Forward Secrecy Extensions for OpenPGP
draft-brown-pgp-pfs-03
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Ian Brown , Ben Laurie | ||
Last updated | 2001-10-08 | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The confidentiality of encrypted data depends on the secrecy of the key needed to decrypt it. If one key is able to decrypt large quantities of data, its compromise will be disastrous. This memo describes three methods for limiting this vulnerability for OpenPGP messages: reducing the lifetime of confidentiality keys; one-time keys; and the additional use of lower-layer security services.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)