Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols
draft-cremers-cfrg-randomness-improvements-00
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Cas Cremers , Luke Garratt , Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev , Nick Sullivan , Christopher A. Wood | ||
| Last updated | 2018-09-02 (Latest revision 2018-03-01) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Randomness is a crucial ingredient for TLS and related security protocols. Weak or predictable "cryptographically-strong" pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNGs) can be abused or exploited for malicious purposes. The Dual EC random number backdoor and Debian bugs are relevant examples of this problem. This document describes a way for security protocol participants to mix their long- term private key into the entropy pool(s) from which random values are derived. This augments and improves randomness from broken or otherwise subverted CSPRNGs.
Authors
Cas Cremers
Luke Garratt
Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev
Nick Sullivan
Christopher A. Wood
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)