Making BGP filtering a habit: Impact on policies
draft-cardona-filtering-threats-02
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Camilo Cardona , Pierre Francois | ||
| Last updated | 2014-01-10 (Latest revision 2013-07-09) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Network operators define their BGP policies based on the business relationships that they maintain with their peers. By limiting the propagation of BGP prefixes, an autonomous system avoids the existence of flows between BGP peers that do not provide any economical gain. This draft describes how undesired flows can emerge in autonomous systems due to the filtering of overlapping BGP prefixes by neighboring domains.
Authors
Camilo Cardona
Pierre Francois
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)