Challenges and Changes in the Internet Threat Model
draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-03

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2020-03-09
Replaces draft-farrell-etm
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Network Working Group                                           J. Arkko
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                                S. Farrell
Expires: September 10, 2020                       Trinity College Dublin
                                                          March 09, 2020

          Challenges and Changes in the Internet Threat Model
                  draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-03

Abstract

   Communications security has been at the center of many security
   improvements in the Internet.  The goal has been to ensure that
   communications are protected against outside observers and attackers.

   This memo suggests that the existing RFC 3552 threat model, while
   important and still valid, is no longer alone sufficient to cater for
   the pressing security and privacy issues seen on the Internet today.
   For instance, it is often also necessary to protect against endpoints
   that are compromised, malicious, or whose interests simply do not
   align with the interests of users.  While such protection is
   difficult, there are some measures that can be taken and we argue
   that investigation of these issues is warranted.

   It is particularly important to ensure that as we continue to develop
   Internet technology, non-communications security related threats, and
   privacy issues, are properly understood.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2020.

Arkko & Farrell        Expires September 10, 2020               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution          March 2020

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Observations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Communications Security Improvements  . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Beyond Communications Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.3.1.  Deliberate adversarial behaviour in applications  . .   9
       2.3.2.  Inadvertent adversarial behaviours  . . . . . . . . .  15
   3.  Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.1.  The Role of End-to-end  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.2.  Trusted networks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.2.1.  Even closed networks can have compromised nodes . . .  19
     3.3.  Balancing Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   4.  Areas requiring more study  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   5.  Guidelines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   6.  Potential changes in BCP 72/RFC 3552  . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     6.1.  Simple change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     6.2.  Additional discussion of compromises  . . . . . . . . . .  29
     6.3.  Guidance with regards to communications security  . . . .  29
       6.3.1.  Limiting time scope of compromise . . . . . . . . . .  29
       6.3.2.  Forcing active attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       6.3.3.  Traffic analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       6.3.4.  Containing compromise of trust points . . . . . . . .  31
   7.  Potential Changes in BCP 188/RFC 7258 . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   8.  Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   9.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   Appendix A.  Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
Show full document text