IPSECME D. Palomares (Ed)
Internet-Draft D. Migault (Ed)

Intended status: Informational Orange Expires: September 6, 2014 March 5, 2014

IKEv2/IPsec Context Definition draft-plmrs-ipsecme-ipsec-ikev2-context-definition-01

Abstract

IKEv2/IPsec clusters are constituted of multiple nodes accessed via a single address by the end user. The traffic is then split between the nodes via specific IP load balancing policies. Once a session is assigned to a given node, IPsec makes it difficult to assign the session to another node. This makes management operations and transparent high availability for end users difficult to perform within the cluster.

This document describes the IKEv2 and IPsec contexts that MUST be transferred between nodes within a cluster so a session can be restored. This makes possible to transfer an IPsec session between different nodes.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of $\underline{\mathsf{BCP}}$ 78 and $\underline{\mathsf{BCP}}$ 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2014.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to <u>BCP 78</u> and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

<u> </u>
2
<u>3</u>
<u>3</u>
4
<u>5</u>
<u>5</u>
<u>5</u>
<u>5</u>
<u>6</u>
<u>6</u>
<u>6</u>
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
8
9
0

1. Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Introduction

Large clusters may take advantage of the multiple nodes to enhance the peer's Quality of Service by performing among others:

- 1) Fail-over with high availability.
- 2) Load balancing among cluster members.

- 3) Scalability for overloaded IPsec platforms.
- 4) Compatibility for IKEv2/IPsec context transfers among different constructors.

This document addresses transfer of an IPsec session between physically or virtually different nodes within an IKEv2/IPsec cluster. More specifically, the document describes the parameters that MUST be transmitted between the IPsec/IKEv2 nodes, so that IKEv2 and IPsec session can be restored on the other node.

Currently IPsec based services can hardly benefit from these features as IPsec Security Associations are bound to a single node and cannot be shared among different cluster members.

This draft describes the parameters that MUST be transferred in order to keep an IKEv2/IPsec session alive in conformance with the Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol [RFC4301] and the Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol [RFC5996].

This includes information such as the cryptographic material, the algorithms and the IP addresses, among others parameters.

Note that IKEv2 and IPsec session do not need to be on the same node as IKEv2 and IPsec context are different. Note also that we do not specify in this document how the IKEv2 or IPsec context are transferred between one node to the other. This can be performed via a simple UDP session that MAY be IPsec protected, a SCP session [RFC4251] or using the context transfer protocol [RFC4067].

3. Terminology

This document uses the following terminology:

IKE SA context: the set of parameters composing a single IKE Security Association. A bidirectional communication will need a pair of IKE SAs, for incoming and outgoing IKE exchanges.

IPsec SA Context: the set of parameters composing a single IPsec Security Association. A bidirectional communication will need a pair of IPsec SAs for incoming and outgoing traffic.

4. Parameters level definition

Information related to the IKEv2 and IPsec contexts can be defined within three different levels: mandatory, optional or vendor specific. This allows classification of the parameters considering their relevance and susceptibility to be transferred in order to maintain an IKEv2/IPsec session alive.

- Mandatory (M): Those parameters identified with a Mandatory flag (M) are considered absolutely relevant and necessary in order to maintain an IKE_SA or an IPsec_SA alive. The absence of a parameter with a mandatory flag, results in the loss of the IKE_SA or IPsec SA.
- Optional (0): Those parameters identified with an optional flag (0) are considered as additional information but are NOT absolutely necessary to maintain an IKEv2/IPsec session alive.
- 3) Vendor Specific (V): Those parameters identified with a vendor's specific flag (V) are considered as the information related to some specific constructor. It ensures enhancement provided by certain proprietary solutions when transmitting IKEv2/IPsec contexts, however, this MUST NOT interfere the interoperability with other IKEv2 and IPsec implementations and standards.

5. IKEv2 key management

Implementations might decide to manage sending cryptographic material (a.k.a. IKEv2/IPsec session keys) in different fashions; especially IKEv2 session keys. This document specifies three different ways to exchange IKEv2 keying information as follows:

- 1) Case 1: The node sends the private Diffie-Hellman key, the peer's KE content and nonces. In this case, the node receiving these information will recalculate all keys from the very beginning as it usually does during any initial IKEv2 exchange. The main drawback for this case is that recalculating keys is computational expensive, especially if thousands of session keys has to be calculated (e.g. during rush hours).
- 2) Case 2: A cluster member sends the SKEYSEED and nonces. In such case, the node receiving the information might not recalculate all the keys since the very beginning, but it still has to compute SK * (SK d, SK ai, SK ar, SK ei, SK er, SK pi, SK pr).
- 3) Case: The cluster member sends all computed keys (SK_* = SK_d, SK_ai, SK_ar, SK_ei, SK_er, SK_pi, SK_pr). In this case, the node receiving the keys wont need to recalculate keys from the beginning. However, this case demands more data to be sent between cluster members. Note that sending SK_pi/SK_pr may be omitted, as these keys are only used during authentication.

6. IKEv2 Session parameters

Considering IKEv2/IPsec sessions as bidirectional, we provide a list of parameters needed to create the IKE_SAs, which are usually stored in the user-land.

<u>6.1</u>. MANDATORY - IKEv2 Session parameters

- 1) Version of IKE: in this draft we only consider version 2.
- 2) The initiator flag and the responder flag for the IKE SAs.
- 3) Local host address and remote host address (IPv4 or IPv6).
- 4) The IKE SA's SPI of both initiator and responder.
- 5) The outgoing and incoming Message ID's.
- 7) The cryptographic material for the IKE_SA (see section <u>Section 5</u> for details).
- 8) The [SA] proposal information: encryption algorithm, length of the encryption key, integrity algorithm, length of the integrity key and the pseudo random function (prf).
- 9) The extensions and condition of the IKE SA (NAT, EAP, MOBIKE...).
- 10) The IDs of the initiator and responder (ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_IPV6_ADDR, ID_FQDN, ID_RFC822_ADDR, ID_DER_ASN1_DN, ID DER ASN1 GN or ID KEY ID).
- 11) Credentials: pre-shared keys or digital certificates.
- 12) The windows bitmap value.

6.2. OPTIONAL - IKEv2 Session parameters

- 1) The IKE lifetime.
- Vendors ID: when a vendors ID payload has been sent during IKE_SA negotiation, it is part of the IKE SA parameters.

6.3. VENDOR SPECIFIC - IKEv2 Session parameters

For now, there are no vendor specific parameters for IKEv2.

7. IPsec Session parameters

Once the IKE SAs are established for securing further IKEv2 exchanges, a pair of IPsec SAs are negotiated in order to secure the traffic flow. The following list includes the parameters needed to build an IPsec SA:

7.1. MANDATORY - IPsec Session parameters

- 1) Local host and remote host addresses (IPv4 or IPv6).
- 2) The inbound and outbound IPsec SA Security Parameter Indexes (SPIs).
- 3) The IP compression information: flag for IPcomp. If active, The IPcomp Compression Parameter Index values (CPI IN, CPI OUT) and the the IPcomp algorithm.
- 4) The sequence number values: SN counter and SN overflow flag
- 5) The anti-replay window value.
- 6) IPsec mode: transport or tunnel mode.
- 7) The SA Lifetime: a time interval or byte count after which an SA must be replaced with a new SA (and new SPI).
- 8) Path MTU: maximum size of an IPsec packet that can be transmitted without fragmentation.
- 9) Upperspec: upper-layer protocol to be used.
- 10) Source IP/Destination IP addresses and ports of the protected traffic.
- 11) The IPsec protocol ESP and/or AH, their encryption/integrity algorithms and the key lengths.
- 12) The cryptograhic material: KEYMAT (encryption and/or authentication keys).

7.2. OPTIONAL - IPsec Session parameters

For now, there are no optional parameters for IPsec sessions.

7.3. VENDOR SPECIFIC - IPsec Session parameters

 Instance-id or flow-id: helps a node to identify which packet processing unit will process some IPsec traffic or which IPsec instance out of multiple IPsec processing units will process the IPsec traffic.

8. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA consideration for this document.

9. Security Considerations

Transferring an IPsec context between different SG involves sending sensitive information through the network. These pieces of information MUST be sent to an authenticated node via a secure channel.

10. Acknowledgment

IPsec cluster management is a joint work between Orange, Universite Pierre et Marie Curie / LIP6 and Institut Telecom / Telcom SudParis.

We would like to thank Maryline Laurent and Tobias Guggemos for their advises.

11. References

<u>11.1</u>. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", <u>BCP 14</u>, <u>RFC 2119</u>, March 1997.
- [RFC4251] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture", <u>RFC 4251</u>, January 2006.
- [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", <u>RFC 4301</u>, December 2005.

11.2. Informative References

11.3. URIs

- [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-plmrs-ipsecme-ipsec-ikev2 -context-definition-01
- [2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-plmrs-ipsecme-ipsec-ikev2 -context-definition-00

Appendix A. ANNEX A: Data structure example

```
Example of an IKEv2 data structure:
```

```
typedef struct IKEV2CONTEXT
          {
               bool *initiator;
               u int32 t *ike spi i;
               u_int32_t *ike_spi_r;
               char *my host;
               char *other host;
               u int16 t *enc alg ike;
               u int16 t *enc alg ike len;
               u int16 t *int alg ike;
               u int16 t *prf alg;
               char *nonce i;
               char *nonce r;
               char *dh secret;
               u_int16_t message_id;
               char *cert;
      } IKEV2CONTEXT;
```

Example of an IPsec session data structure:

```
typedef struct IPSECCONTEXT
          {
               bool initiator;
               char *my host;
               char *other host;
               u int8 t ipsec mode;
               u int16 t encr alg child;
               u int16 t enc alg len child;
               u int16 t int alg child;
               u int32 t enc key i;
               u int32 t int key i;
               u int32 t enc key o;
               u int32 t int key o;
               char *child seq i;
               char *child bit i;
               char *child seq o;
               char *child bit o;
               char *child spi i;
               char *child spi o;
               u int16 t ts l fromport;
               u int16 t ts l toport;
               u_int8_t ts_l_type;
               u int8 t ts l proto;
               char *ts l fromaddress;
               char *ts l toaddress;
               u int16 t ts r fromport;
               u_int16_t ts r toport;
               u int8 t ts r type;
               u int8 t ts r proto;
               char *ts r fromaddress;
               char *ts r toaddress;
               bool ipcomp flag;
               u int32 t ipcom algo;
               char *ipcomp cpi i;
               char *ipcomp cpi o;
      } IPSECCONTEXT;
```

Appendix B. Document Change Log

```
[RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication]

draft-plmrs-ipsecme-ipsec-ikev2-context-definition-01 [1]

Added missing information as part of the IPsec and IKEv2 contexts Worked on the text

Include mandatory, optional and vendor specific flags

Added three different ways send keys session keys
```

draft-plmrs-ipsecme-ipsec-ikev2-context-definition-00 [2]

Internet-Draft IKEv2 and IPsec Context Definition March 2014

initial draft.

Authors' Addresses

Daniel Palomares Orange 38 rue du General Leclerc 92794 Issy-les-Moulineaux Cedex 9 France

Phone: +33 1 45 29 51 16

Email: danielpalomares.ietf@gmail.com

Daniel Migault Orange 38 rue du General Leclerc 92794 Issy-les-Moulineaux Cedex 9 France

Phone: +33 1 45 29 60 52

Email: daniel.migault@orange.com