DHCPv6-Shield: Protecting Against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers
draft-ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield-07

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (opsec WG)
Last updated 2015-05-15
Replaces draft-gont-opsec-dhcpv6-shield
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Best Current Practice
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Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Chittimaneni Kk
Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2014-12-31)
IESG IESG state Approved-announcement to be sent::Point Raised - writeup needed
Consensus Boilerplate Yes
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Responsible AD Joel Jaeggli
Send notices to draft-ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield@ietf.org, draft-ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield.ad@ietf.org, draft-ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield.shepherd@ietf.org, kk.chittimaneni@gmail.com, opsec-chairs@ietf.org, brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com
IANA IANA review state Version Changed - Review Needed
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opsec                                                            F. Gont
Internet-Draft                                    SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Intended status: Best Current Practice                            W. Liu
Expires: November 16, 2015                           Huawei Technologies
                                                         G. Van de Velde
                                                          Alcatel-Lucent
                                                            May 15, 2015

         DHCPv6-Shield: Protecting Against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers
                   draft-ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield-07

Abstract

   This document specifies a mechanism for protecting hosts connected to
   a switched network against rogue DHCPv6 servers.  It is based on
   DHCPv6 packet-filtering at the layer-2 device at which the packets
   are received.  A similar mechanism has been widely deployed in IPv4
   networks ('DHCP snooping'), and hence it is desirable that similar
   functionality be provided for IPv6 networks.  This document specifies
   a Best Current Practice for the implementation of DHCPv6 Shield.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 16, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

Gont, et al.            Expires November 16, 2015               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                DHCPv6-Shield                     May 2015

   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  DHCPv6-Shield Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  DHCPv6-Shield Implementation Requirements . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   This document specifies DHCPv6-Shield: a mechanism for protecting
   hosts connected to a switched network against rogue DHCPv6 servers
   [RFC3315].  The basic concept behind DHCPv6-Shield is that a layer-2
   device filters DHCPv6 messages intended for DHCPv6 clients
   (henceforth "DHCPv6-server messages"), according to a number of
   different criteria.  The most basic filtering criterion is that
   DHCPv6-server messages are discarded by the layer-2 device unless
   they are received on specific ports of the layer-2 device.

   Before the DHCPv6-Shield device is deployed, the administrator
   specifies the layer-2 port(s) on which DHCPv6-server messages are to
   be allowed.  Only those ports to which a DHCPv6 server or relay is to
   be connected should be specified as such.  Once deployed, the
   DHCPv6-Shield device inspects received packets, and allows (i.e.
   passes) DHCPv6-server messages only if they are received on layer-2
   ports that have been explicitly configured for such purpose.

   DHCPv6-Shield is analogous to the RA-Guard mechanism [RFC6104]
   [RFC6105] [RFC7113], intended for protection against rogue Router
   Advertisement [RFC4861] messages.

   We note that DHCPv6-Shield mitigates only DHCPv6-based attacks
   against hosts.  Attack vectors based on other messages meant for
   network configuration (such as ICMPv6 Router Advertisements) are not
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