defined using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
   notation and core rules from [RFC5234] and the rules <IPv4address>
   and <IPv6address> from Appendix A of [RFC3986].  Each <del> command
   specifies an INR to use for Validation Output Filtering.  Each <add>
   command specifies an assertion to use for Locally Adding Assertions.
   See Appendix A for an example SLURM file.

   SLURMFile = header *line

   header = %x53.4c.55.52.4d SP "1.0" CRLF ; "SLURM 1.0"

   line =  *WSP [comment] CRLF
         / *WSP command [ 1*WSP [comment] ] CRLF

   comment = "#" *(VCHAR / WSP)

   command = add / del

   add = %x61.64.64 1*WSP IPprefixMaxLen 1*WSP ASnum

   del = %x64.65.6c 1*WSP inr

   inr = IPprefix / ASnum

   IPprefix = IPv4prefix / IPv6prefix

   IPprefixMaxLen = IPv4prefixMaxLen / IPv6prefixMaxLen

   IPv4prefix = IPv4address "/" 1*2DIGIT

   IPv6prefix = IPv6address "/" 1*3DIGIT

   ; In the following two rules, if the maximum length component is
   ; missing, it is treated as equal to the prefix length.
   IPv4prefixMaxLen = IPv4prefix ["-" 1*2DIGIT]
   IPv6prefixMaxLen = IPv6prefix ["-" 1*3DIGIT]

   ASnum = 1*DIGIT

5.  Combining Mechanisms

   In the typical use case, a relying party uses both output filtering
   and locally added assertions.  In this case, the resulting assertions
   MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed before locally

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   adding assertions.  I.e., locally added assertions MUST NOT be
   removed by output filtering.

   If a relying party chooses to use both SLURM and Suspenders
   [I-D.kent-sidr-suspenders], the SLURM mechanisms MUST be performed on
   the output of Suspenders.

6.  IANA Considerations

   TBD

7.  Security Considerations

   The mechanisms described in this document provide an ISP additional
   control over its own network.  Care should be taken in how that
   control is used.

8.  Acknowledgements

   The author would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
   detailed reviews of this document.

9.  References

9.1.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
              Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", draft-ietf-
              sidr-bgpsec-protocol-08 (work in progress), November 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]
              Reynolds, M., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Local Trust
              Anchor Management for the Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-08 (work in
              progress), April 2013.

   [I-D.kent-sidr-suspenders]
              Kent, S. and D. Mandelberg, "Suspenders: A Fail-safe
              Mechanism for the RPKI", draft-kent-sidr-suspenders-00
              (work in progress), September 2013.

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
              E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP
              5, RFC 1918, February 1996.

   [RFC1930]  Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
              selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
              BCP 6, RFC 1930, March 1996.

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   [RFC4193]  Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
              Addresses", RFC 4193, October 2005.

   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.

   [RFC6483]  Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route
              Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
              Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations
              (ROAs)", RFC 6483, February 2012.

   [RFC6491]  Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
              Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA", RFC
              6491, February 2012.

   [RFC6598]  Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
              M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
              Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, April 2012.

   [RFC6810]  Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
              January 2013.

   [RFC6890]  Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., Bonica, R., and B. Haberman,
              "Special-Purpose IP Address Registries", BCP 153, RFC
              6890, April 2013.

   [RFC6996]  Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
              Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, July 2013.

9.2.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC
              3986, January 2005.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.

Appendix A.  Example SLURM File

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   SLURM 1.0

   # Reserve 192.0.2.0/24 and 2001:DB8::/32 for local use.
   del 192.0.2.0/24
   del 2001:DB8::/32

   # Allow either 65536 or 65537 to originate routes to 192.0.2.0/24.
   add 192.0.2.0/24 65536
   add 192.0.2.0/24 65537

   add 2001:DB8::/48-52 65536 # 65536 originates 2001:DB8::/48 and
                              # sub-prefixes down to length 52.
   add 2001:DB8:0:42::/64 65537 # However, 65537 originates
                                # 2001:DB8:0:42::/64.
   add 2001:DB8:1::/48 65537 # 65537 also originates 2001:DB8:1::/48

Author's Address

   David Mandelberg
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton St.
   Camridge, MA  02138
   US

   Email: david@mandelberg.org

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