Enhanced AS-Loop Detection for BGP
draft-chen-grow-enhanced-as-loop-detection-05
Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
Expired & archived
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Authors | Huanan Chen , Di Ma , Yunan Gu , Shunwan Zhuang , Haibo Wang | ||
Last updated | 2021-03-14 (Latest revision 2020-09-10) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Additional resources | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Misconfiguration and malicious manipulation of BGP AS_Path may lead to route hijack. This document proposes to enhance the BGP [RFC4271] Inbound/ Outbound route processing in the case of detecting an AS loop. It is an enhancement to the current BGP's Inbound/Outbound processing and can be implemented directly on the device, and this document also proposes a centralized usecase. This could empower networks to quickly and accurately figure out they're being victimized. Two options are proposed for the enhancement, a) a local check at the device; b) data collection/analysis at the remote network controller/ server. Both approaches are beneficial for route hijack detection.
Authors
Huanan Chen
Di Ma
Yunan Gu
Shunwan Zhuang
Haibo Wang
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)