Using Transport Layer Security (TLS) to Secure QUIC
draft-ietf-quic-tls-00

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (quic WG)
Last updated 2016-11-28
Replaces draft-thomson-quic-tls
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QUIC                                                     M. Thomson, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                   Mozilla
Intended status: Standards Track                      S. Turner, Ed, Ed.
Expires: June 1, 2017                                              sn3rd
                                                       November 28, 2016

          Using Transport Layer Security (TLS) to Secure QUIC
                         draft-ietf-quic-tls-00

Abstract

   This document describes how Transport Layer Security (TLS) can be
   used to secure QUIC.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 1, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Thomson & Turner, Ed      Expires June 1, 2017                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                QUIC over TLS                November 2016

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Handshake Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  TLS in Stream 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Handshake and Setup Sequence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  QUIC Packet Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Key Phases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.1.  Retransmission of TLS Handshake Messages  . . . . . .  10
       4.1.2.  Distinguishing 0-RTT and 1-RTT Packets  . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  QUIC Key Expansion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.2.1.  0-RTT Secret  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.2.2.  1-RTT Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.2.3.  Packet Protection Key and IV  . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.3.  QUIC AEAD Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.4.  Key Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.5.  Packet Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  Pre-handshake QUIC Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.1.  Unprotected Frames Prior to Handshake Completion  . . . .  17
       5.1.1.  STREAM Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.1.2.  ACK Frames  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.1.3.  WINDOW_UPDATE Frames  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.1.4.  Denial of Service with Unprotected Packets  . . . . .  18
     5.2.  Use of 0-RTT Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.3.  Protected Frames Prior to Handshake Completion  . . . . .  19
   6.  QUIC-Specific Additions to the TLS Handshake  . . . . . . . .  20
     6.1.  Protocol and Version Negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     6.2.  QUIC Extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.3.  Source Address Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.4.  Priming 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.1.  Packet Reflection Attack Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.2.  Peer Denial of Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Appendix A.  Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
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