Deployment Considerations for Secure Origin BGP (soBGP)
draft-white-sobgp-bgp-deployment-01

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2003-06-25
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-white-sobgp-bgp-deployment-01.txt

Abstract

There is a great deal of concern over the security of routing systems within the Internet, particularly in relation to the Border Gateway Protocol [BGP], which is used to provide routing information between autonomous systems. This draft addresses various deployment scenarios and options using the extensions to BGP outlined in [SOBGP-BGP] in conjunction with [SOBGP-KEY] (which is not yet completed or published) and [SOBGP-RADIUS]. Each section of this draft discusses a different deployment situation or deployment option. The final section discusses how private key rollovers can be accomplished with no loss of routing information within soBGP deployments.

Authors

Russ White (riw@cisco.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)