

Using Pre-Shared Key (PSK) in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
[<draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-02.txt>](mailto:draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-02.txt)

Abstract

The invention of a large-scale quantum computer would pose a serious challenge for the cryptographic algorithms that are widely deployed today. The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) supports key transport and key agreement algorithms that could be broken by the invention of such a quantum computer. By storing communications that are protected with the CMS today, someone could decrypt them in the future when a large-scale quantum computer becomes available. Once quantum-secure key management algorithms are available, the CMS will be extended to support the new algorithms, if the existing syntax does not accommodate them. In the near-term, this document describes a mechanism to protect today's communication from the future invention of a large-scale quantum computer by mixing the output of key transport and key agreement algorithms with a pre-shared key.

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[1.](#) Introduction

The invention of a large-scale quantum computer would pose a serious challenge for the cryptographic algorithms that are widely deployed today. It is an open question whether or not it is feasible to build a large-scale quantum computer, and if so, when that might happen. However, if such a quantum computer is invented, many of the cryptographic algorithms and the security protocols that use them would become vulnerable.

The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [[RFC5652](#)][[RFC5803](#)] supports key transport and key agreement algorithms that could be broken by the invention of a large-scale quantum computer [[C2PQ](#)]. These algorithms include RSA [[RFC8017](#)], Diffie-Hellman [[RFC2631](#)], and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman [[RFC5753](#)]. As a result, an adversary that stores CMS-protected communications today, could decrypt those communications in the future when a large-scale quantum computer becomes available.

Once quantum-secure key management algorithms are available, the CMS will be extended to support them, if the existing syntax does not already accommodate the new algorithms.

In the near-term, this document describes a mechanism to protect today's communication from the future invention of a large-scale quantum computer by mixing the output of existing key transport and key agreement algorithms with a pre-shared key (PSK). Secure communication can be achieved today by mixing a strong PSK with the output of an existing key transport algorithm, like RSA [[RFC8017](#)], or an existing key agreement algorithm, like Diffie-Hellman [[RFC2631](#)] or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman [[RFC5753](#)]. A security solution that is believed to be quantum resistant can be achieved by using a PSK with sufficient entropy along with a quantum resistant key derivation function (KDF), like HKDF [[RFC5869](#)], and a quantum resistant encryption algorithm, like 256-bit AES [[AES](#)]. In this way, today's CMS-protected communication can be invulnerable to an attacker with a large-scale quantum computer.

In addition, there may be other reasons for including a strong PSK besides protection against the future invention of a large-scale quantum computer. For example, there is always the possibility of a cryptanalytic breakthrough on one or more of the classic public-key algorithm, and there are longstanding concerns about undisclosed trapdoors in Diffie-Hellman parameters. Inclusion of a strong PSK as part of the overall key management offer additional protection against these concerns.

Note that the CMS also supports key management techniques based on symmetric key-encryption keys and passwords, but they are not discussed in this document because they are already quantum resistant. The symmetric key-encryption key technique is quantum resistant when used with an adequate key size. The password technique is quantum resistant when used with a quantum-resistant key derivation function and a sufficiently large password.

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2. ASN.1

CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [[X680](#)], which uses the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [[X690](#)].

1.3. Version Numbers

The major data structures include a version number as the first item in the data structure. The version number is intended to avoid ASN.1 decode errors. Some implementations do not check the version number prior to attempting a decode, and then if a decode error occurs, the version number is checked as part of the error handling routine. This is a reasonable approach; it places error processing outside of the fast path. This approach is also forgiving when an incorrect version number is used by the sender.

Whenever the structure is updated, a higher version number will be assigned. However, to ensure maximum interoperability, the higher version number is only used when the new syntax feature is employed. That is, the lowest version number that supports the generated syntax is used.

2. Overview

The CMS enveloped-data content type [[RFC5652](#)] and the CMS authenticated-enveloped-data content type [[RFC5083](#)] support both key transport and key agreement public-key algorithms to establish the key used to encrypt the content. No restrictions are imposed on the key transport or key agreement public-key algorithms, which means that any key transport or key agreement algorithm can be used, including algorithms that are specified in the future. In both cases, the sender randomly generates the content-encryption key, and then all recipients obtain that key. All recipients use the sender-generated symmetric content-encryption key for decryption.

This specification defines two quantum-resistant ways to establish a symmetric key-encryption key, which is used to encrypt the sender-generated content-encryption key. In both cases, the PSK is used as one of the inputs to a key-derivation function to create a quantum-resistant key-encryption key. The PSK **MUST** be distributed to the sender and all of the recipients by some out-of-band means that does not make it vulnerable to the future invention of a large-scale quantum computer, and an identifier **MUST** be assigned to the PSK.

The content-encryption key or content-authenticated-encryption key is quantum-resistant, and the sender establishes it using these steps:

When using a key transport algorithm:

1. The content-encryption key or the content-authenticated-encryption key, called CEK, is generated at random.
2. The key-derivation key, called KDK, is generated at random.
3. For each recipient, the KDK is encrypted in the recipient's public key, then the key derivation function (KDF) is used to mix the pre-shared key (PSK) and the KDK to produce the key-encryption key, called KEK.
4. The KEK is used to encrypt the CEK.

When using a key agreement algorithm:

1. The content-encryption key or the content-authenticated-encryption key, called CEK, is generated at random.
2. For each recipient, a pairwise key-encryption key, called KEK1, is established using the recipient's public key and the sender's private key.
3. For each recipient, the key derivation function (KDF) is used to mix the pre-shared key (PSK) and the pairwise KEK1, and the result is called KEK2.
4. For each recipient, the pairwise KEK2 is used to encrypt the CEK.

As specified in [Section 6.2.5 of \[RFC5652\]](#), recipient information for additional key management techniques are represented in the OtherRecipientInfo type. Two key management techniques are specified in this document, and they are each identified by a unique ASN.1 object identifier.

The first key management technique, called keyTransPSK, see [Section 3](#), uses a key transport algorithm to transfer the key-derivation key from the sender to the recipient, and then the key-derivation key is mixed with the PSK using a KDF. The output of the KDF is the key-encryption key, which is used for the encryption of the content-encryption key or content-authenticated-encryption key.

The second key management technique, called keyAgreePSK, see [Section 4](#), uses a key agreement algorithm to establish a pairwise

key-encryption key, which is then mixed with the PSK using a KDF to produce a second pairwise key-encryption key, which is then used to encrypt the content-encryption key or content-authenticated-encryption key.

3. KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo

Per-recipient information using keyTransPSK is represented in the KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo type, which is indicated by the id-ori-keyTransPSK object identifier. Each instance of KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo establishes the content-encryption key or content-authenticated-encryption key for one or more recipients that have access to the same PSK.

The id-ori-keyTransPSK object identifier is:

```
id-ori OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
    rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) TBD1 }
```

```
id-ori-keyTransPSK OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ori 1 }
```

The KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo type is:

```
KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    version CMSVersion, -- always set to 0
    pskid PreSharedKeyIdentifier,
    kdfAlgorithm KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier,
    keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
    ktris KeyTransRecipientInfos,
    encryptedKey EncryptedKey }
```

```
PreSharedKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
```

```
KeyTransRecipientInfos ::= SEQUENCE OF KeyTransRecipientInfo
```

The fields of the KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo type have the following meanings:

version is the syntax version number. The version MUST be 0. The CMSVersion type is described in [Section 10.2.5 of \[RFC5652\]](#).

pskid is the identifier of the PSK used by the sender. The identifier is an OCTET STRING, and it need not be human readable.

kdfAlgorithm identifies the key-derivation algorithm, and any associated parameters, used by the sender to mix the key-derivation key and the PSK to generate the key-encryption key. The KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier is described in Section

10.1.6 of [\[RFC5652\]](#).

keyEncryptionAlgorithm identifies a key-encryption algorithm used to encrypt the content-encryption key. The KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier is described in [Section 10.1.3 of \[RFC5652\]](#).

ktr is contains one KeyTransRecipientInfo type for each recipient; it uses a key transport algorithm to establish the key-derivation key. KeyTransRecipientInfo is described in [Section 6.2.1 of \[RFC5652\]](#).

encryptedKey is the result of encrypting the content-encryption key or the content-authenticated-encryption key with the key-encryption key. EncryptedKey is an OCTET STRING.

4. KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo

Per-recipient information using keyAgreePSK is represented in the KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo type, which is indicated by the id-ori-keyAgreePSK object identifier. Each instance of KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo establishes the content-encryption key or content-authenticated-encryption key for one or more recipients that have access to the same PSK.

The id-ori-keyAgreePSK object identifier is:

```
id-ori-keyAgreePSK OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ori 2 }
```

The KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo type is:

```
KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {  
    version CMSVersion, -- always set to 0  
    pskid PreSharedKeyIdentifier,  
    originator [0] EXPLICIT OriginatorIdentifierOrKey,  
    ukm [1] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL,  
    kdfAlgorithm KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier,  
    keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,  
    recipientEncryptedKeys RecipientEncryptedKeys }
```

The fields of the KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo type have the following meanings:

version is the syntax version number. The version MUST be 0. The CMSVersion type is described in [Section 10.2.5 of \[RFC5652\]](#).

pskid is the identifier of the PSK used by the sender. The identifier is an OCTET STRING, and it need not be human readable.

originator is a CHOICE with three alternatives specifying the sender's key agreement public key. Implementations MUST support all three alternatives for specifying the sender's public key. The sender uses their own private key and the recipient's public key to generate a pairwise key-encryption key. A key derivation function (KDF) is used to mix the PSK and the pairwise key-encryption key to produce a second key-encryption key. The OriginatorIdentifierOrKey type is described in [Section 6.2.2 of \[RFC5652\]](#).

ukm is optional. With some key agreement algorithms, the sender provides a User Keying Material (UKM) to ensure that a different key is generated each time the same two parties generate a pairwise key. Implementations MUST accept a KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo SEQUENCE that includes a ukm field. Implementations that do not support key agreement algorithms that make use of UKMs MUST gracefully handle the presence of UKMs. The UserKeyingMaterial type is described in [Section 10.2.6 of \[RFC5652\]](#).

kdfAlgorithm identifies the key-derivation algorithm, and any associated parameters, used by the sender to mix the pairwise key-encryption key and the PSK to produce a second key-encryption key of the same length as the first one. The KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier is described in [Section 10.1.6 of \[RFC5652\]](#).

keyEncryptionAlgorithm identifies a key-encryption algorithm used to encrypt the content-encryption key or the content-authenticated-encryption key. The KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier type is described in [Section 10.1.3 of \[RFC5652\]](#).

recipientEncryptedKeys includes a recipient identifier and encrypted key for one or more recipients. The KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier is a CHOICE with two alternatives specifying the recipient's certificate, and thereby the recipient's public key, that was used by the sender to generate a pairwise key-encryption key. The encryptedKey is the result of encrypting the content-encryption key or the content-authenticated-encryption key with the second pairwise key-encryption key. EncryptedKey is an OCTET STRING. The RecipientEncryptedKeys type is defined in [Section 6.2.2 of \[RFC5652\]](#).

5. Key Derivation

Many key derivation functions (KDFs) internally employ a one-way hash function. When this is the case, the hash function that is used is identified by the `KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier`. HKDF [RFC5869] is one example of a KDF that make use fo a hash function.

A KDF has several input values. This section describes the conventions for using the KDF to compute the key-encryption key for `KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo` and `KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo`. For simplicity, the terminology used in the HKDF [RFC5869] specification is used here.

The KDF inputs are:

IKM is the input keying material; it is the symmetric secret input to the KDF. For `KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo`, it is the PSK concatenated with the key-derivation key. For `KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo`, it is the PSK concatenated with the pairwise key-encryption key produced by the key agreement algorithm.

salt is an optional non-secret random value. The salt is not used.

L is the length of output keying material in octets; the value depends on the key-encryption algorithm that will be used. The algorithm is identified by the `KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier`. In addition, the OBJECT IDENTIFIER portion of the `KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier` is included in the next input value, called info.

info is optional context and application specific information. The DER-encoding of `CMSORIPSKOtherInfo` is used as the info value. Note that EXPLICIT tagging is used in the ASN.1 module that deines this structure. For `KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo`, the ENUMERATED value of 5 is used. For `KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo`, the ENUMERATED value of 10 is used. `CMSORIPSKOtherInfo` is defined by the following ASN.1 structure:

```
CMSORIPSKOtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyMgmtAlgType      ENUMERATED {
        keyTrans        (5),
        keyAgree        (10) },
    keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
    pskLength            INTEGER (1..MAX),
    kdkLength            INTEGER (1..MAX) }
```


The fields of type CMSORIforPSKOtherInfo have the following meanings:

keyMgmtAlgType is either set to 5 or 10. For KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo, the ENUMERATED value of 5 is used. For KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo, the ENUMERATED value of 10 is used.

keyEncryptionAlgorithm is the KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, which identifies the algorithm and provides algorithm parameters, if any.

pskLength is a positive integer; it contains the length of the PSK in octets.

kdkLength is a positive integer; it contains the length of the key-derivation key in octets. For KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo, the key-derivation key is generated by the sender. For KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo, the key-derivation key is the pairwise key-encryption key produced by the key agreement algorithm.

The KDF output is:

OKM is the output keying material, which is exactly L octets. The OKM is the key-encryption key that is used to encrypt the content-encryption key or the content-authenticated-encryption key.

6. ASN.1 Module

This section contains the ASN.1 module for the two key management techniques defined in this document. This module imports types from other ASN.1 modules that are defined in [\[RFC5911\]](#) and [\[RFC5912\]](#).

CMSORIforPSK-2017

```
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
  smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-ori-psk-2017(TBD0) }
```

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

-- EXPORTS All

IMPORTS

AlgorithmIdentifier{}, KEY-DERIVATION

FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- [\[RFC5912\]](#)

```
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
  security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
  id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
```



```
OTHER-RECIPIENT, OtherRecipientInfo, CMSVersion,
KeyTransRecipientInfo, OriginatorIdentifierOrKey,
UserKeyingMaterial, RecipientEncryptedKeys, EncryptedKey,
KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier, KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier
  FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 -- \[RFC5911\]
    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
      pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
      id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) } ;
```

```
--
-- OtherRecipientInfo Types (ori-)
--
```

```
SupportedOtherRecipInfo OTHER-RECIPIENT ::= {
  ori-keyTransPSK |
  ori-keyAgreePSK,
  ... }
```

```
--
-- Key Transport with Pre-Shared Key
--
```

```
ori-keyTransPSK OTHER-RECIPIENT ::= {
  KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-ori-keyTransPSK }
```

```
id-ori OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
  rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) TBD1 }
```

```
id-ori-keyTransPSK OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ori 1 }
```

```
KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
  version CMSVersion, -- always set to 0
  pskid PreSharedKeyIdentifier,
  kdfAlgorithm KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier,
  keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
  ktris KeyTransRecipientInfos,
  encryptedKey EncryptedKey }
```

```
PreSharedKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
```

```
KeyTransRecipientInfos ::= SEQUENCE OF KeyTransRecipientInfo
```

```
--
-- Key Agreement with Pre-Shared Key
--
```

```
ori-keyAgreePSK ORI-TYPE ::= {
  KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-ori-keyAgreePSK }
```



```
id-ori-keyAgreePSK OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ori 2 }

KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    version CMSVersion, -- always set to 0
    pskid PreSharedKeyIdentifier,
    originator [0] EXPLICIT OriginatorIdentifierOrKey,
    ukm [1] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL,
    kdfAlgorithm KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier,
    keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
    recipientEncryptedKeys RecipientEncryptedKeys }

--
-- Structure to provide 'info' input to the KDF
--

CMSORIforPSKOtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyMgmtAlgType      ENUMERATED {
        keyTrans      (5),
        keyAgree      (10) },
    keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
    pskLength           INTEGER (1..MAX),
    kdkLength           INTEGER (1..MAX) }

END
```

7. Security Considerations

Implementations must protect the pre-shared key (PSK), key transport private key, the agreement private key, the key-derivation key, and the key-encryption key. Compromise of the PSK will make the encrypted content vulnerable to the future invention of a large-scale quantum computer. Compromise of the PSK and either the key transport private key or the agreement private key may result in the disclosure of all contents protected with that combination of keying material. Compromise of the PSK and the key-derivation key may result in disclosure of all contents protected with that combination of keying material. Compromise of the key-encryption key may result in the disclosure of all content-encryption keys or content-authenticated-encryption keys that were protected with that keying material, which in turn may result in the disclosure of the content.

A large-scale quantum computer will essentially negate the security provided by the key transport algorithm or the key agreement algorithm, which means that the attacker with a large-scale quantum computer can discover the key-derivation key. In addition a large-scale quantum computer effectively cuts the security provided by a symmetric key algorithm in half. Therefore, the PSK needs at least 256 bits of entropy to provide 128 bits of security. To match that

same level of security, the key derivation function needs to be quantum-resistant and produce a key-encryption key that is at least 256 bits in length. Similarly, the content-encryption key or content-authenticated-encryption key needs to be at least 256 bits in length.

When using a PSK with a key transport or a key agreement algorithm, a key-encryption key is produced to encrypt the content-encryption key or content-authenticated-encryption key. If the key-encryption algorithm is different than the algorithm used to protect the content, then the effective security is determined by the weaker of the two algorithms. If, for example, content is encrypted with 256-bit AES, and the key is wrapped with 128-bit AES, then at most 128 bits of protection is provided. Implementers must ensure that the key-encryption algorithm is as strong or stronger than the content-encryption algorithm or content-authenticated-encryption algorithm.

Implementers should not mix quantum-resistant key management algorithms with their non-quantum-resistant counterparts. For example, the same content should not be protected with KeyTransRecipientInfo and KeyTransPSKRecipientInfo. Likewise, the same content should not be protected with KeyAgreeRecipientInfo and KeyAgreePSKRecipientInfo. Doing so would make the content vulnerable to the future invention of a large-scale quantum computer.

Implementers should not send the same content in different messages, one using a quantum-resistant key management algorithm and the other using a non-quantum-resistant key management algorithm, even if the content-encryption key is generated independently. Doing so may allow an eavesdropper to correlate the messages, making the content vulnerable to the future invention of a large-scale quantum computer.

Sound cryptographic key hygiene is to use a key for one and only one purpose. Use of the recipient's public key for both the traditional CMS and the PSK-mixing variation specified in this document would be a violations of this principle; however, there is no known way for an attacker to take advantage of this situation. However, an application should enforce separation whenever possible. For example, an purpose identifier for use in the X.509 extended key usage certificate extension [[RFC5280](#)] could be identified in the future to indicate that a public key should only be used in conjunction with a PSK, or only without.

Implementations must randomly generate key-derivation keys as well as the content-encryption keys or content-authenticated-encryption keys. Also, the generation of public/private key pairs for the key transport and key agreement algorithms rely on a random numbers. The

use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys, searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. [\[RFC4086\]](#) offers important guidance in this area.

Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms become weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular cryptographic algorithm will be reduced. Therefore, cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular, allowing new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementors should be prepared for the set of supported algorithms to change over time.

8. Privacy Considerations

An observer can see which parties are using each PSK simply by watching the PSK key identifiers. However, the addition of these key identifiers is not really making privacy worse. When key transport is used, the RecipientIdentifier is always present, and it clearly identifies each recipient to an observer. When key agreement is used, either the IssuerAndSerialNumber or the RecipientKeyIdentifier is always present, and these clearly identify each recipient.

9. IANA Considerations

One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in the [Section 5](#) was assigned in the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifiers (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) [\[IANA-MOD\]](#) registry:

```
id-mod-cms-ori-psk-2017 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
    pkcs-9(9) smime(16) mod(0) TBD0 }
```

One object identifier for an arc to assign Other Recipient Info Identifiers was assigned in the SMI Security for S/MIME Mail Security (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16) [\[IANA-SMIME\]](#) registry:

```
id-ori OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
    rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) TBD1 }
```


This assignment created the new SMI Security for Other Recipient Info Identifiers (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.TBD1) [[IANA-ORI](#)] registry with the following two entries with references to this document:

```
id-ori-keyTransPSK OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
    iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)  
    pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-ori(TBD1) 1 }
```

```
id-ori-keyAgreePSK OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {  
    iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)  
    pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-ori(TBD1) 2 }
```

10. References

10.1. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), March 1997.
- [RFC5083] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", [RFC 5083](#), November 2007.
- [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", [RFC 5652](#), September 2009.
- [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in [RFC 2119](#) Key Words", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 8174](#), May 2017.
- [X680] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T Recommendation X.680, 2015.
- [X690] ITU-T, "Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015.

10.2. Informative References

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- [C2PQ] Hoffman, P., "The Transition from Classical to Post-Quantum Cryptography", work-in-progress, [draft-hoffman-c2pq-03](#), February 2018.

- [IANA-MOD] <https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#security-smime-0>.
- [IANA-SMIME] <https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#security-smime>.
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