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Definitions of Managed Objects for MAP-E draft-ietf-softwire-map-mib-06

Abstract

This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for using with network management protocols in the Internet community. In particular, it defines managed objects for MAP encapsulation (MAP-E) mode.

Status of This Memo

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[1.](#) Introduction

MAP [[RFC7597](#)] is a stateless mechanism for running IPv4 over IPv6-only infrastructure. In particular, it includes two mode, translation mode or encapsulation mode. For the encapsulation mode, it provides an automatic tunnelling mechanism for providing IPv4 connectivity service to end users over a service provider's IPv6 network

This document defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols in the Internet community. This MIB module would be used for monitoring the devices in the MAP scenario, especially, for the encapsulation mode.

[2.](#) The Internet-Standard Management Framework

For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to [section 7 of \[RFC3410\]](#).

Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed the Management Information Base or MIB. MIB objects are generally accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the

Structure of Management Information (SMI). This memo specifies a MIB module that is compliant to the SMIV2, which is described in [\[RFC2578\]](#), [\[RFC2579\]](#) and [\[RFC2580\]](#).

3. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [\[RFC2119\]](#).

4. Structure of the MIB Module

The MAP-E MIB provides a way to configure and monitor the MAP devices in MAP encapsulation mode through SNMP.

MAP-E MIB is configurable on a per-interface basis. It depends on several parts of the IF-MIB[\[RFC2863\]](#).

[4.1. The mapMIBObjects](#)

[4.1.1. The mapRule Subtree](#)

The mapRule subtree describes managed objects used for managing the multiple mapping rules in the MAP encapsulation mode.

According to the MAP specification[\[RFC7597\]](#), the mapping rules are divided into two categories, which are Basic Mapping Rule (BMR), and Forwarding Mapping Rule (FMR).

[4.1.2. The mapSecurityCheck Subtree](#)

The mapSecurityCheck subtree is to statistic the number of invalid packets that have been identified. There are two kind of invalid packets which are defined in the MAP specification [\[RFC7597\]](#)as below.

- The BR MUST perform a validation of the consistency of the source IPv6 address and source port number for the packet using BMR.
- The Customer Edge (CE) SHOULD check that MAP received packets' transport-layer destination port number is in the range configured by MAP for the CE.

[4.2. The mapMIBConformance Subtree](#)

The mapMIBConformance subtree provides conformance information of MIB objects.

5. Definitions

MAP-E-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN

IMPORTS

MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, mib-2,
Integer32, Unsigned32, Counter64
FROM SNMPv2-SMI
ifIndex
FROM IF-MIB
InetAddressType, InetAddress,
InetAddressPrefixLength
FROM INET-ADDRESS-MIB
OBJECT-GROUP, MODULE-COMPLIANCE
FROM SNMPv2-CONF;

mapMIB MODULE-IDENTITY

LAST-UPDATED "201606170000Z"

ORGANIZATION

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DESCRIPTION

"The MIB module is defined for management of objects in the
MAP-E BRs or CEs."

REVISION "201606170000Z"

DESCRIPTION

"Initial version. Published as RFC xxxx."

--RFC Ed.: RFC-editor pls fill in xxxx

::= { mib-2 xxx }

--xxx to be replaced with IANA-assigned value

mapMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {mapMIB 1}

mapRule OBJECT IDENTIFIER
::= { mapMIBObjects 1 }

mapSecurityCheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER
::= { mapMIBObjects 2 }

mapRuleTable OBJECT-TYPE

SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF MapRuleEntry

MAX-ACCESS not-accessible

STATUS current

DESCRIPTION

"The (conceptual) table containing rule Information of
specific mapping rule. It can also be used for row
creation."

::= { mapRule 1 }

mapRuleEntry OBJECT-TYPE

SYNTAX MapRuleEntry

MAX-ACCESS not-accessible

STATUS current

DESCRIPTION

"Each entry in this table contains the information on a
particular mapping rule."

INDEX { mapRuleID }

::= { mapRuleTable 1 }

MapRuleEntry ::=

SEQUENCE {

mapRuleID	Integer32,
mapRuleIPv6PrefixType	InetAddressType,
mapRuleIPv6Prefix	InetAddress,


```
mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen      InetAddressPrefixLength,
mapRuleIPv4PrefixType     InetAddressType,
mapRuleIPv4Prefix         InetAddress,
mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen      InetAddressPrefixLength,
mapRuleBRIPv6Address      InetAddress,
mapRulePSID               Integer32,
mapRulePSIDLen            Integer32,
mapRuleOffset             Unsigned32,
mapRuleEALen              Integer32,
mapRuleType                Integer32
}

mapRuleID OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX Integer32 (1..2147483647)
    MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
    STATUS current
    DESCRIPTION
        "An identifier used to distinguish the multiple mapping
         rule which is unique with each CE in the same BR."
    ::= { mapRuleEntry 1 }

mapRuleIPv6PrefixType OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX      InetAddressType
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS      current
    DESCRIPTION
        "This object MUST be set to the value of ipv6(2) to
         present the IPv6 address. It describes the
         address type of the mapRuleIPv6Prefix and
         mapRuleBRIPv6Address."
    REFERENCE
        "ipv6(2): RFC 4001."
    ::= { mapRuleEntry 2 }

mapRuleIPv6Prefix OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX      InetAddress(SIZE (0..16))
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS      current
    DESCRIPTION
        "The IPv6 prefix defined in mapping rule which will be
         assigned to CE. The address type is given by
         mapRuleIPv6PrefixType."
    ::= { mapRuleEntry 3 }

mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX      InetAddressPrefixLength
    MAX-ACCESS read-only
    STATUS      current
```


DESCRIPTION

"The length of the IPv6 prefix defined in the mapping rule. As a parameter for mapping rule, it will be also assigned to CE."

::= { mapRuleEntry 4 }

mapRuleIPv4PrefixType OBJECT-TYPE

SYNTAX InetAddressType

MAX-ACCESS read-only

STATUS current

DESCRIPTION

"This object MUST be set to the value of ipv4(1) to present the public IPv4 address. It describes the address type of the mapRuleIPv4Prefix."

REFERENCE

"ipv4(1): [RFC 4001](#)."

::= { mapRuleEntry 5 }

mapRuleIPv4Prefix OBJECT-TYPE

SYNTAX InetAddress(SIZE (0..4))

MAX-ACCESS read-only

STATUS current

DESCRIPTION

" The IPv4 prefix defined in mapping rule which will be assigned to CE. The address type is given by mapRuleIPv4PrefixType."

::= { mapRuleEntry 6 }

mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen OBJECT-TYPE

SYNTAX InetAddressPrefixLength

MAX-ACCESS read-only

STATUS current

DESCRIPTION

"The length of the IPv4 prefix defined in the mapping rule. As a parameter for mapping rule, it will be also assigned to CE."

::= { mapRuleEntry 7 }

mapRuleBRIPv6Address OBJECT-TYPE

SYNTAX InetAddress(SIZE (0..16))

MAX-ACCESS read-only

STATUS current

DESCRIPTION

"The IPv6 address of the BR which will be conveyed to CE. The address type is given by mapRuleIPv6PrefixType."

::= { mapRuleEntry 8 }


```
mapRulePSID OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX      Integer32
    MAX-ACCESS  read-only
    STATUS      current
    DESCRIPTION
        "The PSID value algorithmically identifies a set of
        ports assigned to a CE."
    REFERENCE
        "PSID: section 3 of RFC 7597."
    ::= { mapRuleEntry 9 }

mapRulePSIDLen OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX      Integer32
    MAX-ACCESS  read-only
    STATUS      current
    DESCRIPTION
        "The bit length value of the number of significant bits in
        the PSID field. When it is set to 0, the PSID
        field is to be ignored."
    ::= { mapRuleEntry 10 }

mapRuleOffset OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX      Unsigned32(0..15)
    MAX-ACCESS  read-only
    STATUS      current
    DESCRIPTION
        "Bit length value of the number of significant bits in
        the PSID field. When it is set to 0, the PSID
        field is to be ignored."
    ::= { mapRuleEntry 11 }

mapRuleEALen OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX      Integer32
    MAX-ACCESS  read-only
    STATUS      current
    DESCRIPTION
        "The length of the Embedded-Address (EA) defined in
        mapping rule which will be assigned to CE."
    REFERENCE
        "EA: section 3 of RFC 7597."
    ::= { mapRuleEntry 12 }

mapRuleType OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX      Integer32
    MAX-ACCESS  read-only
    STATUS      current
    DESCRIPTION
        "The type of the mapping rule. A value of 0 means it
```


is a BMR; a non-zero value means it is a FMR."
REFERENCE

"BMR, FMR: [section 5 of RFC 7597](#)."
::= { mapRuleEntry 13 }

mapSecurityCheckTable OBJECT-TYPE

SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF MapSecurityCheckEntry

MAX-ACCESS not-accessible

STATUS current

DESCRIPTION

"The (conceptual) table containing information on
MAP security checks. This table can be used to statistic
the number of invalid packets that been identified"

::= { mapSecurityCheck 1 }

mapSecurityCheckEntry OBJECT-TYPE

SYNTAX MapSecurityCheckEntry

MAX-ACCESS not-accessible

STATUS current

DESCRIPTION

"Each entry in this table contains the information on a
particular MAP SecurityCheck."

INDEX { ifIndex }

::= { mapSecurityCheckTable 1 }

MapSecurityCheckEntry ::=

SEQUENCE {

mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4 Counter64,

mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6 Counter64

}

mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4 OBJECT-TYPE

SYNTAX Counter64

MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify

STATUS current

DESCRIPTION

"The CE SHOULD check that MAP received packets'
transport-layer destination port number is in the range
configured by MAP for the CE. So this object indicate
the number of the invalid IPv4 packets received by the
MAP."

::= { mapSecurityCheckEntry 1 }

mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6 OBJECT-TYPE

SYNTAX Counter64

MAX-ACCESS accessible-for-notify

STATUS current

DESCRIPTION


```
"The BR MUST perform a validation of the consistency of
the source IPv6 address and source port number for the
packet using BMR. So this object indicate the number of
the invalid IPv6 packets received by the BR."
 ::= { mapSecurityCheckEntry 2 }

-- Conformance Information
mapMIBConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {mapMIB 2}
mapMIBCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mapMIBConformance 1 }
mapMIBGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mapMIBConformance 2 }

-- compliance statements
mapMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
    STATUS current
    DESCRIPTION
        " Describes the minimal requirements for conformance
        to the MAP-E MIB."
    MODULE -- this module
        MANDATORY-GROUPS { mapMIBRuleGroup , mapMIBSecurityGroup }
    ::= { mapMIBCompliances 1 }

-- Units of Conformance
mapMIBRuleGroup OBJECT-GROUP
    OBJECTS {
        mapRuleIPv6PrefixType,
        mapRuleIPv6Prefix,
        mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen,
        mapRuleIPv4PrefixType,
        mapRuleIPv4Prefix,
        mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen,
        mapRuleBRIPv6Address,
        mapRulePSID,
        mapRulePSIDLen,
        mapRuleOffset,
        mapRuleEALen,
        mapRuleType }
    STATUS current
    DESCRIPTION
        " The collection of this objects are used to give the
        information of mapping rules in MAP-E."
    ::= { mapMIBGroups 1 }

mapMIBSecurityGroup OBJECT-GROUP
    OBJECTS {
        mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4,
        mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6 }
    STATUS current
    DESCRIPTION
```



```
" The collection of this objects are used to give the
information on MAP security checks."
:= { mapMIBGroups 2 }
```

```
END
```

6. IANA Considerations

The MIB module in this document uses the following IANA-assigned OBJECT IDENTIFIER values recorded in the SMI Numbers registry:

Descriptor	OBJECT IDENTIFIER value
-----	-----
MAP-E-MIB	{ mib-2 XXX }

7. Security Considerations

There are no management objects defined in this MIB module that have a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. So, if this MIB module is implemented correctly, then there is no risk that an intruder can alter or create any management objects of this MIB module via direct SNMP SET operations.

Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects with a MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over the network via SNMP. These are the objects and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

```
mapRuleIPv6PrefixType
mapRuleIPv6Prefix
mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen
mapRuleIPv4PrefixType
mapRuleIPv4Prefix
mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen
mapRuleBRIPv6Address
mapRulePSID
```

mapRulePSIDLen

mapRuleOffset

mapRuleEALen

mapRuleType

SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security. Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec), even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB module.

Implementations SHOULD provide the security features described by the SNMPv3 framework (see [[RFC3410](#)]), and implementations claiming compliance to the SNMPv3 standard MUST include full support for authentication and privacy via the User-based Security Model (USM) [[RFC3414](#)] with the AES cipher algorithm [[RFC3826](#)]. Implementations MAY also provide support for the Transport Security Model (TSM) [[RFC5591](#)] in combination with a secure transport such as SSH [[RFC5592](#)] or TLS/DTLS [[RFC6353](#)].

Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT RECOMMENDED. Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to enable cryptographic security. It is then a customer/operator responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them.

8. Acknowledgements

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This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [[RFC2629](#)].

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