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Distributed Node Consensus Protocol
draft-ietf-homenet-dncp-10

The information below is for an old version of the document.
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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 7787.
Authors Markus Stenberg , Steven Barth
Last updated 2015-09-21
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Mark Townsley
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Needs a YES. Needs 10 more YES or NO OBJECTION positions to pass.
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Send notices to homenet-chairs@ietf.org, draft-ietf-homenet-dncp@ietf.org, draft-ietf-homenet-dncp.shepherd@ietf.org, draft-ietf-homenet-dncp.ad@ietf.org, "Mark Townsley" <mark@townsley.net>
IANA IANA review state Version Changed - Review Needed
draft-ietf-homenet-dncp-10
Homenet Working Group                                        M. Stenberg
Internet-Draft                                                  S. Barth
Intended status: Standards Track                             Independent
Expires: March 24, 2016                               September 21, 2015

                  Distributed Node Consensus Protocol
                       draft-ietf-homenet-dncp-10

Abstract

   This document describes the Distributed Node Consensus Protocol
   (DNCP), a generic state synchronization protocol that uses the
   Trickle algorithm and hash trees.  DNCP is an abstract protocol, and
   must be combined with a specific profile to make a complete
   implementable protocol.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 24, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Hash Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Data Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Trickle-Driven Status Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.4.  Processing of Received TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.5.  Adding and Removing Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.6.  Data Liveliness Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Data Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Optional Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.1.  Keep-Alives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.1.1.  Data Model Additions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.1.2.  Per-Endpoint Periodic Keep-Alives . . . . . . . . . .  17
       6.1.3.  Per-Peer Periodic Keep-Alives . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       6.1.4.  Received TLV Processing Additions . . . . . . . . . .  17
       6.1.5.  Peer Removal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.2.  Support For Dense Multicast-Enabled Links . . . . . . . .  18
   7.  Type-Length-Value Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.1.  Request TLVs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       7.1.1.  Request Network State TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       7.1.2.  Request Node State TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     7.2.  Data TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       7.2.1.  Node Endpoint TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       7.2.2.  Network State TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       7.2.3.  Node State TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     7.3.  Data TLVs within Node State TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       7.3.1.  Peer TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       7.3.2.  Keep-Alive Interval TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   8.  Security and Trust Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     8.1.  Pre-Shared Key Based Trust Method . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     8.2.  PKI Based Trust Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     8.3.  Certificate Based Trust Consensus Method  . . . . . . . .  24
       8.3.1.  Trust Verdicts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       8.3.2.  Trust Cache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       8.3.3.  Announcement of Verdicts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       8.3.4.  Bootstrap Ceremonies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   9.  DNCP Profile-Specific Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     12.1.  Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     12.2.  Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31

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   Appendix A.  Alternative Modes of Operation . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     A.1.  Read-only Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     A.2.  Forwarding Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   Appendix B.  DNCP Profile Additional Guidance . . . . . . . . . .  32
     B.1.  Unicast Transport - UDP or TCP? . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     B.2.  (Optional) Multicast Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     B.3.  (Optional) Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   Appendix C.  Example Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   Appendix D.  Some Questions and Answers [RFC Editor: please
                remove]  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   Appendix E.  Changelog [RFC Editor: please remove]  . . . . . . .  35
   Appendix F.  Draft Source [RFC Editor: please remove] . . . . . .  37
   Appendix G.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37

1.  Introduction

   DNCP is designed to provide a way for each participating node to
   publish a small set of TLV (Type-Length-Value) tuples (at most 64
   KB), and to provide a shared and common view about the data published
   by every currently or recently bidirectionally reachable DNCP node in
   a network.

   For state synchronization a hash tree is used.  It is formed by first
   calculating a hash for the dataset published by each node, called
   node data, and then calculating another hash over those node data
   hashes.  The single resulting hash, called network state hash, is
   transmitted using the Trickle algorithm [RFC6206] to ensure that all
   nodes share the same view of the current state of the published data
   within the network.  The use of Trickle with only short network state
   hashes sent infrequently (in steady state, once the maximum Trickle
   interval per link or unicast connection has been reached) makes DNCP
   very thrifty when updates happen rarely.

   For maintaining liveliness of the topology and the data within it, a
   combination of Trickled network state, keep-alives, and "other" means
   of ensuring reachability are used.  The core idea is that if every
   node ensures its peers are present, transitively, the whole network
   state also stays up-to-date.

1.1.  Applicability

   DNCP is most suitable for data that changes only infrequently to gain
   the maximum benefit from using Trickle.  As the network of nodes
   grows, or the frequency of data changes per node increases, Trickle
   is eventually used less and less and the benefit of using DNCP
   diminishes.  In these cases Trickle just provides extra complexity
   within the specification and little added value.

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   The suitability of DNCP for a particular application can roughly be
   evaluated by considering the expected average network-wide state
   change interval A_NC_I; it is computed by dividing the mean interval
   at which a node originates a new TLV set by the number of
   participating nodes.  If keep-alives are used, A_NC_I is the minimum
   of the computed A_NC_I and the keep-alive interval.  If A_NC_I is
   less than the (application-specific) Trickle minimum interval, DNCP
   is most likely unsuitable for the application as Trickle will not be
   utilized most of the time.

   If constant rapid state changes are needed, the preferable choice is
   to use an additional point-to-point channel whose address or locator
   is published using DNCP.  Nevertheless, if doing so does not raise
   A_NC_I above the (sensibly chosen) Trickle interval parameters for a
   particular application, using DNCP is probably not suitable for the
   application.

   Another consideration is the size of the published TLV set by a node
   compared to the size of deltas in the TLV set.  If the TLV set
   published by a node is very large, and has frequent small changes,
   DNCP as currently specified in this specification may be unsuitable
   as it lacks a delta synchronization scheme to keep implementation
   simple.

   DNCP can be used in networks where only unicast transport is
   available.  While DNCP uses the least amount of bandwidth when
   multicast is utilized, even in pure unicast mode, the use of Trickle
   (ideally with k < 2) results in a protocol with an exponential
   backoff timer and fewer transmissions than a simpler protocol not
   using Trickle.

2.  Terminology

   DNCP profile      the values for the set of parameters, given in
                     Section 9. They are prefixed with DNCP_ in this
                     document. The profile also specifies the set of
                     optional DNCP extensions to be used. For a simple
                     example DNCP profile, see Appendix C.

   DNCP-based        a protocol which provides a DNCP profile, according
   protocol          to Section 9, and zero or more TLV assignments from
                     the per-DNCP profile TLV registry as well as their
                     processing rules.

   DNCP node         a single node which runs a DNCP-based protocol.

   Link              a link-layer media over which directly connected
                     nodes can communicate.

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   DNCP network      a set of DNCP nodes running DNCP-based protocol(s)
                     with matching DNCP profile(s).  The set consists of
                     nodes that have discovered each other using the
                     transport method defined in the DNCP profile, via
                     multicast on local links, and / or by using unicast
                     communication.

   Node identifier   an opaque fixed-length identifier consisting of
                     DNCP_NODE_IDENTIFIER_LENGTH bytes which uniquely
                     identifies a DNCP node within a DNCP network.

   Interface         a node's attachment to a particular link.

   Address           an identifier used as source or destination of a
                     DNCP message flow, e.g., a tuple (IPv6 address, UDP
                     port) for an IPv6 UDP transport.

   Endpoint          a locally configured termination point for
                     (potential or established) DNCP message flows. An
                     endpoint is the source and destination for separate
                     unicast message flows to individual nodes and
                     optionally for multicast messages to all thereby
                     reachable nodes (e.g., for node discovery).
                     Endpoints are usually in one of the transport modes
                     specified in Section 4.2.

   Endpoint          a 32-bit opaque and locally unique value, which
   identifier        identifies a particular endpoint of a particular
                     DNCP node. The value 0 is reserved for DNCP and
                     DNCP-based protocol purposes and not used to
                     identify an actual endpoint. This definition is in
                     sync with the interface index definition in
                     [RFC3493], as the non-zero small positive integers
                     should comfortably fit within 32 bits.

   Peer              another DNCP node with which a DNCP node
                     communicates using a particular local and remote
                     endpoint pair.

   Node data         a set of TLVs published and owned by a node in the
                     DNCP network. Other nodes pass it along as-is, even
                     if they cannot fully interpret it.

   Origination Time  the (estimated) time when the node data set with
                     the current sequence number was published.

   Node state        a set of metadata attributes for node data. It
                     includes a sequence number for versioning, a hash

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                     value for comparing equality of stored node data,
                     and a timestamp indicating the time passed since
                     its last publication (i.e., since the origination
                     time). The hash function and the length of the hash
                     value are defined in the DNCP profile.

   Network state     a hash value which represents the current state of
   hash              the network.  The hash function and the length of
                     the hash value are defined in the DNCP profile.
                     Whenever a node is added, removed or updates its
                     published node data this hash value changes as
                     well.  For calculation, please see Section 4.1.

   Trust verdict     a statement about the trustworthiness of a
                     certificate announced by a node participating in
                     the certificate based trust consensus mechanism.

   Effective trust   the trust verdict with the highest priority within
   verdict           the set of trust verdicts announced for the
                     certificate in the DNCP network.

   Topology graph    the undirected graph of DNCP nodes produced by
                     retaining only bidirectional peer relationships
                     between nodes.

   Bidirectionally   a peer is locally unidirectionally reachable if a
   reachable         recent and consistent multicast or any unicast DNCP
                     message has been received by the local node (see
                     Section 4.5).  If said peer in return also
                     considers the local node unidirectionally
                     reachable, then bidirectionally reachability is
                     established.  As this process is based on
                     publishing peer relationships and evaluating the
                     resulting topology graph as described in Section
                     4.6, this information is available to the whole
                     DNCP network.

   Trickle Instance  a distinct Trickle [RFC6206] algorithm state kept
                     by a node (Section 5) and related to an endpoint or
                     a particular (peer, endpoint) tuple with Trickle
                     variables I, t and c. See Section 4.3.

2.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
   2119 [RFC2119].

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3.  Overview

   DNCP operates primarily using unicast exchanges between nodes, and
   may use multicast for Trickle-based shared state dissemination and
   topology discovery.  If used in pure unicast mode with unreliable
   transport, Trickle is also used between peers.

   DNCP discovers the topology of the nodes in the DNCP network and
   maintains the liveliness of published node data by ensuring that the
   publishing node is bidirectionally reachable.  New potential peers
   can be discovered autonomously on multicast-enabled links, their
   addresses may be manually configured or they may be found by some
   other means defined in the particular DNCP profile.  The DNCP profile
   may specify, for example, a well-known anycast address or
   provisioning the remote address to contact via some other protocol
   such as DHCPv6 [RFC3315].

   A hash tree of height 1, rooted in itself, is maintained by each node
   to represent the state of all currently reachable nodes (see
   Section 4.1) and the Trickle algorithm is used to trigger
   synchronization (see Section 4.3).  The need to check peer nodes for
   state changes is thereby determined by comparing the current root of
   their respective hash trees, i.e., their individually calculated
   network state hashes.

   Before joining a DNCP network, a node starts with a hash tree that
   has only one leaf if the node publishes some TLVs, and no leaves
   otherwise.  It then announces the network state hash calculated from
   the hash tree by means of the Trickle algorithm on all its configured
   endpoints.

   When an update is detected by a node (e.g., by receiving a different
   network state hash from a peer) the originator of the event is
   requested to provide a list of the state of all nodes, i.e., all the
   information it uses to calculate its own hash tree.  The node uses
   the list to determine whether its own information is outdated and -
   if necessary - requests the actual node data that has changed.

   Whenever a node's local copy of any node data and its hash tree are
   updated (e.g., due to its own or another node's node state changing
   or due to a peer being added or removed) its Trickle instances are
   reset which eventually causes any update to be propagated to all of
   its peers.

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4.  Operation

4.1.  Hash Tree

   Each DNCP node maintains an arbitrary width hash tree of height 1.
   Each leaf represents one bidirectionally reachable DNCP node (see
   Section 4.6), and is represented by a tuple consisting of the node's
   sequence number in network byte order concatenated with the hash-
   value of the node's ordered node data published in the Node State TLV
   (Section 7.2.3).  These leaves are ordered in ascending order of the
   node identifiers of the nodes they represent.  The root of the tree -
   the network state hash - is represented by the hash-value calculated
   over all such leaf tuples concatenated in order.  It is used to
   determine whether the view of the network of two or more nodes is
   consistent and shared.

   The node data hashes in the leaves and the root network state hash
   are updated on-demand and whenever any locally stored per-node state
   changes.  This includes local unidirectional reachability encoded in
   the published Peer TLVs (Section 7.3.1) and - when combined with
   remote data - results in awareness of bidirectional reachability
   changes.

4.2.  Data Transport

   DNCP has few requirements for the underlying transport; it requires
   some way of transmitting either unicast datagram or stream data to a
   peer and, if used in multicast mode, a way of sending multicast
   datagrams.  As multicast is used only to identify potential new DNCP
   nodes and to send status messages which merely notify that a unicast
   exchange should be triggered, the multicast transport does not have
   to be secured.  If unicast security is desired and one of the built-
   in security methods is to be used, support for some TLS-derived
   transport scheme - such as TLS [RFC5246] on top of TCP or DTLS
   [RFC6347] on top of UDP - is also required.  They provide for
   integrity protection and confidentiality of the node data, as well as
   authentication and authorization using the schemes defined in
   Security and Trust Management (Section 8).  A specific definition of
   the transport(s) in use and their parameters MUST be provided by the
   DNCP profile.

   TLVs are sent across the transport as is, and they SHOULD be sent
   together where, e.g., MTU considerations do not recommend sending
   them in multiple batches.  TLVs in general are handled individually
   and statelessly, with one exception: To form bidirectional peer
   relationships DNCP requires identification of the endpoints used for
   communication.  As bidirectional peer relationships are required for
   validating liveliness of published node data as described in

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   Section 4.6, a DNCP node MUST send a Node Endpoint TLV
   (Section 7.2.1).  When it is sent varies, depending on the underlying
   transport, but conceptually it should be available whenever
   processing a Network State TLV:

   o  If using a stream transport, the TLV MUST be sent at least once
      per connection, but SHOULD NOT be sent more than once.

   o  If using a datagram transport, it MUST be included in every
      datagram that also contains a Network State TLV (Section 7.2.2)
      and MUST be located before any such TLV.  It SHOULD also be
      included in any other datagram, to speed up initial peer
      detection.

   Given the assorted transport options as well as potential endpoint
   configuration, a DNCP endpoint may be used in various transport
   modes:

   Unicast:

      *  If only reliable unicast transport is used, Trickle is not used
         at all.  Where Trickle reset has been specified, a single
         Network State TLV (Section 7.2.2) is sent instead to every
         unicast peer.  Additionally, recently changed Node State TLVs
         (Section 7.2.3) MAY be included.

      *  If only unreliable unicast transport is used, Trickle state is
         kept per peer and it is used to send Network State TLVs
         intermittently, as specified in Section 4.3.

   Multicast+Unicast:  If multicast datagram transport is available on
      an endpoint, Trickle state is only maintained for the endpoint as
      a whole.  It is used to send Network State TLVs periodically, as
      specified in Section 4.3.  Additionally, per-endpoint keep-alives
      MAY be defined in the DNCP profile, as specified in Section 6.1.2.

   MulticastListen+Unicast:  Just like Unicast, except multicast
      transmissions are listened to in order to detect changes of the
      highest node identifier.  This mode is used only if the DNCP
      profile supports dense multicast-enabled link optimization
      (Section 6.2).

4.3.  Trickle-Driven Status Updates

   The Trickle algorithm [RFC6206] has 3 parameters: Imin, Imax and k.
   Imin and Imax represent the minimum value for I and the maximum
   number of doublings of Imin, where I is the time interval during
   which at least k Trickle updates must be seen on an endpoint to

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   prevent local state transmission.  The actual suggested Trickle
   algorithm parameters are DNCP profile specific, as described in
   Section 9.

   The Trickle state for all Trickle instances defined in Section 5 is
   considered inconsistent and reset if and only if the locally
   calculated network state hash changes.  This occurs either due to a
   change in the local node's own node data, or due to receipt of more
   recent data from another node.  A node MUST NOT reset its Trickle
   state merely based on receiving a Network State TLV (Section 7.2.2)
   with a network state hash which is different from its locally
   calculated one.

   Every time a particular Trickle instance indicates that an update
   should be sent, the node MUST send a Network State TLV
   (Section 7.2.2) if and only if:

   o  the endpoint is in Multicast+Unicast transport mode, in which case
      the TLV MUST be sent over multicast.

   o  the endpoint is NOT in Multicast+Unicast transport mode, and the
      unicast transport is unreliable, in which case the TLV MUST be
      sent over unicast.

   A (sub)set of all Node State TLVs (Section 7.2.3) MAY also be
   included, unless it is defined as undesirable for some reason by the
   DNCP profile, or to avoid exposure of the node state TLVs by
   transmitting them within insecure multicast when using secure
   unicast.

4.4.  Processing of Received TLVs

   This section describes how received TLVs are processed.  The DNCP
   profile may specify when to ignore particular TLVs, e.g., to modify
   security properties - see Section 9 for what may be safely defined to
   be ignored in a profile.  Any 'reply' mentioned in the steps below
   denotes sending of the specified TLV(s) over unicast to the
   originator of the TLV being processed.  If the TLV being replied to
   was received via multicast and it was sent to a multiple access link,
   the reply MUST be delayed by a random timespan in [0, Imin/2], to
   avoid potential simultaneous replies that may cause problems on some
   links, unless specified differently in the DNCP profile.  Sending of
   replies MAY also be rate-limited or omitted for a short period of
   time by an implementation.  However, if the TLV is not forbidden by
   the DNCP profile, an implementation MUST reply to retransmissions of
   the TLV with a non-zero probability to avoid starvation which would
   break the state synchronization.

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   A DNCP node MUST process TLVs received from any valid (e.g.,
   correctly scoped) address, as specified by the DNCP profile and the
   configuration of a particular endpoint, whether this address is known
   to be the address of a peer or not.  This provision satisfies the
   needs of monitoring or other host software that needs to discover the
   DNCP topology without adding to the state in the network.

   Upon receipt of:

   o  Request Network State TLV (Section 7.1.1): The receiver MUST reply
      with a Network State TLV (Section 7.2.2) and a Node State TLV
      (Section 7.2.3) for each node data used to calculate the network
      state hash.  The Node State TLVs SHOULD NOT contain the optional
      node data part to avoid redundant transmission of node data,
      unless explicitly specified in the DNCP profile.

   o  Request Node State TLV (Section 7.1.2): If the receiver has node
      data for the corresponding node, it MUST reply with a Node State
      TLV (Section 7.2.3) for the corresponding node.  The optional node
      data part MUST be included in the TLV.

   o  Network State TLV (Section 7.2.2): If the network state hash
      differs from the locally calculated network state hash, and the
      receiver is unaware of any particular node state differences with
      the sender, the receiver MUST reply with a Request Network State
      TLV (Section 7.1.1).  These replies MUST be rate limited to only
      at most one reply per link per unique network state hash within
      Imin.  The simplest way to ensure this rate limit is a timestamp
      indicating requests, and sending at most one Request Network State
      TLV (Section 7.1.1) per Imin.  To facilitate faster state
      synchronization, if a Request Network State TLV is sent in a
      reply, a local, current Network State TLV MAY also be sent.

   o  Node State TLV (Section 7.2.3):

      *  If the node identifier matches the local node identifier and
         the TLV has a greater sequence number than its current local
         value, or the same sequence number and a different hash, the
         node SHOULD re-publish its own node data with a sequence number
         significantly (e.g., 1000) greater than the received one, to
         reclaim the node identifier.  This difference is needed in
         order to ensure that it is higher than any potentially
         lingering copies of the node state in the network.  This may
         occur normally once due to the local node restarting and not
         storing the most recently used sequence number.  If this occurs
         more than once or for nodes not re-publishing their own node
         data, the DNCP profile MUST provide guidance on how to handle

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         these situations as it indicates the existence of another
         active node with the same node identifier.

      *  If the node identifier does not match the local node
         identifier, and one or more of the following conditions are
         true:

         +  The local information is outdated for the corresponding node
            (local sequence number is less than that within the TLV).

         +  The local information is potentially incorrect (local
            sequence number matches but the node data hash differs).

         +  There is no data for that node altogether.

         Then:

         +  If the TLV contains the Node Data field, it SHOULD also be
            verified by ensuring that the locally calculated hash of the
            Node Data matches the content of the H(Node Data) field
            within the TLV.  If they differ, the TLV SHOULD be ignored
            and not processed further.

         +  If the TLV does not contain the Node Data field, and the
            H(Node Data) field within the TLV differs from the local
            node data hash for that node (or there is none), the
            receiver MUST reply with a Request Node State TLV
            (Section 7.1.2) for the corresponding node.

         +  Otherwise the receiver MUST update its locally stored state
            for that node (node data based on Node Data field if
            present, sequence number and relative time) to match the
            received TLV.

      For comparison purposes of the sequence number, a looping
      comparison function MUST be used to avoid problems in case of
      overflow.  The comparison function a < b <=> ((a - b) % (2^32)) &
      (2^31) != 0 where (a % b) represents the remainder of a modulo b
      and (a & b) represents bitwise conjunction of a and b is
      RECOMMENDED unless the DNCP profile defines another.

   o  Any other TLV: TLVs not recognized by the receiver MUST be
      silently ignored unless they are sent within another TLV (for
      example, TLVs within the Node Data field of a Node State TLV).

   If secure unicast transport is configured for an endpoint, any Node
   State TLVs received over insecure multicast MUST be silently ignored.

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4.5.  Adding and Removing Peers

   When receiving a Node Endpoint TLV (Section 7.2.1) on an endpoint
   from an unknown peer:

   o  If received over unicast, the remote node MUST be added as a peer
      on the endpoint and a Peer TLV (Section 7.3.1) MUST be created for
      it.

   o  If received over multicast, the node MAY be sent a (possibly rate-
      limited) unicast Request Network State TLV (Section 7.1.1).

   If keep-alives specified in Section 6.1 are NOT sent by the peer
   (either the DNCP profile does not specify the use of keep-alives or
   the particular peer chooses not to send keep-alives), some other
   existing local transport-specific means (such as Ethernet carrier-
   detection or TCP keep-alive) MUST be used to ensure its presence.  If
   the peer does not send keep-alives, and no means to verify presence
   of the peer are available, the peer MUST be considered no longer
   present and it SHOULD NOT be added back as a peer until it starts
   sending keep-alives again.  When the peer is no longer present, the
   Peer TLV and the local DNCP peer state MUST be removed.

   If the local endpoint is in the Multicast-Listen+Unicast transport
   mode, a Peer TLV (Section 7.3.1) MUST NOT be published for the peers
   not having the highest node identifier.

4.6.  Data Liveliness Validation

   The topology graph MUST be traversed either immediately or with a
   small delay shorter than the DNCP profile-defined Trickle Imin,
   whenever:

   o  A Peer TLV or a whole node is added or removed, or

   o  the origination time (in milliseconds) of some node's node data is
      less than current time - 2^32 + 2^15.

   The topology graph traversal starts with the local node marked as
   reachable.  Other nodes are then iteratively marked as reachable
   using the following algorithm: A candidate not-yet-reachable node N
   with an endpoint NE is marked as reachable if there is a reachable
   node R with an endpoint RE that meet all of the following criteria:

   o  The origination time (in milliseconds) of R's node data is greater
      than current time - 2^32 + 2^15.

   o  R publishes a Peer TLV with:

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      *  Peer Node Identifier = N's node identifier

      *  Peer Endpoint Identifier = NE's endpoint identifier

      *  Endpoint Identifier = RE's endpoint identifier

   o  N publishes a Peer TLV with:

      *  Peer Node Identifier = R's node identifier

      *  Peer Endpoint Identifier = RE's endpoint identifier

      *  Endpoint Identifier = NE's endpoint identifier

   The algorithm terminates, when no more candidate nodes fulfilling
   these criteria can be found.

   DNCP nodes that have not been reachable in the most recent topology
   graph traversal MUST NOT be used for calculation of the network state
   hash, be provided to any applications that need to use the whole TLV
   graph, or be provided to remote nodes.  They MAY be forgotten
   immediately after the topology graph traversal, however it is
   RECOMMENDED to keep them at least briefly to improve the speed of
   DNCP network state convergence.  This reduces the number of queries
   needed to reconverge during both initial network convergence and when
   a part of the network loses and regains bidirectional connectivity
   within that time period.

5.  Data Model

   This section describes the local data structures a minimal
   implementation might use.  This section is provided only as a
   convenience for the implementor.  Some of the optional extensions
   (Section 6) describe additional data requirements, and some optional
   parts of the core protocol may also require more.

   A DNCP node has:

   o  A data structure containing data about the most recently sent
      Request Network State TLVs (Section 7.1.1).  The simplest option
      is keeping a timestamp of the most recent request (required to
      fulfill reply rate limiting specified in Section 4.4).

   A DNCP node has for every DNCP node in the DNCP network:

   o  Node identifier: the unique identifier of the node.  The length,
      how it is produced, and how collisions are handled, is up to the
      DNCP profile.

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   o  Node data: the set of TLV tuples published by that particular
      node.  As they are transmitted ordered (see Node State TLV
      (Section 7.2.3) for details), maintaining the order within the
      data structure here may be reasonable.

   o  Latest sequence number: the 32-bit sequence number that is
      incremented any time the TLV set is published.  The comparison
      function used to compare them is described in Section 4.4.

   o  Origination time: the (estimated) time when the current TLV set
      with the current sequence number was published.  It is used to
      populate the Milliseconds Since Origination field in a Node State
      TLV (Section 7.2.3).  Ideally it also has millisecond accuracy.

   Additionally, a DNCP node has a set of endpoints for which DNCP is
   configured to be used.  For each such endpoint, a node has:

   o  Endpoint identifier: the 32-bit opaque locally unique value
      identifying the endpoint within a node.  It SHOULD NOT be reused
      immediately after an endpoint is disabled.

   o  Trickle instance: the endpoint's Trickle instance with parameters
      I, T, and c (only on an endpoint in Multicast+Unicast transport
      mode).

   and one (or more) of the following:

   o  Interface: the assigned local network interface.

   o  Unicast address: the DNCP node it should connect with.

   o  Set of addresses: the DNCP nodes from which connections are
      accepted.

   For each remote (peer, endpoint) pair detected on a local endpoint, a
   DNCP node has:

   o  Node identifier: the unique identifier of the peer.

   o  Endpoint identifier: the unique endpoint identifier used by the
      peer.

   o  Peer address: the most recently used address of the peer
      (authenticated and authorized, if security is enabled).

   o  Trickle instance: the particular peer's Trickle instance with
      parameters I, T, and c (only on an endpoint in Unicast mode, when
      using an unreliable unicast transport) .

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6.  Optional Extensions

   This section specifies extensions to the core protocol that a DNCP
   profile may specify to be used.

6.1.  Keep-Alives

   Trickle-driven status updates (Section 4.3) provide a mechanism for
   handling of new peer detection on an endpoint, as well as state
   change notifications.  Another mechanism may be needed to get rid of
   old, no longer valid peers if the transport or lower layers do not
   provide one.

   If keep-alives are not specified in the DNCP profile, the rest of
   this subsection MUST be ignored.

   A DNCP profile MAY specify either per-endpoint (sent using multicast
   to all DNCP nodes connected to a multicast-enabled link) or per-peer
   (sent using unicast to each peer individually) keep-alive support.

   For every endpoint that a keep-alive is specified for in the DNCP
   profile, the endpoint-specific keep-alive interval MUST be
   maintained.  By default, it is DNCP_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL.  If there is
   a local value that is preferred for that for any reason
   (configuration, energy conservation, media type, ..), it can be
   substituted instead.  If a non-default keep-alive interval is used on
   any endpoint, a DNCP node MUST publish appropriate Keep-Alive
   Interval TLV(s) (Section 7.3.2) within its node data.

6.1.1.  Data Model Additions

   The following additions to the Data Model (Section 5) are needed to
   support keep-alives:

   For each configured endpoint that has per-endpoint keep-alives
   enabled:

   o  Last sent: If a timestamp which indicates the last time a Network
      State TLV (Section 7.2.2) was sent over that interface.

   For each remote (peer, endpoint) pair detected on a local endpoint, a
   DNCP node has:

   o  Last contact timestamp: a timestamp which indicates the last time
      a consistent Network State TLV (Section 7.2.2) was received from
      the peer over multicast, or anything was received over unicast.
      When adding a new peer, it is initialized to the current time.

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   o  Last sent: If per-peer keep-alives are enabled, a timestamp which
      indicates the last time a Network State TLV (Section 7.2.2) was
      sent to to that point-to-point peer.  When adding a new peer, it
      is initialized to the current time.

6.1.2.  Per-Endpoint Periodic Keep-Alives

   If per-endpoint keep-alives are enabled on an endpoint in
   Multicast+Unicast transport mode, and if no traffic containing a
   Network State TLV (Section 7.2.2) has been sent to a particular
   endpoint within the endpoint-specific keep-alive interval, a Network
   State TLV (Section 7.2.2) MUST be sent on that endpoint, and a new
   Trickle interval started, as specified in the step 2 of Section 4.2
   of [RFC6206].  The actual sending time SHOULD be further delayed by a
   random timespan in [0, Imin/2].

6.1.3.  Per-Peer Periodic Keep-Alives

   If per-peer keep-alives are enabled on a unicast-only endpoint, and
   if no traffic containing a Network State TLV (Section 7.2.2) has been
   sent to a particular peer within the endpoint-specific keep-alive
   interval, a Network State TLV (Section 7.2.2) MUST be sent to the
   peer, and a new Trickle interval started, as specified in the step 2
   of Section 4.2 of [RFC6206].

6.1.4.  Received TLV Processing Additions

   If a TLV is received over unicast from the peer, the Last contact
   timestamp for the peer MUST be updated.

   On receipt of a Network State TLV (Section 7.2.2) which is consistent
   with the locally calculated network state hash, the Last contact
   timestamp for the peer MUST be updated.

6.1.5.  Peer Removal

   For every peer on every endpoint, the endpoint-specific keep-alive
   interval must be calculated by looking for Keep-Alive Interval TLVs
   (Section 7.3.2) published by the node, and if none exist, using the
   default value of DNCP_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL.  If the peer's last contact
   timestamp has not been updated for at least locally chosen
   potentially endpoint-specific keep-alive multiplier (defaults to
   DNCP_KEEPALIVE_MULTIPLIER) times the peer's endpoint-specific keep-
   alive interval, the Peer TLV for that peer and the local DNCP peer
   state MUST be removed.

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6.2.  Support For Dense Multicast-Enabled Links

   This optimization is needed to avoid a state space explosion.  Given
   a large set of DNCP nodes publishing data on an endpoint that uses
   multicast on a link, every node will add a Peer TLV (Section 7.3.1)
   for each peer.  While Trickle limits the amount of traffic on the
   link in stable state to some extent, the total amount of data that is
   added to and maintained in the DNCP network given N nodes on a
   multicast-enabled link is O(N^2).  Additionally if per-peer keep-
   alives are used, there will be O(N^2) keep-alives running on the link
   if liveliness of peers is not ensured using some other way (e.g., TCP
   connection lifetime, layer 2 notification, per-endpoint keep-alive).

   An upper bound for the number of peers that are allowed for a
   particular type of link that an endpoint in Multicast+Unicast
   transport mode is used on SHOULD be provided by a DNCP profile, but
   MAY also be chosen at runtime.  The main consideration when selecting
   a bound (if any) for a particular type of link should be whether it
   supports multicast traffic, and whether a too large number of peers
   case is likely to happen during the use of that DNCP profile on that
   particular type of link.  If neither is likely, there is little point
   specifying support for this for that particular link type.

   If a DNCP profile does not support this extension at all, the rest of
   this subsection MUST be ignored.  This is because when this extension
   is used, the state within the DNCP network only contains a subset of
   the full topology of the network.  Therefore every node must be aware
   of the potential of it being used in a particular DNCP profile.

   If the specified upper bound is exceeded for some endpoint in
   Multicast+Unicast transport mode and if the node does not have the
   highest node identifier on the link, it SHOULD treat the endpoint as
   a unicast endpoint connected to the node that has the highest node
   identifier detected on the link, therefore transitioning to
   Multicast-listen+Unicast transport mode.  See Section 4.2 for
   implications on the specific endpoint behavior.  The nodes in
   Multicast-listen+Unicast transport mode MUST keep listening to
   multicast traffic to both receive messages from the node(s) still in
   Multicast+Unicast mode, and as well to react to nodes with a greater
   node identifier appearing.  If the highest node identifier present on
   the link changes, the remote unicast address of the endpoints in
   Multicast-Listen+Unicast transport mode MUST be changed.  If the node
   identifier of the local node is the highest one, the node MUST switch
   back to, or stay in Multicast+Unicast mode, and normally form peer
   relationships with all peers.

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7.  Type-Length-Value Objects

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Type               |           Length              |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |               Value (if any) (+padding (if any))              |
   ..
   |                     (variable # of bytes)                     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                     (Optional nested TLVs)                    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Each TLV is encoded as:

   o  a 2 byte Type field

   o  a 2 byte Length field which contains the length of the Value field
      in bytes; 0 means no Value

   o  the Value itself (if any)

   o  padding bytes with value of zero up to the next 4 byte boundary if
      the Length is not divisible by 4.

   While padding bytes MUST NOT be included in the number stored in the
   Length field of the TLV, if the TLV is enclosed within another TLV,
   then the padding is included in the enclosing TLV's Length value.

   Each TLV which does not define optional fields or variable-length
   content MAY be sent with additional sub-TLVs appended after the TLV
   to allow for extensibility.  When handling such TLV types, each node
   MUST accept received TLVs that are longer than the fixed fields
   specified for the particular type, and ignore the sub-TLVs with
   either unknown types, or not supported within that particular TLV
   type.  If any sub-TLVs are present, the Length field of the TLV
   describes the number of bytes from the first byte of the TLV's own
   Value (if any) to the last (padding) byte of the last sub-TLV.

   For example, type=123 (0x7b) TLV with value 'x' (120 = 0x78) is
   encoded as: 007B 0001 7800 0000.  If it were to have sub-TLV of
   type=124 (0x7c) with value 'y', it would be encoded as 007B 000C 7800
   0000 007C 0001 7900 0000.

   In this section, the following special notation is used:

      .. = octet string concatenation operation.

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      H(x) = non-cryptographic hash function specified by DNCP profile.

7.1.  Request TLVs

7.1.1.  Request Network State TLV

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Type: REQ-NETWORK-STATE (1)  |          Length: >= 0         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   This TLV is used to request response with a Network State TLV
   (Section 7.2.2) and all Node State TLVs (Section 7.2.3) (without node
   data).

7.1.2.  Request Node State TLV

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Type: REQ-NODE-STATE (2)   |          Length: > 0          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                        Node Identifier                        |
   |                  (length fixed in DNCP profile)               |
   ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   This TLV is used to request a Node State TLV (Section 7.2.3)
   (including node data) for the node with the matching node identifier.

7.2.  Data TLVs

7.2.1.  Node Endpoint TLV

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type: NODE-ENDPOINT (3)     |          Length: > 4          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                        Node Identifier                        |
   |                  (length fixed in DNCP profile)               |
   ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      Endpoint Identifier                      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

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   This TLV identifies both the local node's node identifier, as well as
   the particular endpoint's endpoint identifier.  Section 4.2 specifies
   when it is sent.

7.2.2.  Network State TLV

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Type: NETWORK-STATE (4)    |          Length: > 0          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     H(sequence number of node 1 .. H(node data of node 1) ..  |
   |    .. sequence number of node N .. H(node data of node N))    |
   |                  (length fixed in DNCP profile)               |
   ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   This TLV contains the current locally calculated network state hash,
   see Section 4.1 for how it is calculated.

7.2.3.  Node State TLV

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |      Type: NODE-STATE (5)     |          Length: > 8          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                        Node Identifier                        |
   |                  (length fixed in DNCP profile)               |
   ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                       Sequence Number                         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                Milliseconds Since Origination                 |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         H(Node Data)                          |
   |                  (length fixed in DNCP profile)               |
   ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |       (optionally) Node Data (a set of nested TLVs)           |
   ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   This TLV represents the local node's knowledge about the published
   state of a node in the DNCP network identified by the Node Identifier
   field in the TLV.

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   Every node, including the node publishing the node data, MUST update
   the Milliseconds Since Origination whenever it sends a Node State TLV
   based on when the node estimates the data was originally published.
   This is, e.g., to ensure that any relative timestamps contained
   within the published node data can be correctly offset and
   interpreted.  Ultimately, what is provided is just an approximation,
   as transmission delays are not accounted for.

   Absent any changes, if the originating node notices that the 32-bit
   milliseconds since origination value would be close to overflow
   (greater than 2^32-2^16), the node MUST re-publish its TLVs even if
   there is no change.  In other words, absent any other changes, the
   TLV set MUST be re-published roughly every 48 days.

   The actual node data of the node may be included within the TLV as
   well in the optional Node Data field.  The set of TLVs MUST be
   strictly ordered based on ascending binary content (including TLV
   type and length).  This enables, e.g., efficient state delta
   processing and no-copy indexing by TLV type by the recipient.  The
   Node Data content MUST be passed along exactly as it was received.
   It SHOULD be also verified on receipt that the locally calculated
   H(Node Data) matches the content of the field within the TLV, and if
   the hash differs, the TLV SHOULD be ignored.

7.3.  Data TLVs within Node State TLV

   These TLVs are published by the DNCP nodes, and therefore only
   encoded in the Node Data field of Node State TLVs.  If encountered
   outside Node State TLV, they MUST be silently ignored.

7.3.1.  Peer TLV

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |       Type: PEER (8)          |          Length: > 8          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      Peer Node Identifier                     |
   |                  (length fixed in DNCP profile)               |
   ...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                    Peer Endpoint Identifier                   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                   (Local) Endpoint Identifier                 |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   This TLV indicates that the node in question vouches that the
   specified peer is reachable by it on the specified local endpoint.

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   The presence of this TLV at least guarantees that the node publishing
   it has received traffic from the peer recently.  For guaranteed up-
   to-date bidirectional reachability, the existence of both nodes'
   matching Peer TLVs needs to be checked.

7.3.2.  Keep-Alive Interval TLV

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Type: KEEP-ALIVE-INTERVAL (9) |          Length: >= 8         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      Endpoint Identifier                      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Interval                            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   This TLV indicates a non-default interval being used to send keep-
   alives specified in Section 6.1.

   Endpoint identifier is used to identify the particular endpoint for
   which the interval applies.  If 0, it applies for ALL endpoints for
   which no specific TLV exists.

   Interval specifies the interval in milliseconds at which the node
   sends keep-alives.  A value of zero means no keep-alives are sent at
   all; in that case, some lower layer mechanism that ensures presence
   of nodes MUST be available and used.

8.  Security and Trust Management

   If specified in the DNCP profile, either DTLS [RFC6347] or TLS
   [RFC5246] may be used to authenticate and encrypt either some (if
   specified optional in the profile), or all unicast traffic.  The
   following methods for establishing trust are defined, but it is up to
   the DNCP profile to specify which ones may, should or must be
   supported.

8.1.  Pre-Shared Key Based Trust Method

   A PSK-based trust model is a simple security management mechanism
   that allows an administrator to deploy devices to an existing network
   by configuring them with a pre-defined key, similar to the
   configuration of an administrator password or WPA-key.  Although
   limited in nature it is useful to provide a user-friendly security
   mechanism for smaller networks.

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8.2.  PKI Based Trust Method

   A PKI-based trust-model enables more advanced management capabilities
   at the cost of increased complexity and bootstrapping effort.  It
   however allows trust to be managed in a centralized manner and is
   therefore useful for larger networks with a need for an authoritative
   trust management.

8.3.  Certificate Based Trust Consensus Method

   For some scenarios - such as bootstrapping a mostly unmanaged network
   - the methods described above may not provide a desirable tradeoff
   between security and user experience.  This section includes guidance
   for implementing an opportunistic security [RFC7435] method which
   DNCP profiles can build upon and adapt for their specific
   requirements.

   The certificate-based consensus model is designed to be a compromise
   between trust management effort and flexibility.  It is based on
   X.509-certificates and allows each DNCP node to provide a trust
   verdict on any other certificate and a consensus is found to
   determine whether a node using this certificate or any certificate
   signed by it is to be trusted.

   A DNCP node not using this security method MUST ignore all announced
   trust verdicts and MUST NOT announce any such verdicts by itself,
   i.e., any other normative language in this subsection does not apply
   to it.

   The current effective trust verdict for any certificate is defined as
   the one with the highest priority from all trust verdicts announced
   for said certificate at the time.

8.3.1.  Trust Verdicts

   Trust verdicts are statements of DNCP nodes about the trustworthiness
   of X.509-certificates.  There are 5 possible trust verdicts in order
   of ascending priority:

      0 (Neutral): no trust verdict exists but the DNCP network should
      determine one.

      1 (Cached Trust): the last known effective trust verdict was
      Configured or Cached Trust.

      2 (Cached Distrust): the last known effective trust verdict was
      Configured or Cached Distrust.

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      3 (Configured Trust): trustworthy based upon an external ceremony
      or configuration.

      4 (Configured Distrust): not trustworthy based upon an external
      ceremony or configuration.

   Trust verdicts are differentiated in 3 groups:

   o  Configured verdicts are used to announce explicit trust verdicts a
      node has based on any external trust bootstrap or predefined
      relation a node has formed with a given certificate.

   o  Cached verdicts are used to retain the last known trust state in
      case all nodes with configured verdicts about a given certificate
      have been disconnected or turned off.

   o  The Neutral verdict is used to announce a new node intending to
      join the network so a final verdict for it can be found.

   The current effective trust verdict for any certificate is defined as
   the one with the highest priority within the set of trust verdicts
   announced for the certificate in the DNCP network.  A node MUST be
   trusted for participating in the DNCP network if and only if the
   current effective trust verdict for its own certificate or any one in
   its certificate hierarchy is (Cached or Configured) Trust and none of
   the certificates in its hierarchy have an effective trust verdict of
   (Cached or Configured) Distrust.  In case a node has a configured
   verdict, which is different from the current effective trust verdict
   for a certificate, the current effective trust verdict takes
   precedence in deciding trustworthiness.  Despite that, the node still
   retains and announces its configured verdict.

8.3.2.  Trust Cache

   Each node SHOULD maintain a trust cache containing the current
   effective trust verdicts for all certificates currently announced in
   the DNCP network.  This cache is used as a backup of the last known
   state in case there is no node announcing a configured verdict for a
   known certificate.  It SHOULD be saved to a non-volatile memory at
   reasonable time intervals to survive a reboot or power outage.

   Every time a node (re)joins the network or detects the change of an
   effective trust verdict for any certificate, it will synchronize its
   cache, i.e., store new effective trust verdicts overwriting any
   previously cached verdicts.  Configured verdicts are stored in the
   cache as their respective cached counterparts.  Neutral verdicts are
   never stored and do not override existing cached verdicts.

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8.3.3.  Announcement of Verdicts

   A node SHOULD always announce any configured trust verdicts it has
   established by itself, and it MUST do so if announcing the configured
   trust verdict leads to a change in the current effective trust
   verdict for the respective certificate.  In absence of configured
   verdicts, it MUST announce cached trust verdicts it has stored in its
   trust cache, if one of the following conditions applies:

   o  The stored trust verdict is Cached Trust and the current effective
      trust verdict for the certificate is Neutral or does not exist.

   o  The stored trust verdict is Cached Distrust and the current
      effective trust verdict for the certificate is Cached Trust.

   A node rechecks these conditions whenever it detects changes of
   announced trust verdicts anywhere in the network.

   Upon encountering a node with a hierarchy of certificates for which
   there is no effective trust verdict, a node adds a Neutral Trust-
   Verdict-TLV to its node data for all certificates found in the
   hierarchy, and publishes it until an effective trust verdict
   different from Neutral can be found for any of the certificates, or a
   reasonable amount of time (10 minutes is suggested) with no reaction
   and no further authentication attempts has passed.  Such trust
   verdicts SHOULD also be limited in rate and number to prevent denial-
   of-service attacks.

   Trust verdicts are announced using Trust-Verdict TLVs:

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Type: Trust-Verdict (10)    |        Length: > 36           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Verdict    |                 (reserved)                    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   |                      SHA-256 Fingerprint                      |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                          Common Name                          |

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      Verdict represents the numerical index of the trust verdict.

      (reserved) is reserved for future additions and MUST be set to 0
      when creating TLVs and ignored when parsing them.

      SHA-256 Fingerprint contains the SHA-256 [RFC6234] hash value of
      the certificate in DER-format.

      Common Name contains the variable-length (1-64 bytes) common name
      of the certificate.

8.3.4.  Bootstrap Ceremonies

   The following non-exhaustive list of methods describes possible ways
   to establish trust relationships between DNCP nodes and node
   certificates.  Trust establishment is a two-way process in which the
   existing network must trust the newly added node and the newly added
   node must trust at least one of its peer nodes.  It is therefore
   necessary that both the newly added node and an already trusted node
   perform such a ceremony to successfully introduce a node into the
   DNCP network.  In all cases an administrator MUST be provided with
   external means to identify the node belonging to a certificate based
   on its fingerprint and a meaningful common name.

8.3.4.1.  Trust by Identification

   A node implementing certificate-based trust MUST provide an interface
   to retrieve the current set of effective trust verdicts, fingerprints
   and names of all certificates currently known and set configured
   trust verdicts to be announced.  Alternatively it MAY provide a
   companion DNCP node or application with these capabilities with which
   it has a pre-established trust relationship.

8.3.4.2.  Preconfigured Trust

   A node MAY be preconfigured to trust a certain set of node or CA
   certificates.  However such trust relationships MUST NOT result in
   unwanted or unrelated trust for nodes not intended to be run inside
   the same network (e.g., all other devices by the same manufacturer).

8.3.4.3.  Trust on Button Press

   A node MAY provide a physical or virtual interface to put one or more
   of its internal network interfaces temporarily into a mode in which
   it trusts the certificate of the first DNCP node it can successfully
   establish a connection with.

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8.3.4.4.  Trust on First Use

   A node which is not associated with any other DNCP node MAY trust the
   certificate of the first DNCP node it can successfully establish a
   connection with.  This method MUST NOT be used when the node has
   already associated with any other DNCP node.

9.  DNCP Profile-Specific Definitions

   Each DNCP profile MUST specify the following aspects:

   o  Unicast and optionally multicast transport protocol(s) to be used.
      If multicast-based node and status discovery is desired, a
      datagram-based transport supporting multicast has to be available.

   o  How the chosen transport(s) are secured: Not at all, optionally or
      always with the TLS scheme defined here using one or more of the
      methods, or with something else.  If the links with DNCP nodes can
      be sufficiently secured or isolated, it is possible to run DNCP in
      a secure manner without using any form of authentication or
      encryption.

   o  Transport protocols' parameters such as port numbers to be used,
      or multicast address to be used.  Unicast, multicast, and secure
      unicast may each require different parameters, if applicable.

   o  When receiving TLVs, what sort of TLVs are ignored in addition -
      as specified in Section 4.4 - e.g., for security reasons.  While
      the security of the node data published within the Node State TLVs
      is already ensured by the base specification (if secure mode is
      enabled, Node State TLVs are sent only via unicast as multicast
      ones are ignored on receipt), if a profile adds TLVs that are sent
      outside the node data, a profile should indicate whether or not
      those TLVs should be ignored if they are received via multicast or
      non-secured unicast.  A DNCP profile may define the following DNCP
      TLVs to be safely ignored:

      *  Anything received over multicast, except Node Endpoint TLV
         (Section 7.2.1) and Network State TLV (Section 7.2.2).

      *  Any TLVs received over unreliable unicast or multicast at too
         high rate; Trickle will ensure eventual convergence given the
         rate slows down at some point.

   o  How to deal with node identifier collision as described in
      Section 4.4.  Main options are either for one or both nodes to
      assign new node identifiers to themselves, or to notify someone
      about a fatal error condition in the DNCP network.

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   o  Imin, Imax and k ranges to be suggested for implementations to be
      used in the Trickle algorithm.  The Trickle algorithm does not
      require these to be the same across all implementations for it to
      work, but similar orders of magnitude helps implementations of a
      DNCP profile to behave more consistently and to facilitate
      estimation of lower and upper bounds for convergence behavior of
      the network.

   o  Hash function H(x) to be used, and how many bits of the output are
      actually used.  The chosen hash function is used to handle both
      hashing of node specific data, and network state hash, which is a
      hash of node specific data hashes.  SHA-256 defined in [RFC6234]
      is the recommended default choice, but a non-cryptographic hash
      function could be used as well.

   o  DNCP_NODE_IDENTIFIER_LENGTH: The fixed length of a node identifier
      (in bytes).

   o  Whether to send keep-alives, and if so, whether per-endpoint
      (requires multicast transport), or per-peer.  Keep-alive has also
      associated parameters:

      *  DNCP_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL: How often keep-alives are to be sent
         by default (if enabled).

      *  DNCP_KEEPALIVE_MULTIPLIER: How many times the
         DNCP_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL (or peer-supplied keep-alive interval
         value) a node may not be heard from to be considered still
         valid.  This is just a default used in absence of any other
         configuration information, or particular per-endpoint
         configuration.

   o  Whether to support dense multicast-enabled link optimization
      (Section 6.2) or not.

   For some guidance on choosing transport and security options, please
   see Appendix B.

10.  Security Considerations

   DNCP-based protocols may use multicast to indicate DNCP state changes
   and for keep-alive purposes.  However, no actual published data TLVs
   will be sent across that channel.  Therefore an attacker may only
   learn hash values of the state within DNCP and may be able to trigger
   unicast synchronization attempts between nodes on a local link this
   way.  A DNCP node MUST therefore rate-limit its reactions to
   multicast packets.

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   When using DNCP to bootstrap a network, PKI based solutions may have
   issues when validating certificates due to potentially unavailable
   accurate time, or due to inability to use the network to either check
   Certificate Revocation Lists or perform on-line validation.

   The Certificate-based trust consensus mechanism defined in this
   document allows for a consenting revocation, however in case of a
   compromised device the trust cache may be poisoned before the actual
   revocation happens allowing the distrusted device to rejoin the
   network using a different identity.  Stopping such an attack might
   require physical intervention and flushing of the trust caches.

11.  IANA Considerations

   IANA should set up a registry for the (decimal 16-bit) "DNCP TLV
   Types" under "Distributed Node Consensus Protocol (DNCP)", with the
   following initial contents: ([RFC Editor: please remove] ideally as
   http://www.iana.org/assignments/dncp-registry)

      0: Reserved

      1: Request network state

      2: Request node state

      3: Node endpoint

      4: Network state

      5: Node state

      6: Reserved (was: Custom)

      7: Reserved (was: Fragment count)

      8: Peer

      9: Keep-alive interval

      10: Trust-Verdict

      11-31: Free - policy of standards action [RFC5226] should be used

      32-511: Reserved for per-DNCP profile use

      512-767: Free - policy of standards action [RFC5226] should be
      used

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      768-1023: Private use [RFC5226]

      1024-65535: Reserved for future protocol evolution (for example,
      DNCP version 2)

12.  References

12.1.  Normative references

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC6206]  Levis, P., Clausen, T., Hui, J., Gnawali, O., and J. Ko,
              "The Trickle Algorithm", RFC 6206, March 2011.

   [RFC6234]  Eastlake, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, May 2011.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.

12.2.  Informative references

   [RFC3493]  Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., McCann, J., and W.
              Stevens, "Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6", RFC
              3493, February 2003.

   [RFC3315]  Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
              and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
              IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC7435]  Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
              Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
              December 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.

Appendix A.  Alternative Modes of Operation

   Beyond what is described in the main text, the protocol allows for
   other uses.  These are provided as examples.

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A.1.  Read-only Operation

   If a node uses just a single endpoint and does not need to publish
   any TLVs, full DNCP node functionality is not required.  Such limited
   node can acquire and maintain view of the TLV space by implementing
   the processing logic as specified in Section 4.4.  Such node would
   not need Trickle, peer-maintenance or even keep-alives at all, as the
   DNCP nodes' use of it would guarantee eventual receipt of network
   state hashes, and synchronization of node data, even in presence of
   unreliable transport.

A.2.  Forwarding Operation

   If a node with a pair of endpoints does not need to publish any TLVs,
   it can detect (for example) nodes with the highest node identifier on
   each of the endpoints (if any).  Any TLVs received from one of them
   would be forwarded verbatim as unicast to the other node with highest
   node identifier.

   Any tinkering with the TLVs would remove guarantees of this scheme
   working; however passive monitoring would obviously be fine.  This
   type of simple forwarding cannot be chained, as it does not send
   anything proactively.

Appendix B.  DNCP Profile Additional Guidance

   This appendix explains implications of design choices made when
   specifying DNCP profile to use particular transport or security
   options.

B.1.  Unicast Transport - UDP or TCP?

   The node data published by a DNCP node is limited to 64KB due to the
   16-bit size of the length field of the TLV it is published within.
   Some transport choices may decrease this limit; if using e.g.  UDP
   datagrams for unicast transport the upper bound of node data size is
   whatever the nodes and the underlying network can pass to each other
   as DNCP does not define its own fragmentation scheme.  A profile
   which chooses UDP has to be limited to small node data (e.g. somewhat
   smaller than IPv6 default MTU if using IPv6), or specify a minimum
   which all nodes have to support.  Even then, if using non-link-local
   communications, there is some concern about what middleboxes do to
   fragmented packets.  Therefore, the use of stream transport such as
   TCP is probably a good idea if either non-link-local communication is
   desired, or fragmentation is expected to cause problems.

   TCP also provides some other facilities, such as a relatively long
   built-in keep-alive which in conjunction with connection closes

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   occurring from eventual failed retransmissions may be sufficient to
   avoid the use of in-protocol keep-alive defined in Section 6.1.
   Additionally it is reliable, so there is no need for Trickle on such
   unicast connections.

   The major downside of using TCP instead of UDP with DNCP-based
   profiles lies in the loss of control over the time at which TLVs are
   received; while unreliable UDP datagrams also have some delay, TLVs
   within reliable stream transport may be delayed significantly due to
   retransmissions.  This is not a problem if no relative time dependent
   information is stored within the TLVs in the DNCP-based protocol; for
   such a protocol, TCP is a reasonable choice for unicast transport if
   it is available.

B.2.  (Optional) Multicast Transport

   Multicast is needed for dynamic peer discovery and to trigger unicast
   exchanges; for that, unreliable datagram transport (=typically UDP)
   is the only transport option defined within this specification,
   although DNCP-based protocols may themselves define some other
   transport or peer discovery mechanism (e.g. based on mDNS or DNS).

   If multicast is used, a well-known address should be specified, and
   for e.g.  IPv6 respectively the desired address scopes.  In most
   cases link-local and possibly site-local are useful scopes.

B.3.  (Optional) Transport Security

   In terms of provided security, DTLS and TLS are equivalent; they also
   consume similar amount of state on the devices.  While TLS is on top
   of a stream protocol, using DTLS also requires relatively long
   session caching within the DTLS layer to avoid expensive re-
   authentication/authorization steps if and when any state within the
   DNCP network changes or per-peer keep-alive (if enabled) is sent.

   TLS implementations (at the time of the writing of the specification)
   seem more mature and available (as open source) than DTLS ones.  This
   may be due to a long history of use with HTTPS.

   Some libraries seem not to support multiplexing between insecure and
   secure communication on the same port, so specifying distinct ports
   for secured and unsecured communication may be beneficial.

Appendix C.  Example Profile

   This is the DNCP profile of SHSP, an experimental (and for the
   purposes of this document fictional) home automation protocol.  The
   protocol itself is used to make key-value store published by each of

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   the nodes available to all other nodes for distributed monitoring and
   control of a home infrastructure.  It defines only one additional TLV
   type: a key=value TLV which contains a single key=value assignment
   for publication.

   o  Unicast transport: IPv6 TCP on port EXAMPLE-P1 since only absolute
      timestamps are used within the key=value data and since it focuses
      primarily on Linux-based nodes which support both protocols well.
      Connections from and to non-link-local addresses are ignored to
      avoid exposing this protocol outside the secure links.

   o  Multicast transport: IPv6 UDP on port EXAMPLE-P2 to link-local
      scoped multicast address ff02:EXAMPLE.  At least one node per link
      in the home is assumed to facilitate node discovery without
      depending on any other infrastructure.

   o  Security: None.  It is to be used only on trusted links (WPA2-x
      wireless, physically secure wired links).

   o  Additional TLVs to be ignored: None.  No DNCP security is
      specified, and no new TLVs are defined outside of node data.

   o  Node identifier length (DNCP_NODE_IDENTIFIER_LENGTH): 32 bits that
      are randomly generated.

   o  Node identifier collision handling: Pick new random node
      identifier.

   o  Trickle parameters: Imin = 200ms, Imax = 7, k = 1.  It means at
      least one multicast per link in 25 seconds in stable state (0.2 *
      2^7).

   o  Hash function H(x) + length: SHA-256, only 128 bits used.
      Relatively fast, and 128 bits should be plenty to prevent random
      conflicts (64 bits would most likely be sufficient, too).

   o  No in-protocol keep-alives (Section 6.1); TCP keep-alive is to be
      used.  In practice TCP keep-alive is seldom encountered anyway as
      changes in network state cause packets to be sent on the unicast
      connections, and those that fail sufficiently many retransmissions
      are dropped much before keep-alive actually would fire.

   o  No support for dense multicast-enabled link optimization
      (Section 6.2); SHSP is a simple protocol for few nodes (network-
      wide, not even to mention on a single link), and therefore would
      not provide any benefit.

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Appendix D.  Some Questions and Answers [RFC Editor: please remove]

   Q: 32-bit endpoint id?

   A: Here, it would save 32 bits per peer if it was 16 bits (and less
   is not realistic).  However, TLVs defined elsewhere would not seem to
   even gain that much on average.  32 bits is also used for ifindex in
   various operating systems, making for simpler implementation.

   Q: Why have topology information at all?

   A: It is an alternative to the more traditional seq#/TTL-based
   flooding schemes.  In steady state, there is no need to, e.g., re-
   publish every now and then.

Appendix E.  Changelog [RFC Editor: please remove]

   draft-ietf-homenet-dncp-10:

   o  Added profile guidance section, as well as example profile.

   draft-ietf-homenet-dncp-09:

   o  Reserved 1024+ TLV types for future versions (=versioning
      mechanism); private use section moved from 192-255 to 512-767.

   o  Added applicability statement and clarified some text based on
      reviews.

   draft-ietf-homenet-dncp-08:

   o  Removed fragmentation as it is somewhat underspecified and
      unimplemented.  It may be specified in some future extension draft
      or new version of DNCP.

   o  Added generic sub-TLV extensibility mechanism.

   draft-ietf-homenet-dncp-06:

   o  Removed custom TLV.

   o  Made keep-alive multipliers local implementation choice, profiles
      just provide guidance on sane default value.

   o  Removed the DNCP_GRACE_INTERVAL as it is really implementation
      choice.

   o  Simplified the suggested structures in data model.

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   o  Reorganized the document and provided an overview section.

   draft-ietf-homenet-dncp-04:

   o  Added mandatory rate limiting for network state requests, and
      optional slightly faster convergence mechanism by including
      current local network state in the remote network state requests.

   draft-ietf-homenet-dncp-03:

   o  Renamed connection -> endpoint.

   o  !!! Backwards incompatible change: Renumbered TLVs, and got rid of
      node data TLV; instead, node data TLV's contents are optionally
      within node state TLV.

   draft-ietf-homenet-dncp-02:

   o  Changed DNCP "messages" into series of TLV streams, allowing
      optimized round-trip saving synchronization.

   o  Added fragmentation support for bigger node data and for chunking
      in absence of reliable L2 and L3 fragmentation.

   draft-ietf-homenet-dncp-01:

   o  Fixed keep-alive semantics to consider unicast requests also
      updates of most recently consistent, and added proactive unicast
      request to ensure even inconsistent keep-alive messages eventually
      triggering consistency timestamp update.

   o  Facilitated (simple) read-only clients by making Node Connection
      TLV optional if just using DNCP for read-only purposes.

   o  Added text describing how to deal with "dense" networks, but left
      actual numbers and mechanics up to DNCP profiles and (local)
      configurations.

   draft-ietf-homenet-dncp-00: Split from pre-version of draft-ietf-
   homenet-hncp-03 generic parts.  Changes that affect implementations:

   o  TLVs were renumbered.

   o  TLV length does not include header (=-4).  This facilitates, e.g.,
      use of DHCPv6 option parsing libraries (same encoding), and
      reduces complexity (no need to handle error values of length less
      than 4).

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   o  Trickle is reset only when locally calculated network state hash
      is changes, not as remote different network state hash is seen.
      This prevents, e.g., attacks by multicast with one multicast
      packet to force Trickle reset on every interface of every node on
      a link.

   o  Instead of 'ping', use 'keep-alive' (optional) for dead peer
      detection.  Different message used!

Appendix F.  Draft Source [RFC Editor: please remove]

   As usual, this draft is available at https://github.com/fingon/ietf-
   drafts/ in source format (with nice Makefile too).  Feel free to send
   comments and/or pull requests if and when you have changes to it!

Appendix G.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Ole Troan, Pierre Pfister, Mark Baugher, Mark Townsley,
   Juliusz Chroboczek, Jiazi Yi, Mikael Abrahamsson, Brian Carpenter,
   Thomas Clausen, DENG Hui and Margaret Cullen for their contributions
   to the draft.

   Thanks to Kaiwen Jin and Xavier Bonnetain for their related research
   work.

Authors' Addresses

   Markus Stenberg
   Independent
   Helsinki  00930
   Finland

   Email: markus.stenberg@iki.fi

   Steven Barth
   Independent
   Halle  06114
   Germany

   Email: cyrus@openwrt.org

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