Challenges and Changes in the Internet Threat Model
draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-00
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Network Working Group J. Arkko
Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Informational S. Farrell
Expires: May 7, 2020 Trinity College Dublin
November 04, 2019
Challenges and Changes in the Internet Threat Model
draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-00
Abstract
Communications security has been at the center of many security
improvements in the Internet. The goal has been to ensure that
communications are protected against outside observers and attackers.
This memo suggests that the existing threat model, while important
and still valid, is no longer alone sufficient to cater for the
pressing security issues in the Internet. For instance, it is also
necessary to protect systems against endpoints that are compromised,
malicious, or whose interests simply do not align with the interests
of the users. While such protection is difficult, there are some
measures that can be taken.
It is particularly important to ensure that as we continue to develop
Internet technology, non-communications security related threats are
properly understood.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020.
Arkko & Farrell Expires May 7, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Internet Threat Model Evolution November 2019
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Communications Security Improvements . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Beyond Communications Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.1. Deliberate adversarial behaviour in applications . . 8
2.3.2. Inadvertent adversarial behaviours . . . . . . . . . 13
3. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1. The Role of End-to-end . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2. Trusted networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.1. Even closed networks can have compromised nodes . . . 17
3.3. Balancing Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4. Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1. Basic Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2. Potential Further Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2.1. Consider ABuse-cases as well as use-cases . . . . . . 20
4.2.2. Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2.3. Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2.4. Minimise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.5. Same-Origin Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.6. Greasing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.7. Generalise OAuth Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.8. Look again at how well we're securing infrastructure 22
4.2.9. Consider recovery from attack as part of protocol
design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2.10. Don't think in terms of hosts . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3. Does IETF Analysis of Protocols Need to Change? . . . . . 23
4.3.1. Develop a BCP for privacy considerations . . . . . . 23
4.3.2. Re-consider protocol design "lore" . . . . . . . . . 23
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