Using Transport Layer Security (TLS) to Secure QUIC
draft-ietf-quic-tls-14

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (quic WG)
Last updated 2018-08-14 (latest revision 2018-06-27)
Replaces draft-thomson-quic-tls
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QUIC                                                     M. Thomson, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                   Mozilla
Intended status: Standards Track                          S. Turner, Ed.
Expires: February 16, 2019                                         sn3rd
                                                         August 15, 2018

          Using Transport Layer Security (TLS) to Secure QUIC
                         draft-ietf-quic-tls-14

Abstract

   This document describes how Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to
   secure QUIC.

Note to Readers

   Discussion of this draft takes place on the QUIC working group
   mailing list (quic@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=quic [1].

   Working Group information can be found at https://github.com/quicwg
   [2]; source code and issues list for this draft can be found at
   https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/labels/-tls [3].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 16, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Thomson & Turner        Expires February 16, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                QUIC over TLS                  August 2018

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  TLS Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Carrying TLS Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Interface to TLS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.1.  Sending and Receiving Handshake Messages  . . . . . .   9
       4.1.2.  Encryption Level Changes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.1.3.  TLS Interface Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  TLS Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.3.  ClientHello Size  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.4.  Peer Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.5.  Enabling 0-RTT  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.6.  Rejecting 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.7.  HelloRetryRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.8.  TLS Errors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.9.  Discarding Unused Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  QUIC Packet Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.1.  QUIC Packet Encryption Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       5.1.1.  Initial Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.2.  QUIC AEAD Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.3.  Packet Number Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       5.3.1.  AES-Based Packet Number Protection  . . . . . . . . .  20
       5.3.2.  ChaCha20-Based Packet Number Protection . . . . . . .  20
     5.4.  Receiving Protected Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.5.  Use of 0-RTT Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.6.  Receiving Out-of-Order Protected Frames . . . . . . . . .  21
   6.  Key Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   7.  Security of Initial Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   8.  QUIC-Specific Additions to the TLS Handshake  . . . . . . . .  24
     8.1.  Protocol and Version Negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     8.2.  QUIC Transport Parameters Extension . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     9.1.  Packet Reflection Attack Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . .  25
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