Evolving the Web Public Key Infrastructure
draft-tschofenig-iab-webpki-evolution-01

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2014-05-23 (latest revision 2013-11-19)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-iab-webpki-evolution-01.txt

Abstract

The problems with the WebPKI have received the attention by the Internet security community when DigiNotar, a Dutch certification authority, had a security breach in 2011 and in the same year a Comodo affiliate was compromised. Both cases led to fraudulent issuance of certificates and raise questions regarding the strength of the WebPKI used by so many applications. Almost 2 years have passed since these incidents and various standardization activities have happened in the meanwhile offering new technical solutions to make the public key infrastructure more resilient. The important question, however, is which of the technical solutions will get widespread deployment? In this document we compare the different technical solutions in an attempt to engage the impacted stakeholders to trigger deployment actions to improve the status quo. This document does not include any recommendations what techniques to use.

Authors

Hannes Tschofenig (Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net)
Eliot Lear (elear@cisco.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)