

Network Working Group
Internet-Draft
Updates: [5996](#) (if approved)
Intended status: Experimental
Expires: February 2, 2013

Y. Nir
Check Point
Q. Wu
Huawei
August 1, 2012

**An IKEv2 Extension for Supporting ERP
draft-nir-ipsecme-erx-06**

Abstract

This document describes an extension to the IKEv2 protocol that allows an IKE Security Association (SA) to be created and authenticated using the EAP Re-authentication Protocol extension as described in [RFC 6696](#).

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of [BCP 78](#) and [BCP 79](#).

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on February 2, 2013.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to [BCP 78](#) and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

1. Introduction

IKEv2, as specified in [section 2.16 of \[RFC5996\]](#), allows authentication of the initiator using an EAP method. Using EAP significantly increases the count of round-trips required to establish the IPsec SA, and also may require user interaction. This makes it inconvenient to allow a single remote access client to create multiple IPsec tunnels with multiple IPsec gateways that belong to the same domain.

The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP), as described in [\[RFC6696\]](#), allows an EAP peer to authenticate to multiple authenticators, while performing the full EAP method only once. Subsequent authentications require fewer round-trips and no user interaction.

Bringing these two technologies together allows a remote access IPsec client to create multiple tunnels with different gateways that belong to a single domain, as well as using the keys from other contexts of using EAP, such as network access within the same domain, to transparently connect to VPN gateways within this domain.

1.1. Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [\[RFC2119\]](#).

2. Usage Scenarios

This work is motivated by the following scenarios:

- o Multiple tunnels for a single remote access VPN client. Suppose a company has offices in New York City, Paris, and Shanghai. For historical reasons, the email server is located in the Paris office, while most of the servers hosting the company's intranet are located in Shanghai, and the finance department servers are in NYC. An employee using remote access VPN may need to connect to servers from all three locations. While it is possible to connect to a single gateway, and have that gateway route the requests to the other gateways (perhaps through site to site VPN), this is not efficient, and it is more desirable to have the client initiate three different tunnels. It is, however, not desirable to have the user type in a password three times.
- o Roaming. In these days of mobile phones and tablets, users often move from the wireless LAN in their office, where access may be granted through 802.1x, to a cellular network where VPN is necessary and back again. Both the VPN server and the 802.1x access point are authenticators that connect to the same

Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) servers. So it makes sense to make the transition smooth, without requiring user interaction. The device still needs to detect whether it is within the protected network, in which case it should not use VPN, but this process is beyond the scope of this document. [[SecureBeacon](#)] is a now-abandoned attempt at this.

3. Protocol Outline

Supporting ERX requires an EAP payload in the first IKE_AUTH request. This is a deviation from the rules in [RFC 5996](#), so support needs to be indicated through a Notify payload in the IKE_SA_INIT response. This Notify serves the same purpose as the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start message of ERX, as specified in [section 5.3.1 of RFC 6696](#). The domain name included in the Domain-Name TLV as specified in [section 5.3.1.1](#) of the same document.

A supporting initiator that has unexpired keys for this domain will send the EAP_Initiate/Re-auth message in an EAP payload in the first IKE_AUTH request.

The responder sends the EAP payload content to a backend AAA server, and receives the rMSK and an EAP-Finish/Re-auth message. It then forwards the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message to the Initiator in an EAP payload within the first IKE_AUTH response.

The initiator then sends an additional IKE_AUTH request, that includes the AUTH payload which has been calculated using the rMSK in the role of the MSK as described in sections [2.15](#) and [2.16](#) of [RFC 5996](#). The responder replies similarly, and the IKE_AUTH exchange is finished.

The following figure is adapted from appendixes C.1 and C.3 of [RFC 5996](#), with most of the optional payloads removed. Note that the EAP_Initiate/Re-auth message is added.

IKE_SA_INIT Exchange:

```
| init request      --> SA, KE, Ni,  
|  
| init response    <-- SA, KE, Nr,  
|                  N[ERX_SUPPORTED]
```

IKE_AUTH Exchanges:

```
| first request     --> EAP(EAP_Initiate/Re-auth),  
|                  IDi,  
|                  SA, TSi, TSr  
|  
| first response    <-- IDr, [CERT+], AUTH,  
|                  EAP(EAP-Finish/Re-auth)  
|  
| last request      --> AUTH  
|  
| last response     <-- AUTH,  
|                  SA, TSi, TSr
```

The IDi payload MUST have ID Type ID_RFC822_ADDR and the data field MUST contain the same value as the KeyName-NAI TLV in the EAP_Initiate/Re-auth message. See [Section 3.2](#) for details.

3.1. Clarification About EAP Codes

[Section 3.16 of RFC 5996](#) enumerates the EAP codes in EAP messages which are carried in EAP payloads. The enumeration goes only to 4. It is not clear whether that list is supposed to be exhaustive or not.

To clarify, an implementation conforming to this specification MUST accept and transmit EAP messages with at least the codes for Initiate and Finish (5 and 6) from [RFC 6696](#), in addition to the four codes enumerated in [RFC 5996](#). This document is intentionally silent about other EAP codes that are neither enumerated in [RFC 5996](#) nor in that document.

3.2. User Name in the Protocol

The authors, as well as participants of the HOKEY and IPsecME working groups believe that all use cases for this extension to IKE have a single backend AAA server doing both the authentication and the re-authentication. The reasoning behind this is that IKE runs over the Internet, and would naturally connect to the user's home network.

This section addresses instances where this is not the case.

[Section 5.3.2 of RFC 6696](#) describes the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet,

which in the case of IKEv2 is carried in the first IKE_AUTH request. This packet contains the KeyName-NAI TLV. This TLV contains the username used in authentication. It is relayed to the AAA server in the AccessRequest message, and is returned from the AAA server in the AccessAccept message.

The username part of the NAI within the TLV is the EMSKName ([RFC5295] encoded in hexadecimal digits. The domain part is the domain name of the home domain of the user. The username part is ephemeral in the sense that a new one is generated for each full authentication. This ephemeral value is not a good basis for making policy decisions, and they are also a poor source of user identification for the purposes of logging.

Instead, it is up to the implementation in the IPsec gateway to make policy decisions based on other factors. The following list is by no means exhaustive:

- o In some cases the home domain name may be enough to make policy decisions. If all users with a particular home domain get the same authorization, then policy does not depend on the real user name. Meaningful logs can still be issued by correlating VPN gateway IKE events with AAA servers access records.
- o Sometimes users receive different authorizations based on groups they belong to. The AAA server can communicate such information to the VPN gateway, for example using the CLASS attribute ([RFC2865]) in RADIUS and Diameter ([RFC3588]). Logging again depends on correlation with AAA servers.
- o AAA servers may support extensions that allow them to communicate with their clients (in our case - the VPN gateway) to push user information. For example, a certain product integrates a RADIUS server with the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP - [RFC4511]), so a client could query the server using LDAP and receive the real record for this user. Others may provide this data through vendor-specific extensions to RADIUS or DIAMETER.

In any case authorization is a major issue in deployments, if the backend AAA server supporting the re-authentication is different from the AAA server that had supported the original authentication. It is up to the re-authenticating AAA server to provide the necessary information for authorization. A conforming implementation of this protocol MAY reject initiators for which it is unable to make policy decisions because of these reasons.

4. ERX_SUPPORTED Notification

The Notify payload is as described in [RFC 5996](#):


```

          1               2               3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
! Next Payload !C!  RESERVED   !           Payload Length           !
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
! Protocol ID  !   SPI Size   !   ERX Notify Message Type   !
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
!                                     Domain Name                                     !
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

- o Protocol ID (1 octet) MUST be 1, as this message is related to an IKE SA.
- o SPI Size (1 octet) MUST be zero, in conformance with [section 3.10 of RFC 5996](#).
- o ERX Notify Message Type (2 octets) - MUST be xxxxx, the value assigned for ERX. TBA by IANA.
- o Domain Name (variable) - contains the domain name or realm, as these terms are used in [RFC 6696](#), and encoded as ASCII, as specified in [[RFC4282](#)].

5. Security Considerations

The protocol extension described in this document extends the authentication from one EAP context, which may or may not be part of IKEv2, to an IKEv2 context. Successful completion of the protocol proves to the authenticator, which in our case is a VPN gateway, that the supplicant, or VPN client, has authenticated in some other EAP context.

The protocol supplies the authenticator with the domain name with which the supplicant has authenticated, but does not supply it with a specific identity. Instead, the gateway receives an EMSKName, which is an ephemeral ID. With this variant of the IKEv2 protocol, the initiator never sends its real identity on the wire, while the server does. This is different from the usual IKEv2 practice of the initiator revealing its identity first.

If the domain name is sufficient to make access control decisions, this is enough. If not, then the gateway needs to find out either the real name or authorization information for that particular user. This may be done using the AAA protocol or by some other federation protocol, which is out of scope for this specification.

6. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign a notify message type from the status

types range (16418-40959) of the "IKEv2 Notify Message Types" registry with name "ERX_SUPPORTED".

7. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Yaron Sheffer for comments and suggested text that have contributed to this document.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), March 1997.
- [RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The Network Access Identifier", [RFC 4282](#), December 2005.
- [RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri, "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", [RFC 5295](#), August 2008.
- [RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol: IKEv2", [RFC 5996](#), September 2010.
- [RFC6696] Cao, Z., He, B., Shi, Y., Wu, Q., and G. Zorn, "EAP Extensions for the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)", [RFC 6696](#), July 2012.

8.2. Informative References

- [RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", [RFC 2865](#), June 2000.
- [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", [RFC 3588](#), September 2003.
- [RFC4511] Sermersheim, J., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol", [RFC 4511](#), June 2006.
- [SecureBeacon] Sheffer, Y. and Y. Nir, "Secure Beacon: Securely Detecting a Trusted Network", [draft-sheffer-ipsecme-secure-beacon](#)

(work in progress), June 2009.

Authors' Addresses

Yoav Nir
Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.
5 Hasolelim st.
Tel Aviv 67897
Israel

Email: ynir@checkpoint.com

Qin Wu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District
Nanjing, JiangSu 210012
China

Email: sunseawq@huawei.com