RFC 3552 additions due to evolving Internet thread model
draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-3552-additions-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Jari Arkko  , Stephen Farrell 
Last updated 2020-07-13
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Network Working Group                                           J. Arkko
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                                S. Farrell
Expires: January 15, 2021                         Trinity College Dublin
                                                           July 14, 2020

        RFC 3552 additions due to evolving Internet thread model
           draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-3552-additions-00

Abstract

   Communications security has been at the center of many security
   improvements in the Internet.  The goal has been to ensure that
   communications are protected against outside observers and attackers.

   This memo suggests additions to the RFC 3552 threat model to cater
   for the evolving security and privacy issues seen on the Internet
   today.  For instance, it is often also necessary to protect against
   endpoints that are compromised, malicious, or whose interests simply
   do not align with the interests of users.  While such protection is
   difficult, there are some measures that can be taken and we argue
   that investigation of these issues is warranted.

Status of This Memo

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Arkko & Farrell         Expires January 15, 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             RFC 3552 additions                  July 2020

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  The range of potential changes in BCP 72/RFC 3552 . . . . . .   3
   3.  Simple change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Change to add discussion of compromises . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Change to add guidance with regards to communications
       security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Limiting time scope of compromise . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  Forcing active attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.3.  Traffic analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.4.  Containing compromise of trust points . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix A.  Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   Communications security has been at the center of many security
   improvements in the Internet.  The goal has been to ensure that
   communications are protected against outside observers and attackers.
   At the IETF, this approach has been formalized in BCP 72 [RFC3552],
   which defined the Internet threat model in 2003.

   The purpose of a threat model is to outline what threats exist in
   order to assist the protocol designer.  But RFC 3552 also ruled some
   threats to be in scope and of primary interest, and some threats out
   of scope [RFC3552]:

      The Internet environment has a fairly well understood threat
      model.  In general, we assume that the end-systems engaging in a
      protocol exchange have not themselves been compromised.
      Protecting against an attack when one of the end-systems has been
      compromised is extraordinarily difficult.  It is, however,
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