Thoughts about Digital Signatures for the Open Web Authentication (OAuth) Protocol
draft-tschofenig-oauth-signature-thoughts-00
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Hannes Tschofenig , Blaine Cook | ||
Last updated | 2010-10-18 | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The initial version of the Open Web Authentication Protocol (OAuth 1.0), often referred to as the community addition, included an mechanism for putting a digital signature (when using asymmetric keys) or a keyed message digest (when using symmetric keys) to a resource request when presenting the OAuth token. This cryptographic mechanism has lead to lots of discussions, particularly about the problems implementers had, the use cases it supports, and the benefit-cost tradeoff. This document tries to describe the use of the so-called 'OAuth Signature' mechamism in an unbiased and less emotional way with the main purpose to conclude the discussions.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)