Intentional SYN Drop for mitigation against SYN flooding attacks
draft-park-tcpm-intentional-syn-drop-option-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Sungwon Ahn , Minho Park | ||
| Last updated | 2019-06-07 (Latest revision 2018-12-04) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document proposes an option to mitigate SYN flooding attacks, called Intentional SYN Drop (ISD). This option can mitigate the SYN flooding attack by intentionally dropping the first SYN. It also includes a connection management mechanism to detect intelligent attackers who mimic normal clients. Therefore, it can effectively mitigate the SYN flooding DDoS attack.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)