Generation of Deterministic Initialization Vectors (IVs) and Nonces
draft-mcgrew-iv-gen-03
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | David McGrew | ||
| Last updated | 2014-04-18 (Latest revision 2013-10-15) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Many cryptographic algorithms use deterministic IVs, including CTR, GCM, CCM, GMAC. This type of IV is also called a (deterministic) nonce. Deterministic IVs must be distinct, for each fixed key, to guarantee the security of the algorithm. This note describes best practices for the generation of such IVs, and summarizes how they are generated and used in different protocols. Some problem areas are highlighted, and test considerations are outlined. This note will be useful to implementers of algorithms using deterministic IVs, and to protocol or system designers using them.
Authors
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