Firmware Updates for Internet of Things Devices - An Information Model for Manifests
draft-ietf-suit-information-model-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (suit WG)
Last updated 2018-07-02
Replaces draft-moran-suit-architecture
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SUIT                                                            B. Moran
Internet-Draft                                             H. Tschofenig
Intended status: Standards Track                             Arm Limited
Expires: January 3, 2019                                     H. Birkholz
                                                          Fraunhofer SIT
                                                           July 02, 2018

 Firmware Updates for Internet of Things Devices - An Information Model
                             for Manifests
                  draft-ietf-suit-information-model-01

Abstract

   Vulnerabilities with Internet of Things (IoT) devices have raised the
   need for a solid and secure firmware update mechanism that is also
   suitable for constrained devices.  Incorporating such update
   mechanism to fix vulnerabilities, to update configuration settings as
   well as adding new functionality is recommended by security experts.

   One component of such a firmware update is the meta-data, or
   manifest, that describes the firmware image(s) and offers appropriate
   protection.  This document describes all the information that must be
   present in the manifest.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Moran, et al.            Expires January 3, 2019                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    A Firmware Manifest Information Model        July 2018

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Motivation for Manifest Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Threat Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Threat Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.1.  Threat MFT1: Old Firmware . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.2.  Threat MFT2: Mismatched Firmware  . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.3.  Threat MFT3: Offline device + Old Firmware  . . . . .   7
       3.2.4.  Threat MFT4: The target device misinterprets the type
               of payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.5.  Threat MFT5: The target device installs the payload
               to the wrong location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.6.  Threat MFT6: Redirection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.7.  Threat MFT7: Payload Verification on Boot . . . . . .   8
       3.2.8.  Threat MFT8: Unauthenticated Updates  . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.9.  Threat MFT9: Unexpected Precursor images  . . . . . .   8
       3.2.10. Threat MFT10: Unqualified Firmware  . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.11. Threat MFT11: Reverse Engineering Of Firmware Image
               for Vulnerability Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.12. Threat MFT12: Overriding Critical Manifest Elements .  10
     3.3.  Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
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