Challenges and Changes in the Internet Threat Model
draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-00

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Network Working Group                                           J. Arkko
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                                S. Farrell
Expires: May 7, 2020                              Trinity College Dublin
                                                       November 04, 2019

          Challenges and Changes in the Internet Threat Model
                  draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-00

Abstract

   Communications security has been at the center of many security
   improvements in the Internet.  The goal has been to ensure that
   communications are protected against outside observers and attackers.

   This memo suggests that the existing threat model, while important
   and still valid, is no longer alone sufficient to cater for the
   pressing security issues in the Internet.  For instance, it is also
   necessary to protect systems against endpoints that are compromised,
   malicious, or whose interests simply do not align with the interests
   of the users.  While such protection is difficult, there are some
   measures that can be taken.

   It is particularly important to ensure that as we continue to develop
   Internet technology, non-communications security related threats are
   properly understood.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020.

Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Observations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Communications Security Improvements  . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Beyond Communications Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.3.1.  Deliberate adversarial behaviour in applications  . .   8
       2.3.2.  Inadvertent adversarial behaviours  . . . . . . . . .  13
   3.  Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.1.  The Role of End-to-end  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.2.  Trusted networks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.2.1.  Even closed networks can have compromised nodes . . .  17
     3.3.  Balancing Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   4.  Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.1.  Basic Guidelines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.2.  Potential Further Guidelines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       4.2.1.  Consider ABuse-cases as well as use-cases . . . . . .  20
       4.2.2.  Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       4.2.3.  Transparency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       4.2.4.  Minimise  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       4.2.5.  Same-Origin Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       4.2.6.  Greasing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       4.2.7.  Generalise OAuth Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       4.2.8.  Look again at how well we're securing infrastructure   22
       4.2.9.  Consider recovery from attack as part of protocol
               design  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       4.2.10. Don't think in terms of hosts . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     4.3.  Does IETF Analysis of Protocols Need to Change? . . . . .  23
       4.3.1.  Develop a BCP for privacy considerations  . . . . . .  23
       4.3.2.  Re-consider protocol design "lore"  . . . . . . . . .  23