Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-02

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Replaces draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation
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IDR and SIDR                                                   K. Sriram
Internet-Draft                                             D. Montgomery
Intended status: Standards Track                                 US NIST
Expires: September 15, 2016                                   B. Dickson

                                                                K. Patel
                                                                   Cisco
                                                          A. Robachevsky
                                                        Internet Society
                                                          March 14, 2016

        Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
           draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-02

Abstract

   In [I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition], the authors have
   provided a definition of the route leak problem, and also enumerated
   several types of route leaks.  In this document, we first examine
   which of those route-leak types are detected and mitigated by the
   existing origin validation (OV) [RFC 6811].  It is recognized that OV
   offers a limited detection and mitigation capability against route
   leaks.  This document proposes an enhancement that significantly
   extends the route-leak detection and mitigation capabilities of BGP.
   The solution involves carrying a per-hop route-leak protection (RLP)
   field in BGP updates.  The RLP field is proposed be carried in an
   optional transitive path attribute.  The solution is meant to be
   initially implemented as an enhancement of BGP without requiring
   BGPsec [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].  However, when BGPsec is
   deployed in the future, the solution can be incorporated in BGPsec,
   enabling cryptographic protection for the RLP field.  That would be
   one way of implementing the proposed solution in a secure way.  It is
   not claimed that the solution detects all possible types of route
   leaks but it detects several types, especially considering some
   significant route-leak occurrences that have been observed in recent
   years.  The document also includes a stopgap method for detection and
   mitigation of route leaks for an intermediate phase when OV is
   deployed but BGP protocol on the wire is unchanged.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute

Sriram, et al.         Expires September 15, 2016               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     Route Leak Detection and Mitigation        March 2016

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 15, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Related Prior Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Mechanisms for Detection and Mitigation of Route Leaks  . . .   4
     3.1.  Route-Leak Protection (RLP) Field Encoding by Sending
           Router  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Recommended Actions at a Receiving Router for Detection
           of Route Leaks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  Possible Actions at a Receiving Router for Mitigation . .   9
   4.  Stopgap Solution when Only Origin Validation is Deployed  . .   9
   5.  Design Rationale and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Is route-leak solution without cryptographic protection a
           serious attack vector?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  Combining results of route-leak detection, OV and BGPsec
           validation for path selection decision  . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.3.  Are there cases when valley-free violations can be
           considered legitimate?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
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