Alternative Challenge Password Attributes for Enrollment over Secure Transport
RFC 7894
Document | Type |
RFC
- Proposed Standard
(June 2016)
Was
draft-wallace-est-alt-challenge
(individual)
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Max Pritikin , Carl Wallace | ||
Last updated | 2016-06-08 | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats | |||
IESG | Responsible AD | Stephen Farrell | |
Send notices to | (None) |
RFC 7894
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Pritikin Request for Comments: 7894 Cisco Systems, Inc. Category: Standards Track C. Wallace ISSN: 2070-1721 Red Hound Software, Inc. June 2016 Alternative Challenge Password Attributes for Enrollment over Secure Transport Abstract This document defines a set of new Certificate Signing Request attributes for use with the Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) protocol. These attributes provide disambiguation of the existing overloaded uses for the challengePassword attribute defined in "PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0" (RFC 2985). Uses include the original certificate revocation password, common authentication password uses, and EST-defined linking of transport security identity. Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7894. Pritikin & Wallace Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 7894 EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes June 2016 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction ....................................................3 2. Terminology .....................................................4 3. Alternative Challenge Password Attributes .......................4 3.1. OTP Challenge Attribute ....................................4 3.2. Revocation Challenge Attribute .............................5 3.3. EST Identity Linking Attribute .............................5 4. Indicating Support for the Alternative Challenge Attributes .....6 5. Security Considerations .........................................6 6. IANA Considerations .............................................7 7. References ......................................................7 7.1. Normative References .......................................7 7.2. Informative References .....................................8 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module ..........................................9 Acknowledgements ..................................................10 Authors' Addresses ................................................10 Pritikin & Wallace Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 7894 EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes June 2016 1. Introduction "PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0" [RFC2985] defined a challengePassword attribute that has been overloaded by modern protocol usage with the appropriate interpretation being provided by context rather than OID definition. PKCS #9 defines the challengePassword attribute as "a password by which an entity may request certificate revocation". The parsing and embedding of this attribute within Certificate Signing Requests is well supported by common PKI toolsets, but many workflows leverage this supported field as a one-time password for authentication. For example, this is codified in many Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) implementations as indicated by [SCEP]. Continuing this trend, Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] defines an additional semantic for the challengePassword attribute in Section 3.5, in order to provide a linking of the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) to the secure transport. Where the context of the protocol operation fully defined the proper semantic, and when only one use was required at a time, the overloading of this field did not cause difficulties. Implementation experience with EST has shown this to be a limitation though. There are plausible use cases where it is valuable to use either of the existing methods separately or in concert. For example, an EST server might require the client to authenticate itself using the existing client X.509 certificate as well as the user's username and password, and to include a one-time password within the CSR, all while maintaining identity linking to bind the CSR to the secure transport. The overloading of a single attribute type should not be the limiting factor for administrators attempting to meet their security requirements. This document defines the otpChallenge attribute for use when a one- time password (OTP) value within the CSR is a requirement. The revocationChallenge attribute is defined to allow disambiguated usage of the original challenge password attribute semantics for certificate revocation. The estIdentityLinking attribute is defined to reference existing EST challenge password semantics with no potential for confusion with legacy challenge password practices. The attributes defined in this specification supplement existing EST mechanisms and are not intended to displace current usage of any existing EST authentication mechanisms. Conveying the authentication value itself as an attribute may be preferable to using an HTTP or Transport Layer Security (TLS) password or other TLS authentication mechanism in environments where the certificate request processing component is removed from the HTTP/TLS termination point, for example, when a web application firewall is used. Pritikin & Wallace Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 7894 EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes June 2016 2. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 3. Alternative Challenge Password Attributes The following sections describe three alternative challenge password attributes for use with EST [RFC7030]. Appendix A provides an ASN.1 module containing the new definitions. Each attribute described below is defined as a DirectoryString with a maximum length of 255, which features several possible encoding options. Attribute values generated in accordance this document SHOULD use the PrintableString encoding whenever possible. If internationalization issues make this impossible, the UTF8String alternative SHOULD be used. Attribute processing systems MUST be able to recognize and process the PrintableString and UTF8String string types in DirectoryString values. Support for other string types is OPTIONAL. 3.1. OTP Challenge Attribute The otpChallenge attribute is defined as a DirectoryString with a maximum length of 255. This is consistent with the challengePassword attribute as originally defined in PKCS #9 [RFC2985]. The otpChallenge attribute is identified by the id-aa-otpChallenge object identifier. This facilitates reuse of the existing challengePassword code by associating the new object identifiers with the existing parsing and generation code. This attribute provides a means of conveying a one-time password value as part of a CSR request. Generation, verification, storage, etc., of the value is not addressed by this specification. [RFC4226] and [RFC6238] define one- time password mechanisms that MAY be used with this attribute. ub-aa-otpChallenge INTEGER ::= 255 id-aa-otpChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 56 } otpChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-aa-otpChallenge} EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseExactMatch SINGLE VALUE TRUE ID id-aa-otpChallenge } Pritikin & Wallace Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 7894 EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes June 2016 Note that following DTLS-SRTP procedures for the [I-D.ietf-perc-double] cipher, the endpoint will generate both E2E and HBH encryption keys and salt values. Endpoints MAY use the DTLS- SRTP generated E2E key for transmission or MAY generate a fresh E2E key. In either case, the generated SRTP master salt for E2E encryption MUST be replaced with the salt value provided by the Key Distributor via the EKTKey message. That is because every endpoint in the conference uses the same SRTP master salt. The endpoint only transmits the SRTP master key (not the salt) used for E2E encryption to other endpoints in RTP/RTCP packets per [I-D.ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet]. Media Distributors use DTLS-SRTP [RFC5764] directly with a peer Media Distributor to establish the HBH key for transmitting RTP and RTCP packets to that peer Media Distributor. The Key Distributor does not facilitate establishing a HBH key for use between Media Distributors. 4.5.2. Key Exchange during a Conference Following the initial key information exchange with the Key Distributor, an endpoint will be able to encrypt media end-to-end with an E2E key, sending that E2E key to other endpoints encrypted with the KEK, and will be able to encrypt and authenticate RTP packets using a HBH key. The procedures defined do not allow the Media Distributor to gain access to the KEK information, preventing it from gaining access to any endpoint's E2E key and subsequently decrypting media. The KEK (i.e., EKT Key) may need to change from time-to-time during the life of a conference, such as when a new participant joins or leaves a conference. Dictating if, when or how often a conference is to be re-keyed is outside the scope of this document, but this framework does accommodate re-keying during the life of a conference. When a Key Distributor decides to re-key a conference, it transmits a specific message defined in PERC EKT [I-D.ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet] to each of the conference participants. The endpoint MUST create a new SRTP master key and prepare to send that key inside a Full EKT Field using the new EKTKey. Since it may take some time for all of the endpoints in conference to finish re-keying, senders MUST delay a short period of time before sending media encrypted with the new master key, but it MUST be prepared to make use of the information from a new inbound EKT Key immediately. See Section 2.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet]. Endpoints MAY follow the procedures in section 5.2 of [RFC5764] to re-negotiate HBH keys as desired. If new HBH keys are generated, the Jones, et al. Expires March 8, 2019 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Private Media Framework September 2018 new keys are also delivered to the Media Distributor following the procedures defined in [I-D.ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel]. Endpoints are at liberty to change the E2E encryption key used at any time. Endpoints MUST generate a new E2E encryption key whenever it receives a new EKT Key. After switching to a new key, the new key will be conveyed to other endpoints in the conference in RTP/RTCP packets per [I-D.ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet]. 5. Authentication It is important to this solution framework that the entities can validate the authenticity of other entities, especially the Key Distributor and endpoints. The details of this are outside the scope of specification but a few possibilities are discussed in the following sections. The key requirements is that endpoints can verify they are connected to the correct Key Distributor for the conference and the Key Distributor can verify the endpoints are the correct endpoints for the conference. Two possible approaches to solve this are Identity Assertions and Certificate Fingerprints. 5.1. Identity Assertions WebRTC Identity assertion [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch] can be used to bind the identity of the user of the endpoint to the fingerprint of the DTLS-SRTP certificate used for the call. This certificate is unique for a given call and a conference. This allows the Key Distributor to ensure that only authorized users participate in the conference. Similarly the Key Distributor can create a WebRTC Identity assertion to bind the fingerprint of the unique certificate used by the Key Distributor for this conference so that the endpoint can validate it is talking to the correct Key Distributor. Such a setup requires an Identity Provider (Idp) trusted by the endpoints and the Key Distributor. 5.2. Certificate Fingerprints in Session Signaling Entities managing session signaling are generally assumed to be untrusted in the PERC framework. However, there are some deployment scenarios where parts of the session signaling may be assumed trustworthy for the purposes of exchanging, in a manner that can be authenticated, the fingerprint of an entity's certificate. As a concrete example, SIP [RFC3261] and SDP [RFC4566] can be used to convey the fingerprint information per [RFC5763]. An endpoint's SIP User Agent would send an INVITE message containing SDP for the media Jones, et al. Expires March 8, 2019 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Private Media Framework September 2018 session along with the endpoint's certificate fingerprint, which can be signed using the procedures described in [RFC4474] for the benefit of forwarding the message to other entities by the Focus [RFC4353]. Other entities can now verify the fingerprints match the certificates found in the DTLS-SRTP connections to find the identity of the far end of the DTLS-SRTP connection and check that is the authorized entity. Ultimately, if using session signaling, an endpoint's certificate fingerprint would need to be securely mapped to a user and conveyed to the Key Distributor so that it can check that that user is authorized. Similarly, the Key Distributor's certificate fingerprint can be conveyed to endpoint in a manner that can be authenticated as being an authorized Key Distributor for this conference. 5.3. Conferences Identification The Key Distributor needs to know what endpoints are being added to a given conference. Thus, the Key Distributor and the Media Distributor will need to know endpoint-to-conference mappings, which is enabled by exchanging a conference-specific unique identifier as defined in [I-D.ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel]. How this unique identifier is assigned is outside the scope of this document. 6. Security Considerations This framework, and the individual protocols defined to support it, must take care to not increase the exposure to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by untrusted or third-party entities and should take measures to mitigate, where possible, more serious DoS attacks from on-path and off-path attackers. The following section enumerates the kind of attacks that will be considered in the development of this framework's solution. 6.1. Third Party Attacks On-path attacks are mitigated by HBH integrity protection and encryption. The integrity protection mitigates packet modification and encryption makes selective blocking of packets harder, but not impossible. Off-path attackers may try connecting to different PERC entities and send specifically crafted packets. A successful attacker might be able to get the Media Distributor to forward such packets. If not making use of HBH authentication on the Media Distributor, such an attack could only be detected in the receiving endpoints where the forged packets would finally be dropped. Jones, et al. Expires March 8, 2019 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Private Media Framework September 2018 Another potential attack is a third party claiming to be a Media Distributor, fooling endpoints in to sending packets to the false Media Distributor instead of the correct one. The deceived sending endpoints could incorrectly assuming their packets have been delivered to endpoints when they in fact have not. Further, the false Media Distributor may cascade to another legitimate Media Distributor creating a false version of the real conference. This attack can be mitigated by the false Media Distributor not being authenticated by the Key Distributor during PERC Tunnel establishment. Without the tunnel in place, endpoints will not establish secure associations with the Key Distributor and receive the KEK, causing the conference to not proceed. 6.2. Media Distributor Attacks The Media Distributor can attack the session in a number of possible ways. 6.2.1. Denial of service Any modification of the end-to-end authenticated data will result in the receiving endpoint getting an integrity failure when performing authentication on the received packet. The Media Distributor can also attempt to perform resource consumption attacks on the receiving endpoint. One such attack would be to insert random SSRC/CSRC values in any RTP packet with an inband key-distribution message attached (i.e., Full EKT Field). Since such a message would trigger the receiver to form a new cryptographic context, the Media Distributor can attempt to consume the receiving endpoints resources. Another denial of service attack is where the Media Distributor rewrites the PT field to indicate a different codec. The effect of this attack is that any payload packetized and encoded according to one RTP payload format is then processed using another payload format and codec. Assuming that the implementation is robust to random input, it is unlikely to cause crashes in the receiving software/ hardware. However, it is not unlikely that such rewriting will cause severe media degradation. For audio formats, this attack is likely to cause highly disturbing audio and/or can be damaging to hearing and playout equipment. Jones, et al. Expires March 8, 2019 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Private Media Framework September 2018 6.2.2. Replay Attack Replay attack is when an already received packets from a previous point in the RTP stream is replayed as new packet. This could, for example, allow a Media Distributor to transmit a sequence of packets identified as a user saying "yes", instead of the "no" the user actually said. The mitigation for a replay attack is to prevent old packets beyond a small-to-modest jitter and network re-ordering sized window to be rejected. End-to-end replay protection MUST be provided for the whole duration of the conference. 6.2.3. Delayed Playout Attack The delayed playout attack is a variant of the replay attack. This attack is possible even if E2E replay protection is in place. However, due to fact that the Media Distributor is allowed to select a sub-set of streams and not forward the rest to a receiver, such as in forwarding only the most active speakers, the receiver has to accept gaps in the E2E packet sequence. The issue with this is that a Media Distributor can select to not deliver a particular stream for a while. Within the window from last packet forwarded to the receiver and the latest received by the Media Distributor, the Media Distributor can select an arbitrary starting point when resuming forwarding packets. Thus what the media source said can be substantially delayed at the receiver with the receiver believing that it is what was said just now, and only delayed due to transport delay. 6.2.4. Splicing Attack The splicing attack is an attack where a Media Distributor receiving multiple media sources splices one media stream into the other. If the Media Distributor is able to change the SSRC without the receiver having any method for verifying the original source ID, then the Media Distributor could first deliver stream A and then later forward stream B under the same SSRC as stream A was previously using. Not allowing the Media Distributor to change the SSRC mitigates this attack. 7. IANA Considerations There are no IANA considerations for this document. Jones, et al. Expires March 8, 2019 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Private Media Framework September 2018 8. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Mo Zanaty and Christian Oien for invaluable input on this document. Also, we would like to acknowledge Nermeen Ismail for serving on the initial versions of this document as a co-author. 9. References 9.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-perc-double] Jennings, C., Jones, P., Barnes, R., and A. Roach, "SRTP Double Encryption Procedures", draft-ietf-perc-double-09 (work in progress), May 2018. [I-D.ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel] Jones, P., Ellenbogen, P., and N. Ohlmeier, "DTLS Tunnel between a Media Distributor and Key Distributor to Facilitate Key Exchange", draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-03 (work in progress), April 2018. [I-D.ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet] Jennings, C., Mattsson, J., McGrew, D., Wing, D., and F. Andreasen, "Encrypted Key Transport for DTLS and Secure RTP", draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-08 (work in progress), July 2018. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V. Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550, July 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3550>. [RFC6904] Lennox, J., "Encryption of Header Extensions in the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 6904, DOI 10.17487/RFC6904, April 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6904>. 9.2. Informative References [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch] Rescorla, E., "WebRTC Security Architecture", draft-ietf- rtcweb-security-arch-15 (work in progress), July 2018. Jones, et al. Expires March 8, 2019 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Private Media Framework September 2018 [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>. [RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K. Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 3711, DOI 10.17487/RFC3711, March 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711>. [RFC4353] Rosenberg, J., "A Framework for Conferencing with the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4353, DOI 10.17487/RFC4353, February 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4353>. [RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, DOI 10.17487/RFC4474, August 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4474>. [RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session Description Protocol", RFC 4566, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566, July 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566>. [RFC5763] Fischl, J., Tschofenig, H., and E. Rescorla, "Framework for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 5763, DOI 10.17487/RFC5763, May 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5763>. [RFC5764] McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 5764, DOI 10.17487/RFC5764, May 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5764>. [RFC6464] Lennox, J., Ed., Ivov, E., and E. Marocco, "A Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) Header Extension for Client-to- Mixer Audio Level Indication", RFC 6464, DOI 10.17487/RFC6464, December 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6464>. [RFC7667] Westerlund, M. and S. Wenger, "RTP Topologies", RFC 7667, DOI 10.17487/RFC7667, November 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7667>. Jones, et al. Expires March 8, 2019 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Private Media Framework September 2018 Appendix A. PERC Key Inventory PERC specifies the use of a number of different keys and, understandably, it looks complicated or confusing on the surface. This section summarizes the various keys used in the system, how they are generated, and what purpose they serve. The keys are described in the order in which they would typically be acquired. The various keys used in PERC are shown in Figure 4 below. +-----------+----------------------------------------------------+ | Key | Description | +-----------+----------------------------------------------------+ | KEK | Key shared by all endpoints and used to encrypt | | (EKT Key) | each endpoint's SRTP master key so receiving | | | endpoints can decrypt media. | +-----------+----------------------------------------------------+ | HBH Key | Key used to encrypt media hop-by-hop. | +-----------+----------------------------------------------------+ | E2E Key | Key used to encrypt media end-to-end. | +-----------+----------------------------------------------------+ Figure 4: Key Inventory As you can see, the number key types is very small. However, what can be challenging is keeping track of all of the distinct E2E keys as the conference grows in size. With 1,000 participants in a conference, there will be 1,000 distinct SRTP master keys, all of which share the same master salt. Each of those keys are passed through the KDF defined in [RFC3711] to produce the actual encryption and authentication keys. Complicating key management is the fact that the KEK can change and, when it does, the endpoints generate new SRTP master keys. And, of course, there is a new SRTP master salt to go with those keys. Endpoints have to retain old keys for a period of time to ensure they can properly decrypt late-arriving or out-of- order packets. The time required to retain old keys (either EKT Keys or SRTP master keys) is not specified, but they should be retained at least for the period of time required to re-key the conference or handle late- arriving or out-of-order packets. A period of 60s should be considered a generous retention period, but endpoints may keep old keys on hand until the end of the conference. Or more detailed explanation of each of the keys follows. Jones, et al. Expires March 8, 2019 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Private Media Framework September 2018 A.1. DTLS-SRTP Exchange Yields HBH Keys The first set of keys acquired are for hop-by-hop encryption and decryption. Assuming the use of Double [I-D.ietf-perc-double], the endpoint would perform DTLS-SRTP exchange with the key distributor and receive a key that is, in fact, "double&3.2. Revocation Challenge Attribute The original PKCS #9 challengePassword field has been overloaded, and the common use is unclear. The revocationChallenge attribute defined here provides an unambiguous method of indicating the original PKCS #9 intent for this attribute type. The revocationChallenge attribute is identified by the id-aa-revocationChallenge object identifier. [RFC2985] discusses the original semantics for the PKCS #9 challenge password attribute. ub-aa-revocationChallenge INTEGER ::= 255 id-aa-revocationChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 57 } revocationChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-aa-revocationChallenge} EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseExactMatch SINGLE VALUE TRUE ID id-aa-revocationChallenge } 3.3. EST Identity Linking Attribute EST defines a mechanism for associating identity information from an authenticated TLS session with proof-of-possession information in a certificate request. The mechanism was labeled using the pkcs-9-at- challengePassword identifier from [RFC2985]. To avoid any confusion with the semantics described in [RFC2985] or any other specifications that similarly defined use of the PKCS #9 challenge password attribute for their own purposes, a new object identifier is defined here and associated with the semantics described in Section 3.5 of [RFC7030]. ub-aa-est-identity-linking INTEGER ::= 255 id-aa-estIdentityLinking OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 58 } estIdentityLinking ATTRIBUTE ::= { WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-aa-est-identity-linking} EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseExactMatch SINGLE VALUE TRUE ID id-aa-estIdentityLinking } Pritikin & Wallace Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 7894 EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes June 2016 4. Indicating Support for the Alternative Challenge Attributes The EST server MUST indicate these attributes, as the particular use case requires, in every CSR Attributes Response. An EST server MAY send both the estIdentityLinking attribute and the challengePassword attribute [RFC7030] in a CSR Attributes Response to ensure support for legacy clients. The client MUST include every indicated attribute for which it has values in the subsequent CSR. If a client sees an estIdentityLinking attribute in a CSR Attributes Response, it SHOULD prefer that and not include a challengePassword attribute [RFC7030] in the resulting CSR. EST clients that include an unsolicited estIdentityLinking attribute MAY also include the challengePassword attribute [RFC7030] to ensure support for legacy servers. EST servers MUST evaluate each challenge attribute independently. All challenge attributes included by an EST client MUST be successfully processed by an EST server for a request to be considered valid. The EST server MAY ignore challenge attributes according to local policy, for example, if the EST client is an authenticated Registration Authority, the EST server may ignore the estIdentityLinking attribute within a CSR (see Section 3.7 of [RFC7030]). The EST server MAY refuse enrollment requests that are not encoded according to the policy of the Certification Authority (CA). 5. Security Considerations In addition to the security considerations expressed in the EST specification [RFC7030], additional security considerations may be associated with the mechanism used to generate and verify the otpChallenge value. Where a one-time password is used, the security considerations expressed in "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm" [RFC4226] or "TOTP: Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm" [RFC6238] may be relevant. Similarly, the security considerations from [RFC2985] that apply to the challenge attribute are relevant as well. Pritikin & Wallace Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 7894 EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes June 2016 6. IANA Considerations Section 3 defines three attributes that have been assigned object identifiers in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Attributes (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2)" registry [RFC7107]: Value Description Reference -------- --------------------------------- ---------- 56 id-aa-otpChallenge RFC 7894 57 id-aa-revocationChallenge RFC 7894 58 id-aa-estIdentityLinking RFC 7894 Appendix A contains an ASN.1 module. A module identifier has been assigned in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry [RFC7299]. Value Description Reference -------- --------------------------------- ---------- 87 id-mod-EST-Alt-Challenge RFC 7894 7. References 7.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>. [RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>. [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>. Pritikin & Wallace Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 7894 EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes June 2016 [RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed., "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030, DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>. 7.2. Informative References [RFC4226] M'Raihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm", RFC 4226, DOI 10.17487/RFC4226, December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4226>. [RFC6238] M'Raihi, D., Machani, S., Pei, M., and J. Rydell, "TOTP: Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm", RFC 6238, DOI 10.17487/RFC6238, May 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6238>. [RFC7107] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group", RFC 7107, DOI 10.17487/RFC7107, January 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7107>. [RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>. [SCEP] Gutmann, P. and M. Pritikin, "Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol", Work in Progress, draft-gutmann-scep-02, March 2016. Pritikin & Wallace Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 7894 EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes June 2016 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module The following ASN.1 module includes the definitions to support usage of the attributes defined in this specification. Modules from [RFC5912] are imported (the original Standards Track source for the imported structures is [RFC5280] and [RFC5272]). Mod-EST-Alt-Challenge { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 87 } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS DirectoryString{} FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } ATTRIBUTE FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }; ub-aa-otpChallenge INTEGER ::= 255 id-aa-otpChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 56 } otpChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE DirectoryString {ub-aa-otpChallenge} COUNTS MIN 1 MAX 1 IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-otpChallenge } ub-aa-revocationChallenge INTEGER ::= 255 id-aa-revocationChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 57 } revocationChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE DirectoryString {ub-aa-revocationChallenge} COUNTS MIN 1 MAX 1 IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-revocationChallenge } Pritikin & Wallace Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 7894 EST Alternative Challenge Password Attributes June 2016 ub-aa-est-identity-linking INTEGER ::= 255 id-aa-estIdentityLinking OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 58 } estIdentityLinking ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE DirectoryString {ub-aa-est-identity-linking} COUNTS MIN 1 MAX 1 IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-estIdentityLinking } END Acknowledgements Thanks to Jim Schaad, Dan Harkins, Phil Scheffler, Geoff Beier, Mike Jenkins, and Deb Cooley for their feedback. Authors' Addresses Max Pritikin Cisco Systems, Inc. 510 McCarthy Drive Milpitas, CA 95035 United States Email: pritikin@cisco.com Carl Wallace Red Hound Software, Inc. Email: carl@redhoundsoftware.com Pritikin & Wallace Standards Track [Page 10]