Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) Discovery for Proxy Mobile IPv6
RFC 6097
Document | Type | RFC - Informational (February 2011) | |
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Jouni Korhonen , Vijay Devarapalli | ||
Last updated | 2015-10-14 | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats | |||
Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
IESG | Responsible AD | Jari Arkko | |
Send notices to | (None) |
RFC 6097
DOTS T. Reddy, Ed. Internet-Draft McAfee Intended status: Standards Track M. Boucadair, Ed. Expires: January 29, 2020 Orange P. Patil Cisco A. Mortensen Arbor Networks, Inc. N. Teague Iron Mountain Data Centers July 28, 2019 Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-37 Abstract This document specifies the DOTS signal channel, a protocol for signaling the need for protection against Distributed Denial-of- Service (DDoS) attacks to a server capable of enabling network traffic mitigation on behalf of the requesting client. A companion document defines the DOTS data channel, a separate reliable communication layer for DOTS management and configuration purposes. Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor) Please update these statements within the document with the RFC number to be assigned to this document: o "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;" o "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification"; o "| [RFCXXXX] |" o reference: RFC XXXX Please update this statement with the RFC number to be assigned to the following documents: o "RFC YYYY: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification (used to be I-D.ietf-dots-data- channel) Reddy, et al. Expires January 29, 2020 [Page 1] Internet-Draft DOTS Signal Channel Protocol July 2019 Please update TBD/TBD1/TBD2 statements with the assignments made by IANA to DOTS Signal Channel Protocol. Also, please update the "revision" date of the YANG modules. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on January 29, 2020. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Design Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. DOTS Signal Channel: Messages & Behaviors . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1. DOTS Server(s) Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2. CoAP URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.3. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . 10 4.4. DOTS Mitigation Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.4.1. Request Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Reddy, et al. Expires January 29, 2020 [Page 2]3. Discovery Solutions Based on Data from Lower Layers The following section discusses solutions where a MAG acquires information from layers below the IP layer. Based on this information, the MAG is able to determine which LMA to contact when the MN attaches to the MAG. The lower layers discussed here are not explicitly defined but include different radio access technologies and tunneling solutions such as an Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) [RFC5996] IPsec tunnel [RFC4303]. 3.1. Constructing the LMA FQDN from a Mobile Node Identity A MAG acquires an MN identity from lower layers. The MAG can use the information embedded in the identity to construct a generic LMA FQDN (based on some pre-configured formatting rules) and then proceed to resolve the LMA IP address(es) using the DNS. Obviously, the MN identity must embed information that can be used to uniquely identify the entity hosting and operating the LMA for the MN. Examples of such MN identities are the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and the Globally Unique Temporary User Equipment Identity (GUTI) [3GPP.23.003]. These MN identities contain information that can uniquely identify the operator to whom the subscription belongs. 3.2. Receiving the LMA FQDN or IP Address from Lower Layers The solution described here is similar to the solution discussed in Section 3.1. A MAG receives an LMA FQDN or an IP address from lower layers, for example, as a part of the normal lower-layer signaling when the MN attaches to the network. IKEv2 could be an existing example of such lower-layer signaling where IPsec is the "lower layer" for the MN [3GPP.24.302]. IKEv2 has an IKEv2 Identification - Responder (IDr) payload, which is used by the IKEv2 initiator (i.e., the MN in this case) to specify which of the responder's identities (i.e., the LMA in this case) it wants to talk to. And here the responder identity could be an FQDN or an IP address of the LMA (as the IKEv2 identification payload can be an IP address or an FQDN). Another existing example is the Access Point Name Information Element (APN IE) [3GPP.24.008] used in 3GPP radio network access signaling and capable of carrying an FQDN. However, in general, this means the MN is also the originator of the LMA information. The LMA information content as such can be transparent to the MN, meaning the MN does not associate the information with any LMA function. Korhonen & Devarapalli Informational [Page 5] RFC 6097 LMA Discovery February 2011 3.3. Constructing the LMA FQDN from a Service Name Some network access technologies (including tunneling solutions) allow the MN to signal the service name that identifies a particular service or the external network it wants to access [3GPP.24.302] [RFC5996]. If the MN-originated service name also embeds the information of the entity hosting the service, or the hosting information can be derived from other information available at the same time (e.g., see Section 3.1), then the MAG can construct a generic LMA FQDN (e.g., based on some pre-defined formatting rules) providing an access to the service or the external network. The pre-defined formatting rules [3GPP.23.003] are usually agreed on among operators that belong to the same inter-operator roaming consortium or by network infrastructure vendors defining an open networking system architecture. Once the MAG has the FQDN, it can proceed to resolve the LMA IP address(es) using the DNS. An example of such a service or external network name is the Access Point Name (APN) [3GPP.23.003] that contains the information of the operator providing the access to the given service or the external network. For example, an FQDN for an "ims" APN could be "ims.apn.epc.mnc015.mcc234.3gppnetwork.org". 4. Handover Considerations Whenever an MN moves and attaches to a new MAG in a PMIPv6 domain, all the MAGs that the MN attaches to should use the same LMA. If there is only one LMA per PMIPv6 domain, then there is no issue. If there is a context transfer mechanism available between the MAGs, then the new MAG knows the LMA information from the old MAG. Such a mechanism is described in [RFC5949]. If the MN-related context is not transferred between the MAGs, then a mechanism to deliver the current LMA information to the new MAG is required. Relying on DNS during handovers is not generally a working solution if the PMIPv6 domain has more than one LMA, unless the DNS consistently assigns a specific LMA for each given MN. In most cases described in Section 3, where the MAG derives the LMA FQDN, there is no prior knowledge whether the LMA FQDN resolves to one or more LMA IP address(es) in the PMIPv6 domain. However, depending on the deployment and deployment-related regulations (such as inter-operator roaming consortium agreements), the situation might not be this desperate. For example, a MAG might be able to synthesize an LMA-specific FQDN (e.g., out of an MN identity or some other Korhonen & Devarapalli Informational [Page 6] RFC 6097 LMA Discovery February 2011 service-specific parameters). Alternatively, the MAG could use (for example), an MN identity as an input to an algorithm that deterministically assigns the same LMA out of a pool of LMAs (assuming the MAG has, e.g., learned a group of LMA FQDNs via an SRV [RFC2782] query). These approaches would guarantee that DNS always returns the same LMA Address to the MAG. Once the MN completes its initial attachment to a PMIPv6 domain, the information about the LMA that is selected to serve the MN is stored in the policy store (or the AAA server). The LMA information is conveyed to the policy store by the LMA after the initial attachment is completed [RFC5779]. Typically, AAA infrastructure is used for exchanging information between the LMA and the policy store. When the MN moves and attaches to another MAG in the PMIPv6 domain, then the AAA server delivers the existing LMA information to the new MAG as part of the authentication and authorization procedure as described in Section 2.1. 5. Recommendations This document discussed several solution approaches for a dynamic LMA discovery. All discussed solution approaches actually require additional functionality or infrastructure support that the base PMIPv6 specification [RFC5213] does not require. Solutions in Section 3 all depend on lower layers being able to provide information that a MAG can then use to query the DNS and discover a suitable LMA. The capabilities of the lower layers and the interactions with them are generally out of scope of the IETF, and specific to a certain system and architecture. Solutions in Section 2 depend on the existence of an AAA infrastructure, which is able to provide to a MAG either an LMA IP address or an LMA FQDN. While there can be system- and architecture- specific details regarding the AAA interactions and the use of DNS, the dynamic LMA discovery can be implemented in an access- and technology-agnostic manner, and work in the same way across heterogeneous environments. Therefore, using AAA-based LMA discovery solutions is recommended by this document. Furthermore, following the guidance in Section 4, Paragraph 4.1 of [RFC1958], the use of FQDNs should be preferred over IP addresses in the context of AAA-based LMA discovery solutions. Korhonen & Devarapalli Informational [Page 7] RFC 6097 LMA Discovery February 2011 6. Security Considerations The use of DNS for obtaining the IP address of a mobility agent carries certain security risks. These are explained in detail in Section 9.1 of [RFC5026]. However, the risks described in [RFC5026] are mitigated to a large extent in this document, since the MAG and the LMA belong to the same PMIPv6 domain. The DNS server that the MAG queries is also part of the same PMIPv6 domain. Even if the MAG obtains the IP address of a bogus LMA from a bogus DNS server, further harm is prevented since the MAG and the LMA should authenticate each other before exchanging PMIPv6 signaling messages. [RFC5213] specifies the use of IKEv2 between the MAG and the LMA to authenticate each other and set up IPsec security associations for protecting the PMIPv6 signaling messages. The AAA infrastructure may be used to transport the LMA-discovery- related information between the MAG and the AAA server via one or more AAA brokers and/or AAA proxies. In this case, the MAG-to-AAA- server communication relies on the security properties of the intermediate AAA brokers and AAA proxies. 7. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Julien Laganier, Christian Vogt, Ryuji Wakikawa, Frank Xia, Behcet Sarikaya, Charlie Perkins, Qin Wu, Jari Arkko, and Xiangsong Cui for their comments, extensive discussions, and suggestions on this document. Korhonen & Devarapalli Informational [Page 8] RFC 6097 LMA Discovery February 2011 8. References 8.1. Normative References [RFC5213] Gundavelli, S., Leung, K., Devarapalli, V., Chowdhury, K., and B. Patil, "Proxy Mobile IPv6", RFC 5213, August 2008. 8.2. Informative References [3GPP.23.003] 3GPP, "Numbering, addressing and identification", 3GPP TS 23.003 v10.0.0, December 2010. [3GPP.24.008] 3GPP, "Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification", 3GPP TS 24.008 v10.1.0, December 2010. [3GPP.24.302] 3GPP, "Access to the 3GPP Evolved Packet Core (EPC) via non-3GPP access networks", 3GPP TS 24.302 v10.2.0, December 2010. [RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the Internet", RFC 1958, June 1996. [RFC2782] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782, February 2000. [RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303, December 2005. [RFC5026] Giaretta, G., Ed., Kempf, J., and V. Devarapalli, Ed., "Mobile IPv6 Bootstrapping in Split Scenario", RFC 5026, October 2007. [RFC5149] Korhonen, J., Nilsson, U., and V. Devarapalli, "Service Selection for Mobile IPv6", RFC 5149, February 2008. [RFC5779] Korhonen, J., Ed., Bournelle, J., Chowdhury, K., Muhanna, A., and U. Meyer, "Diameter Proxy Mobile IPv6: Mobile Access Gateway and Local Mobility Anchor Interaction with Diameter Server", RFC 5779, February 2010. Korhonen & Devarapalli Informational [Page 9] RFC 6097 LMA Discovery February 2011 [RFC5949] Yokota, H., Chowdhury, K., Koodli, R., Patil, B., and F. Xia, "Fast Handovers for Proxy Mobile IPv6", RFC 5949, September 2010. [RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 5996, September 2010. Authors' Addresses Jouni Korhonen Nokia Siemens Networks Linnoitustie 6 FIN-02600 Espoo Finland EMail: jouni.nospam@gmail.com Vijay Devarapalli Vasona Networks EMail: dvijay@gmail.com Korhonen & Devarapalli Informational [Page 10]