Ballot for draft-ietf-dmm-4283mnids
Discuss
Yes
No Objection
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 04 and is now closed.
I don't consider that merely mentioning that there are some privacy issues (maybe) is nearly sufficient here. Instead I would argue that any of these identifier types that could have privacy implications need to be specifically justified or else dropped. By specifically justified, I mean that there ought be an argument (and a fairly holistic one) that the Internet is better, and not worse, if we define a codepoint that allows MIPv6 (and later, other protocols) to use that identifier. I do accept that my position is perhaps innovative, in terms of IETF processes, so I'll split the discuss into two parts, one process oriented and mostly for the IESG, and the second relating to the content of the draft. (1) For the IESG: is it ok that we introduce (codepoints for) a slew of new long-term stable privacy-sensitive identifiers just because they might someday be needed, or do we need to have specific justification for defining such things? I would argue the latter, but that may need us to validate that there is IETF consensus for that somehow, and perhaps in the meantime hold on to this draft. Part of my reasoning is that once we define such codepoints (e.g. for IMSIs) then that inevitably means that other protocols, and not just MIPv6, will do the same eventually, so accepting this draft basically means accepting that we end up commonly and perhaps carelessly, passing such highly-sensitive information about on the Internet in many protocols and in many contexts. My argument here I think does adhere to various of our BCPs that do argue for security and privacy, but I do also accept that this may be novel and to some extent goes against another of our generally accepted ideas which is that we benefit from folks documenting things even if those things are sub-optimal in various ways. So I'd argue this is a real case for an IESG discussion - I know what I think, but what do the rest of you think? (2) For the authors: to the extent you are willing to, and want to get ahead of the discussion on point (1) above, can you in fact provide an argument, for each of the identifiers here that have privacy-sensitivity, that the Internet is better overall if we define these codepoints knowing that if we do define a way to represent e.g. an IMSI in MIPv6 that is likely to be copied elsewhere? Note for the authors: I think it's entirely fine for you to do nothing pending the discussion of point (1) above, if that's your preference.
Thanks for addressing my DISCUSS.
Thanks for resolving my DISCUSS point.
The discussion resulting from Dale's excellent Gen-ART review probably needs to move forward before this document is ready to be made an RFC.
Thanks for the changes per the SecDir review and Mirja's discuss. https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg07164.html
Author agreed to do the following change in the security considerations section: OLD "If used in the MNID extension as defined in this document, the packet including the MNID extension should be encrypted so that personal information or trackable identifiers would not be inadvertently disclosed to passive observers." NEW "If used in the MNID extension as defined in this document, the packet including the MNID extension MUST be encrypted so that personal information or trackable identifiers would not be inadvertently disclosed to passive observers."
I'll watch the DISCUSSions from other ADs ...