DNS X-Proxied-For
draft-bellis-dnsop-xpf-02
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| Authors | Ray Bellis , Peter van Dijk , Rémi Gacogne | ||
| Last updated | 2017-07-03 | ||
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draft-bellis-dnsop-xpf-02
DNSOP Working Group R. Bellis
Internet-Draft ISC
Updates: RFC 2845, RFC 2931 (if P. van Dijk
approved) (if approved) R. Gacogne
Intended status: Standards Track PowerDNS
Expires: January 4, 2018 July 03, 2017
DNS X-Proxied-For
draft-bellis-dnsop-xpf-02
Abstract
It is becoming more commonplace to install front end proxy devices in
front of DNS servers to provide (for example) load balancing or to
perform transport layer conversions.
This document defines a meta resource record that allows a DNS server
to receive information about the client's original transport protocol
parameters when supplied by trusted proxies.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Proxy Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Wire Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. Presentation Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.5. Signed DNS Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
It is becoming more commonplace to install front end proxy devices in
front of DNS servers [RFC1035] to provide load balancing or to
perform transport layer conversions (e.g. to add DNS over TLS
[RFC7858] to a DNS server that lacks native support).
This has the unfortunate side effect of hiding the clients' source IP
addresses from the server, making it harder to employ server-side
technologies that rely on knowing those addresses (e.g. ACLs, DNS
Response Rate Limiting, etc).
This document defines a DNS meta resource record (RR) that allows a
DNS server to receive information about the client's original
transport protocol parameters when supplied by trusted proxies.
Whilst in some circumstances it would be possible to re-use the
Client Subnet EDNS Option [RFC7871] to carry a subset of this
information, a new RR is defined to allow both this feature and the
Client Subnet Option to co-exist in the same packet.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The word "proxy" in this document means a network component that sits
on the inbound query path in front of a recursive or authoritative
DNS server, receiving DNS queries from clients and dispatching them
to local servers. This is to distinguish these from a "forwarder"
since that term is usually understood to describe a network component
that sits on the outbound query path of a client.
3. Description
The XPF RR contains the entire 5-tuple of (protocol, source address,
destination address, source port and destination port) of the packet
received from the client by the proxy.
The presence of the source address supports use of ACLs based on the
client's IP address.
The source port allows for ACLs to support Carrier Grade NAT whereby
different end-users might share a single IP address.
The destination address supports scenarios where the server behaviour
depends upon the packet destination (e.g. BIND view's "match-
destinations" option)
The protocol and destination port fields allow server behaviour to
vary depending on whether DNS over TLS [RFC7858] or DNS over DTLS
[RFC8094] are in use.
3.1. Proxy Processing
Proxies MUST append this RR to the Additional Section of each request
packet received (and update the ARCOUNT field accordingly) before
sending it to the intended DNS server.
If this RR is already present in an incoming request it MUST be
stripped from the request unless the request was received from an
upstream proxy that is itself white-listed by the receiving proxy
(i.e. if the proxies are configured in a multi-tier architecture), in
which case the original value the RRs MUST be preserved.
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Where multiple XPF RRs to appear in a request their ordering MUST
also be preserved.
<< TODO: what about truncation on the client -> server path? >>
3.2. Server Processing
When this RR is received from a white-listed client the DNS server
SHOULD use the transport information contained therein in preference
to the packet's own transport information for any data processing
logic (e.g. ACLs) that would otherwise depend on the latter.
If this RR is received from a non-white-listed client the server MUST
return a REFUSED response.
If a server finds this RR anywhere other than in the Additional
Section of a request it MUST return a REFUSED response.
If the value of the RR's IP version field is not understood by the
server it MUST return a REFUSED response.
If the length of the IP addresses contained in the RR are not
consistent with that expected for the given IP version then the
server MUST return a FORMERR response.
Servers MUST NOT send this RR in DNS responses.
3.3. Wire Format
The XPF RR is formatted like any standard RR, but none of the fields
except RDLENGTH and RDATA have any meaning in this specification.
All multi-octet fields are transmitted in network order (i.e. big-
endian).
The required values of the RR header fields are as follows:
NAME: MUST contain a single 0 octet (i.e. the root domain).
TYPE: MUST contain TBD1 (XPF).
CLASS: MUST contain 1 (IN).
TTL: MUST contain 0 (zero).
RDLENGTH: specifies the length in octets of the RDATA field.
The RDATA of the XPF RR is as follows:
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+0 (MSB) +1 (LSB)
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
0: | Unused | IP Version | Protocol |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
2: | Source Address Octet 0 | ... |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| ... /// |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| Destination Address Octet 0 | ... |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| ... /// |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| Source Port |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| Destination Port |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Unused: Currently reserved. These bits MUST be zero unless redefined
in a subsequent specification.
IP Version: The IP protocol version number used by the client, as
defined in the IANA IP Version Number Registry [IANA-IP].
Implementations MUST support IPv4 (4) and IPv6 (6).
Protocol: The Layer 4 protocol number (e.g. UDP or TCP) as defined
in the IANA Protocol Number Registry [IANA-PROTO].
Source Address: The source IP address of the client.
Destination Address: The destination IP address of the request, i.e.
the IP address of the proxy on which the request was received.
Source Port: The source port used by the client.
Destination Port: The destination port of the request.
The length of the Source Address and Destination Address fields will
be variable depending on the IP Version in use.
3.4. Presentation Format
Since this is a "meta" RR that cannot appear in master format zone
files no presentation format is defined.
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3.5. Signed DNS Requests
Any XPF RRs found in a packet MUST be ignored for the purposes of
verifying any signatures used for Secret Key Transaction
Authentication for DNS [RFC2845] or DNS Request and Transaction
Signatures (SIG(0)) [RFC2931].
Similarly, if either TSIG or SIG(0) are configured between the proxy
and server then any XPF RRs MUST be ignored when the proxy calculates
the packet signature.
4. Security Considerations
If the white-list of trusted proxies is implemented as a list of IP
addresses, the server administrator MUST have the ability to
selectively disable this feature for any transport where there is a
possibility of the proxy's source address being spoofed.
This does not mean to imply that use over UDP is impossible - if for
example the network architecture keeps all proxy-to-server traffic on
a dedicated network and clients have no direct access to the servers
then the proxies' source addresses can be considered unspoofable.
5. Privacy Considerations
Used incorrectly, this RR could expose internal network information,
however it is not intended for use on proxy / forwarder devices that
sit on the client-side of a DNS request.
This specification is only intended for use on server-side proxy
devices that are under the same administrative control as the DNS
servers themselves. As such there is no change in the scope within
which any private information might be shared.
Use other than as described above would be contrary to the principles
of [RFC6973].
6. IANA Considerations
<< a copy of the RFC 6895 IANA RR TYPE application template will
appear here >>
7. Acknowledgements
Mark Andrews, Robert Edmonds, Duane Wessels
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[IANA-IP] IANA, "IANA IP Version Registry", n.d.,
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/version-numbers/>.
[IANA-PROTO]
IANA, "IANA Protocol Number Registry", n.d.,
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B.
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
(TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>.
[RFC2931] Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures
( SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, DOI 10.17487/RFC2931, September
2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2931>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, DOI
10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
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[RFC7871] Contavalli, C., van der Gaast, W., Lawrence, D., and W.
Kumari, "Client Subnet in DNS Queries", RFC 7871, DOI
10.17487/RFC7871, May 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7871>.
[RFC8094] Reddy, T., Wing, D., and P. Patil, "DNS over Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 8094, DOI 10.17487/
RFC8094, February 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8094>.
Authors' Addresses
Ray Bellis
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.
950 Charter Street
Redwood City CA 94063
USA
Phone: +1 650 423 1200
Email: ray@isc.org
Peter van Dijk
PowerDNS.COM B.V.
Den Haag
The Netherlands
Email: peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com
Remi Gacogne
PowerDNS.COM B.V.
Den Haag
The Netherlands
Email: remi.gacogne@powerdns.com
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