Last Call Review of draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-17

Request Review of draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 24)
Type Last Call Review
Team General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) (genart)
Deadline 2017-04-07
Requested 2017-03-17
Other Reviews Rtgdir Early review of -02 by Ines Robles (diff)
Yangdoctors Early review of -13 by Ladislav Lhotka (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -17 by Vincent Roca (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -20 by Matthew Miller (diff)
Review State Completed
Reviewer Matthew Miller
Review review-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-17-genart-lc-miller-2017-04-07
Posted at
Reviewed rev. 17 (document currently at 24)
Review result Almost Ready
Draft last updated 2017-04-07
Review completed: 2017-04-07


I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.

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Document: draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-17
Reviewer: Matthew A. Miller
Review Date: 2017-04-07
IETF LC End Date: 2017-04-07
IESG Telechat date: 2017-04-13


This document is almost ready to be published as a Proposed Standard,
once the issues noted herein are resolved.

Major issues:


Minor issues:

* Forgive me for my limited knowledge of YANG, but is there a reason
key-strings are only representable as either a YANG string or
hex-string type, and not the YANG binary type?

* This document does not provide much guidance around AES key wrap
other than it can be used and the KEK is provided out-of-band/-context.
For instance, AES key-wrapped key-strings probably require using
"hexidecimal-string".  Also, assuming I'm reading the model correctly,
it appears this feature applies to the whole chain, which I think is
worth calling out.

* This document warns against using the "clear-text" algorithm, which the
reader is lead to understand is for legacy implementation reasons.
However, is there not a similar concern with cryptographically weak
algorithms, such as md5 and (arguably) sha1?

Nits/editorial comments:

* In Section 3.2. "Key Chain Model Features", the word "of" is missing
between "configuration" and "an" in the phrase "support configuration an
acceptance tolerance".


* I note that idnits is calling out some odd spacing issues, but I think
they are safe to ignore.