DNS Error Reporting
draft-arends-dns-error-reporting-00
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Active Internet-Draft (individual)
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Roy Arends
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Matt Larson
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2020-10-30
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Independent Submission R. Arends
Internet-Draft M. Larson
Intended status: Standards Track ICANN
Expires: May 1, 2021 October 28, 2020
DNS Error Reporting
draft-arends-dns-error-reporting-00
Abstract
DNS Error Reporting is a lightweight error reporting mechanism that
provides the operator of an authoritative server with reports on DNS
resource records that fail to resolve or validate, that a Domain
Owner or DNS Hosting organization can use to improve domain hosting.
The reports are based on Extended DNS Errors [RFC8914].
When a domain name fails to resolve or validate due to a
misconfiguration or an attack, the operator of the authoritative
server may be unaware of this. To mitigate this lack of feedback,
this document describes a method for a validating recursive resolver
to automatically signal an error to an agent specified by the
authoritative server. DNS Error Reporting uses the DNS to report
errors.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 1, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Requirements Notation
3. Terminology
4. Overview
4.1. Managing Caching Optimizations
4.2. Example
5. EDNS0 Option Specification
6. DNS Error Reporting Specification
6.1. Reporting Resolver Specification
6.1.1. Constructing the Reporting Query
6.2. Authoritative Server Specification
6.3. Reporting Agent Specification
6.4. Choosing a Reporting Agent Domain
7. Limitations
8. IANA Considerations
9. Security Considerations
10. Acknowledgements
11. Informative References
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
When an authoritative server serves a stale DNSSEC signed zone, the
cryptographic signatures over the resource record sets (RRsets) may
have lapsed. A validating recursive resolver will fail to validate
these resource records.
Similarly, when there is a mismatch between the DS records at a
parent zone and the key signing key at the child zone, a validating
recursive resolver will fail to authenticate records in the child
zone.
These are two of several failure scenarios that may go unnoticed for
some time by the operator of a zone.
There is no direct relationship between operators of validating
recursive resolvers and authoritative servers. Outages are often
noticed indirectly, by end users, and reported via social media, if
reported at all.
When records fail to validate there is no facility to report this
failure in an automated way. If there is any indication that an
error or warning has happened, it is buried in log files of the
validating resolver, if these errors are logged at all.
This document describes a facility that can be used by validating
recursive resolvers to report errors in an automated way.
It allows an authoritative server to signal a reporting agent where
the validating recursive resolver can report issues if it is
configured to do so.
The burden of reporting a failure falls on the validating recursive
resolver. It is important that the effort needed to report failure
is low, with minimal impact to its main functions. To accomplish
this goal, the DNS itself is utilized to report the error.
2. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
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