DTN Bundle Protocol Security COSE Security Contexts
draft-bsipos-dtn-bpsec-cose-04

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Author Brian Sipos 
Last updated 2020-12-22
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Delay-Tolerant Networking                                       B. Sipos
Internet-Draft                                           RKF Engineering
Intended status: Standards Track                        22 December 2020
Expires: 25 June 2021

          DTN Bundle Protocol Security COSE Security Contexts
                     draft-bsipos-dtn-bpsec-cose-04

Abstract

   This document defines a security context suitable for using CBOR
   Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) algorithms within Bundle
   Protocol Security (BPSec) integrity and confidentiality blocks.  A
   profile of COSE is also defined for BPSec interoperation.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 June 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Sipos                     Expires 25 June 2021                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               DTN BPSec COSE                December 2020

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  PKIX Environments and CA Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Use of CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  BPSec Security Context  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Security Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.1.  Key Containers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.2.  AAD Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.3.1.  Integrity Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.3.2.  Confidentiality Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.4.  Key Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.5.  Canonicalization Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.5.1.  Generating AAD  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.5.2.  Payload Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.6.  Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.6.1.  Security Source Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.6.2.  Policy Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  COSE Profile for BPSec  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.1.  COSE Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.2.  Interoperability Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.3.  Asymmetric Key Types and Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.3.1.  PKIX Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   5.  PKIX Certificate Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.1.  Multiple-Certificate Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   6.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.1.  Threat: BPSec Block Replay  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.2.  Threat: Untrusted End-Entity Certificate  . . . . . . . .  19
     7.3.  Threat: Certificate Validation Vulnerabilities  . . . . .  19
     7.4.  Threat: BP Node Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.5.  Threat: Unidentifiable Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     7.6.  Threat: Non-Trusted Public Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     7.7.  Threat: Passive Leak of Key Material  . . . . . . . . . .  20
     7.8.  Threat: Algorithm Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     8.1.  BPSec Security Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
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