Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-05

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (idr WG)
Last updated 2017-01-09
Replaces draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation
Replaced by draft-ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text pdf html bibtex
Additional URLs
- Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd No shepherd assigned
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
IDR and SIDR                                                   K. Sriram
Internet-Draft                                             D. Montgomery
Intended status: Standards Track                                 US NIST
Expires: July 13, 2017                                        B. Dickson

                                                                K. Patel
                                                                  Arrcus
                                                          A. Robachevsky
                                                        Internet Society
                                                         January 9, 2017

        Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
           draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-05

Abstract

   [I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition] provides a definition
   of the route leak problem, and also enumerates several types of route
   leaks.  This document first examines which of those route-leak types
   are detected and mitigated by the existing origin validation (OV)
   [RFC 6811].  It is recognized that OV offers a limited detection and
   mitigation capability against route leaks.  This document specifies
   enhancements that significantly extend the route-leak prevention,
   detection, and mitigation capabilities of BGP.  One solution
   component involves carrying a per-hop route-leak protection (RLP)
   field in BGP updates.  The RLP field is proposed to be carried in a
   new optional transitive attribute, called BGP RLP attribute.  The
   solution is meant to be initially implemented as an enhancement of
   BGP without requiring BGPsec [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].
   However, when BGPsec is deployed in the future, the solution can be
   incorporated in BGPsec, enabling cryptographic protection for the RLP
   field.  That would be one way of implementing the proposed solution
   in a secure way.  The document also includes a stopgap method for
   detection and mitigation of route leaks for an intermediate phase
   when OV is deployed but BGP protocol on the wire is unchanged.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Sriram, et al.            Expires July 13, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     Route Leak Detection and Mitigation      January 2017

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 13, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Related Prior Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Mechanisms for Detection and Mitigation of Route Leaks  . . .   4
     3.1.  Route-Leak Protection (RLP) Field Encoding by Sending
           Router  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.1.  BGP RLP Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.1.2.  Carrying RLP Flag Values in the BGPsec Flags  . . . .   9
     3.2.  Intra-AS Messaging for Route Leak Prevention  . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  Recommended Actions at a Receiving Router for Detection
           of Route Leaks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.4.  Possible Actions at a Receiving Router for Mitigation . .  11
   4.  Stopgap Solution when Only Origin Validation is Deployed  . .  11
   5.  Design Rationale and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  Is route-leak solution without cryptographic protection a
           serious attack vector?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  Combining results of route-leak detection, OV and BGPsec
           validation for path selection decision  . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.3.  Are there cases when valley-free violations can be
           considered legitimate?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
Show full document text