IANA Rules for the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
draft-arkko-pana-iana-02

Network Working Group                                           J. Arkko
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Updates: 5191 (if approved)                                     A. Yegin
Intended status: Standards Track                                 Samsung
Expires: August 20, 2010                               February 16, 2010

 IANA Rules for PANA (Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
                                Access)
                        draft-arkko-pana-iana-02

Abstract

   This document relaxes the IANA rules for the Protocol for Carrying
   Authentication for Network Access (PANA).

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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   This document relaxes the IANA rules for the Protocol for Carrying
   Authentication for Network Access (PANA) [RFC5191].  Rules for the
   following protocol fields, all defined in [RFC5191], are affected:

   o  Message Type

   o  Message Flags

   o  Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) Flags

   o  Result-Code AVP Value

   o  Termination-Cause AVP Value

   The rationale for this update is that there can be situations where
   it makes sense to grant an allocation under special circumstances.
   At the time of writing this, one such allocation is currently in the
   approval process at the IETF.  By changing the current IANA rules to
   allow also for IESG Approval [RFC5226], it becomes possible for the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) to consider an allocation
   request, even if it does not fulfill the default rule.  For instance,
   an experimental protocol extension could perhaps deserve an
   allocation from a field of reserved bits, as long as a sufficient
   number of bits still remains for other purposes, and the PANA
   community is happy with such an allocation.

2.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to updated the registries related to PANA Message
   Types, Message Flags, AVP Flags, Result-Code AVP Values, and
   Termination-Cause AVP Values as specified below.  All other PANA IANA
   registries are to remain unchanged.

2.1.  Message Type

   The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages.
   Message Type 0 is not used and is not assigned by IANA.  The range of
   values 1 - 65,519 are for permanent, standard message types,

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   allocated by IETF Review or IESG approval [RFC5226].  Previously, the
   rule for this range was allocation by IETF Review only.  [RFC5191]
   defined the range of values 1 - 4.  The same Message Type is used for
   both the request and the answer messages, except for type 1.  The
   Request bit distinguishes requests from answers.

   The range of values 65,520 - 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfff0 -
   0xffff) are reserved for experimental messages.  As these codes are
   only for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for
   interoperability between the communicating PANA Client (PaC) and PANA
   Authentication Agent (PAA) using experimental commands, as outlined
   in [RFC3692].

2.2.  Message Flags

   There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA message header.
   Section 6.2 of [RFC5191] assigned bit 0 ('R'), 1 ('S'), 2 ('C'), 3
   ('A'), 4 ('P'), and 5 ('I').  Allocations from the remaining free
   bits in the PANA header Flag field are done via Standards Action or
   IESG Approval [RFC5226].  Previously, the rule for these bits was
   allocation by Standards Action only.

2.3.  AVP Flags

   There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined
   in Section 6.3 of [RFC5191].  That RFC also assigned bit 0 ('V').
   The remaining bits are assigned via a Standards Action or IESG
   Approval [RFC5226].  Previously, the rule for these bits was
   allocation by Standards Action only.

2.4.  Result-Code AVP Values

   As defined in Section 8.7 of [RFC5191], the Result-Code AVP (AVP Code
   7) defines the values 0-2.

   All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Review or
   IESG Approval [RFC5226].  Previously, the rule for these bits was
   allocation by IETF Review only.

2.5.  Termination-Cause AVP Values

   As defined in Section 8.9 of [RFC5191], the Termination-Cause AVP
   (AVP Code 9) defines the values 1, 4, and 8.

   All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Review or
   IESG Approval [RFC5226].  Previously, the rule for these bits was
   allocation by IETF Review only.

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3.  Security Considerations

   This specification does not change the security properties of PANA.

   However, a few words are necessary about the use of the experimental
   code points defined in Section 2.1.  Potentially harmful side-effects
   from the use of the experimental values needs to be carefully
   evaluated before deploying any experiment across networks that the
   owner of the experiment does not entirely control.  Guidance given in
   [RFC3692] about the use of experimental values needs to be followed.

4.  References

4.1.  Normative References

   [RFC5191]  Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A.
              Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
              Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

4.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3692]  Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers
              Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.

Appendix A.  Changes from RFC 5191

   This document changes the IANA rules for the Message Type, Message
   Flags, AVP Flags, Result-Code AVP Value, and Termination-Cause AVP
   Value.

Appendix B.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Yoshihiro Ohba, Ralph Droms, Magnus
   Westerlund, and Alfred Hoenes for reviews and comments on this topic.

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Authors' Addresses

   Jari Arkko
   Ericsson
   Jorvas  02420
   Finland

   Email: jari.arkko@piuha.net

   Alper Yegin
   Samsung
   Istanbul
   Turkey

   Email: alper.yegin@yegin.org

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