Last Call Review of draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-17
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate’s ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.
Summary: ready with nits
** Question: when saying:
"When configured, the key-strings can be encrypted using the AES Key Wrap algorithm"
you do not provide any recommendation. I understand it is possible, but is there any good
reason to recommend it or do you believe the NETCONF access control feature is sufficient?
Are there environments where recommending it would be meaningful? I'd like to have more
This is a bit surprising when I compare with last paragraph where keys are RECOMMENDED
to be encrypted when stored within network devices.
** Minor comment: I don't see any good reason to separate paragraphs 2 and 4.
** section 1.2: it says:
" o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys."
There may be a confusion with the term "keys" here (i.e., something different from
a cryptographic key).
For instance, in section 3.3:
| +--rw key-chain* [name]
name is not a cryptographic key.
** section 2.2: there's something I don't understand. It says:
3. When the send lifetime of the new key becomes valid, the network
devices within the domain of key chain will start sending the new
I have the feeling you mean that this new key will start to be used for transmissions
(instead of "start sending the new key"). Did I misunderstood something?