Guidelines for Choosing RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) Canonical Names (CNAMEs)
draft-ietf-avtcore-6222bis-05

Network Working Group                                           A. Begen
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Obsoletes: 6222 (if approved)                                 C. Perkins
Updates: 3550 (if approved)                        University of Glasgow
Intended status: Standards Track                                 D. Wing
Expires: January 09, 2014                                          Cisco
                                                             E. Rescorla
                                                              RTFM, Inc.
                                                           July 08, 2013

          Guidelines for Choosing RTP Control Protocol (RTCP)
                        Canonical Names (CNAMEs)
                     draft-ietf-avtcore-6222bis-05

Abstract

   The RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) Canonical Name (CNAME) is a
   persistent transport-level identifier for an RTP endpoint.  While the
   Synchronization Source (SSRC) identifier of an RTP endpoint may
   change if a collision is detected or when the RTP application is
   restarted, its RTCP CNAME is meant to stay unchanged, so that RTP
   endpoints can be uniquely identified and associated with their RTP
   media streams.

   For proper functionality, RTCP CNAMEs should be unique within the
   participants of an RTP session.  However, the existing guidelines for
   choosing the RTCP CNAME provided in the RTP standard are insufficient
   to achieve this uniqueness.  RFC 6222 was published to update those
   guidelines to allow endpoints to choose unique RTCP CNAMEs.
   Unfortunately, later investigations showed that some parts of the new
   algorithms were unnecessarily complicated and/or ineffective.  This
   document addresses these concerns and replaces RFC 6222.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Deficiencies with Earlier Guidelines for Choosing an RTCP
       CNAME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Choosing an RTCP CNAME  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Persistent RTCP CNAMEs versus Per-Session RTCP CNAMEs . .   4
     4.2.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Procedure to Generate a Unique Identifier . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.1.  Considerations on Uniqueness of RTCP CNAMEs . . . . . . .   7
     6.2.  Session Correlation Based on RTCP CNAMEs  . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

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   In Section 6.5.1 of [RFC3550], there are a number of recommendations
   for choosing a unique RTCP CNAME for an RTP endpoint.  However, in
   practice, some of these methods are not guaranteed to produce a
   unique RTCP CNAME.  [RFC6222] updated the guidelines for choosing
   RTCP CNAMEs, superseding those presented in Section 6.5.1 of
   [RFC3550].  Unfortunately, some parts of the new algorithms are
   rather complicated and also produce RTCP CNAMEs which in some cases
   are potentially linkable over multiple RTCP sessions even if a new
   RTCP CNAME is generated for each session.  This document specifies a
   replacement for the algorithm in Section 5 of [RFC6222], which does
   not have this limitation and is also simpler to implement.

   For a discussion on the linkability of RTCP CNAMES produced by
   [RFC6222], refer to [I-D.rescorla-avtcore-random-cname].

2.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

3.  Deficiencies with Earlier Guidelines for Choosing an RTCP CNAME

   The recommendation in [RFC3550] is to generate an RTCP CNAME of the
   form "user@host" for multiuser systems, or "host" if the username is
   not available.  The "host" part is specified to be the fully
   qualified domain name (FQDN) of the host from which the real-time
   data originates.  While this guidance was appropriate at the time
   [RFC3550] was written, FQDNs are no longer necessarily unique and can
   sometimes be common across several endpoints in large service
   provider networks.  This document replaces the use of FQDN as an RTCP
   CNAME by alternative mechanisms.

   IPv4 addresses are also suggested for use in RTCP CNAMEs in
   [RFC3550], where the "host" part of the RTCP CNAME is the numeric
   representation of the IPv4 address of the interface from which the
   RTP data originates.  As noted in [RFC3550], the use of private
   network address space [RFC1918] can result in hosts having network
   addresses that are not globally unique.  Additionally, this shared
   use of the same IPv4 address can also occur with public IPv4
   addresses if multiple hosts are assigned the same public IPv4 address
   and connected to a Network Address Translation (NAT) device
   [RFC3022].  When multiple hosts share the same IPv4 address, whether
   private or public, using the IPv4 address as the RTCP CNAME leads to
   RTCP CNAMEs that are not necessarily unique.

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   It is also noted in [RFC3550] that if hosts with private addresses
   and no direct IP connectivity to the public Internet have their RTP
   packets forwarded to the public Internet through an RTP-level
   translator, they could end up having non-unique RTCP CNAMEs.  The
   suggestion in [RFC3550] is that such applications provide a
   configuration option to allow the user to choose a unique RTCP CNAME;
   this technique puts the burden on the translator to translate RTCP
   CNAMEs from private addresses to public addresses if necessary to
   keep private addresses from being exposed.  Experience has shown that
   this does not work well in practice.

4.  Choosing an RTCP CNAME

   It is difficult, and in some cases impossible, for a host to
   determine if there is a NAT between itself and its RTP peer.
   Furthermore, even some public IPv4 addresses can be shared by
   multiple hosts in the Internet.  Using the numeric representation of
   the IPv4 address as the "host" part of the RTCP CNAME is NOT
   RECOMMENDED.

4.1.  Persistent RTCP CNAMEs versus Per-Session RTCP CNAMEs

   The RTCP CNAME can be either persistent across different RTP sessions
   for an RTP endpoint or unique per session, meaning that an RTP
   endpoint chooses a different RTCP CNAME for each RTP session.

   An RTP endpoint that is emitting multiple related RTP streams that
   require synchronization at the other endpoint(s) MUST use the same
   RTCP CNAME for all streams that are to be synchronized.  This
   requires a short-term persistent RTCP CNAME that is common across
   several RTP streams, and potentially across several related RTP
   sessions.  A common example of such use occurs when lip-syncing audio
   and video streams in a multimedia session, where a single participant
   has to use the same RTCP CNAME for its audio RTP session and for its
   video RTP session.  Another example might be to synchronize the
   layers of a layered audio codec, where the same RTCP CNAME has to be
   used for each layer.

   If the multiple RTP streams in an RTP session are not related, thus
   do not require synchronization, an RTP endpoint can use different
   RTCP CNAMEs for these streams.

   A longer-term persistent RTCP CNAME is sometimes useful to facilitate
   third-party monitoring, consistent with [RFC3550].  One such use
   might be to allow network management tools to correlate the ongoing
   quality of service for a participant across multiple RTP sessions for
   fault diagnosis, and to understand long-term network performance
   statistics.  An application developer that wishes to discourage this

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   type of third-party monitoring can choose to generate a unique RTCP
   CNAME for each RTP session, or group of related RTP sessions, that
   the application will join.  Such a per-session RTCP CNAME cannot be
   used for traffic analysis, and so provides some limited form of
   privacy.  Note that there are non-RTP means that can be used by a
   third party to correlate RTP sessions, so the use of per-session RTCP
   CNAMEs will not prevent a determined traffic analyst from monitoring
   such sessions.

   This memo defines several different ways by which an implementation
   can choose an RTCP CNAME.  It is possible, and legitimate, for
   independent implementations to make different choices of RTCP CNAME
   when running on the same host.  This can hinder third-party
   monitoring, unless some external means is provided to configure a
   persistent choice of RTCP CNAME for those implementations.

   Note that there is no backwards compatibility issue (with
   [RFC3550]-compatible implementations) introduced in this memo, since
   the RTCP CNAMEs are opaque strings to remote peers.

4.2.  Requirements

   RTP endpoints will choose to generate RTCP CNAMEs that are persistent
   or per-session.  An RTP endpoint that wishes to generate a persistent
   RTCP CNAME MUST use one of the following two methods:

   o  To produce a long-term persistent RTCP CNAME, an RTP endpoint MUST
      generate and store a Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID)
      [RFC4122] for use as the "host" part of its RTCP CNAME.  The UUID
      MUST be version 1, 2, or 4, as described in [RFC4122], with the
      "urn:uuid:" stripped, resulting in a 36-octet printable string
      representation.

   o  To produce a short-term persistent RTCP CNAME, an RTP endpoint
      MUST generate and use an identifier by following the procedure
      described in Section 5.  That procedure is performed at least once
      per initialization of the software.  After obtaining an
      identifier, minimally the least significant 96 bits SHOULD be
      converted to ASCII using Base64 encoding [RFC4648] (to compromise
      between packet size and uniqueness - refer to Section 6.1).  If 96
      bits are used, the resulting string will be 16 octets.

   In the two cases above, the "user@" part of the RTCP CNAME MAY be
   omitted on single-user systems and MAY be replaced by an opaque token
   on multi-user systems, to preserve privacy.

   An RTP endpoint that wishes to generate a per-session RTCP CNAME MUST
   use the following method:

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quot;

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 23, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.

   This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not
   be created, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to
   translate it into languages other than English.

Table of Contents

   1.  Background and Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Overview of Saratoga File Transfer  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Optional Parts of Saratoga  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.1.  Optional but useful functions in Saratoga . . . . . . . .  11
     3.2.  Optional congestion control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.3.  Optional functionality requiring other protocols  . . . .  12
   4.  Packet Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.1.  BEACON  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.2.  REQUEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     4.3.  METADATA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     4.4.  DATA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     4.5.  STATUS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   5.  The Directory Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   6.  Behaviour of a Saratoga Peer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     6.1.  Saratoga Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     6.2.  Beacons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     6.3.  Upper-Layer Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     6.4.  Inactivity Timer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     6.5.  Streams and wrapping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     6.6.  Completing file delivery and ending the session . . . . .  50
   7.  Mailing list  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52

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   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
   11. A Note on Naming  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
   Appendix A.  Timestamp/Nonce field considerations . . . . . . . .  54
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56

1.  Background and Introduction

   Saratoga is a file transfer and content dissemination protocol
   capable of efficiently sending both small (kilobyte) and very large
   (exabyte) files, as well as streaming continuous content.  Saratoga
   was originally designed for the purpose of large file transfer from
   small low-Earth-orbiting satellites.  It has been used in daily
   operations since 2004 to move mission imaging data files of the order
   of several hundred megabytes each from the Disaster Monitoring
   Constellation (DMC) remote-sensing satellites to ground stations.

   The DMC satellites, built at the University of Surrey by Surrey
   Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL), all use IP for payload
   communications and delivery of Earth imagery.  At the time of this
   writing, in March 2013, nine DMC satellites have been launched into
   orbit since 2002, five of those are currently operational in orbit,
   and three more are planned.  The DMC satellites use Saratoga to
   provide Earth imagery under the aegis of the International Charter on
   Space and Major Disasters.  A pass of connectivity between a
   satellite and ground station offers an 8-12 minute time window in
   which to transfer imagery files using a minimum of an 8.1 Mbps
   downlink and a 9.6 kbps uplink.  The latest operational DMC
   satellites have faster downlinks, capable of 20, 40, 80, 105 or 201
   Mbps.  Newer satellites are expected to use downlinks to 400 Mbps,
   without significant increases in uplink rates.  This high degree of
   link asymmetry, with the need to fully utilize the available downlink
   capacity to move the volume of data required within the limited time
   available, motivates much of Saratoga's design.

   Further details on how these DMC satellites use IP to communicate
   with the ground and the terrestrial Internet are discussed elsewhere
   [Hogie05][Wood07a].  Saratoga has also been evaluated for use in
   high-speed private ground networks supporting radio astronomy sensors
   [Wood11].

   Store-and-forward delivery relies on reliable hop-by-hop transfers of
   files, removing the need for the final receiver to talk to the
   original sender across long delays and allowing for the possibility
   that an end-to-end path may never exist between sender and receiver
   at any given time.  Breaking an end-to-end path into multiple hops

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   allows data to be transferred as quickly as possible across each
   link; congestion on a longer Internet path is then not detrimental to
   the transfer rate on a space downlink.  Use of store-and-forward hop-
   by-hop delivery is typical of scenarios in space exploration for both
   near-Earth and deep-space missions, and useful for other scenarios,
   such as underwater networking, ad-hoc sensor networks, and some
   message-ferrying relay scenarios.  Saratoga is intended to be useful
   for relaying data in these scenarios.

   Saratoga can optionally also be used to carry the Bundle Protocol
   "bundles" intended for Delay and Disruption-Tolerant Networking (DTN)
   by the IRTF DTN Research Group [RFC5050].  This has been tested from
   orbit using the UK-DMC satellite [Ivancic10].  How Saratoga can
   optionally function as a "bundle convergence layer" alongside a DTN
   bundle agent is specified in a companion document
   [I-D.wood-dtnrg-saratoga].

   Saratoga contains a Selective Negative Acknowledgement (SNACK)
   'holestofill' mechanism to provide reliable retransmission of data.
   This is intended to correct losses of corrupted link-layer frames due
   to channel noise over a space link.  Packet losses in the DMC are due
   to corruption introducing non-recoverable errors in the frame.  The
   DMC design uses point-to-point links and scheduling of applications
   in order, so that the link is dedicated to one application transfer
   at a time, meaning that packet loss cannot be due to congestion when
   applications compete for link capacity simultaneously.  In other
   wireless environments that may be shared by many nodes and
   applications, allocation of channel resources to nodes becomes a MAC-
   layer function.  Forward Error Coding (FEC) to get the most reliable
   transmission through a channel is best left near the physical layer
   so that it can be tailored for the channel.  Use of FEC complements
   Saratoga's transport-level negative-acknowledgement approach that
   provides a reliable ARQ mechanism.

   Saratoga is scalable in that it is capable of efficiently
   transferring small or large files, by choosing a width of file offset
   descriptor appropriate for the filesize, and advertising accepted
   offset descriptor sizes.  16-bit, 32-bit, 64-bit and 128-bit
   descriptors can be selected, for maximum file sizes of 64KiB-1 (<64
   Kilobytes of disk space), 4GiB-1 (<4 Gigabytes), 16EiB-1 (<16
   Exabytes) and 256 EiEiB-1 (<256 Exa-exabytes) respectively.

   Earth imaging files currently transferred by Saratoga are mostly up
   to a few gigabytes in size.  Some implementations do transfer more
   than 4 GiB in size, and so require offset descriptors larger than 32
   bits.  We believe that supporting a 128-bit descriptor can satisfy
   all future needs, but we expect current implementations to only
   support up to 32-bit or 64-bit descriptors, depending on their

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   application needs.  The 16-bit descriptor is useful for small
   messages, including messages from 8-bit devices, and is always
   supported.  The 128-bit descriptor can be used for moving very large
   files stored on a 128-bit filesystem, such as on OpenSolaris ZFS.

   As a UDP-based protocol, Saratoga can be used with either IPv4 or
   IPv6.  Compatibility between Saratoga and the wide variety of links
   that can already carry IP traffic is assured.

   High link utilization is important during periods of limited
   connectivity.  Given that Saratoga was originally developed for
   scheduled peer-to-peer communications over dedicated links in private
   networks, where each application has the entire link for the duration
   of its transfer, many Saratoga implementations deliberately lack any
   form of congestion control and send at line rate to maximise
   throughput and link utilisation in their limited, carefully
   controlled, environments.  In accordance with UDP Guidelines
   [RFC5405] for protocols able to traverse the public Internet, newer
   implementations may perform TCP-Friendly Rate Control (TFRC)
   [RFC5348] or other congestion control mechanisms.  This is described
   further in [I-D.wood-tsvwg-saratoga-congestion-control].

   Saratoga was originally implemented as outlined in [Jackson04], but
   the specification given here differs substantially, as we have added
   a number of capabilities while cleaning up the initial Saratoga
   specification.  The original Saratoga code uses a version number of
   0, while code that implements this version of the protocol advertises
   a version number of 1.  Further discussion of the history and
   development of Saratoga is given in [Wood07b].

   This document contains an overview of the transfer process and
   sessions using Saratoga in Section 2, followed by a formal definition
   of the packet types used by Saratoga in Section 4, and the details of
   the various protocol mechanisms in Section 6.

   Here, Saratoga session types are labelled with underscores around
   lowercase names (such as a "_get_" session), while Saratoga packet
   types are labelled in all capitals (such as a "REQUEST" packet) in
   order to distinguish between the two.

   The remainder of this specification uses 'file' as a shorthand for
   'binary object', which may be a file, or other type of data, such as
   a DTN bundle.  This specification uses 'file' when also discussing
   streaming of data of indeterminate length.  Saratoga uses unsigned
   integers in its fields, and does not use signed types.

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   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY&Internet-Draft           Choosing an RTCP CNAME                July 2013

   o  For every new RTP session, a new RTCP CNAME is generated following
      the procedure described in Section 5.  After performing that
      procedure, minimally the least significant 96 bits SHOULD be
      converted to ASCII using Base64 encoding [RFC4648].  The RTCP
      CNAME cannot change over the life of an RTP session [RFC3550].
      The "user@" part of the RTCP CNAME is omitted when generating
      per-session RTCP CNAMEs.

   It is believed that obtaining uniqueness (with a high probability) is
   an important property that requires careful evaluation of the method.
   This document provides a number of methods, at least one of which
   would be suitable for all deployment scenarios.  This document
   therefore does not provide for the implementor to define and select
   an alternative method.

   A future specification might define an alternative method for
   generating RTCP CNAMEs, as long as the proposed method has
   appropriate uniqueness and there is consistency between the methods
   used for multiple RTP sessions that are to be correlated.  However,
   such a specification needs to be reviewed and approved before
   deployment.

   The mechanisms described in this document are to be used to generate
   RTCP CNAMEs, and they are not to be used for generating general-
   purpose unique identifiers.

5.  Procedure to Generate a Unique Identifier

   To locally produce a unique identifier, one simply generates a
   cryptographically pseudorandom value as described in [RFC4086].  This
   value MUST be at least 96 bits and MAY be up to 512 bits.

   The biggest bottleneck to implementation of this algorithm is the
   availability of an appropriate cryptographically secure pseudorandom
   number generator (CSPRNG).  In any setting which already has a secure
   PRNG, this algorithm described is far simpler than the algorithm
   described in Section 5 of [RFC6222].  SIP stacks [RFC3261] are
   required to use cryptographically random numbers to generate To and
   From tags (Section 19.3).  RTCWEB implementations
   [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch] will need to have secure PRNGs to
   implement ICE [RFC5245] and DTLS-SRTP [RFC5764].  And, of course,
   essentially every Web browser already supports TLS, which requires a
   secure PRNG.

6.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of [RFC3550] apply to this memo.

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6.1.  Considerations on Uniqueness of RTCP CNAMEs

   The considerations in this section apply to random RTCP CNAMEs.

   The recommendations given in this document for RTCP CNAME generation
   ensure that a set of cooperating participants in an RTP session will,
   with very high probability, have unique RTCP CNAMEs.  However,
   neither [RFC3550] nor this document provides any way to ensure that
   participants will choose RTCP CNAMEs appropriately, and thus
   implementations MUST NOT rely on the uniqueness of RTCP CNAMEs for
   any essential security services.  This is consistent with [RFC3550],
   which does not require that RTCP CNAMEs are unique within a session
   but instead says that condition SHOULD hold.  As described in the
   Security Considerations section of [RFC3550], because each
   participant in a session is free to choose its own RTCP CNAME, they
   can do so in such a way as to impersonate another participant.  That
   is, participants are trusted to not impersonate each other.  No
   recommendation for generating RTCP CNAMEs can prevent this
   impersonation, because an attacker can neglect the stipulation.
   Secure RTP (SRTP) [RFC3711] keeps unauthorized entities out of an RTP
   session, but it does not aim to prevent impersonation attacks from
   authorized entities.

   Because of the properties of the PRNG, there is no significant
   privacy/linkability difference between long and short RTCP CNAMEs.
   However, the requirement to generate unique RTCP CNAMEs implies a
   certain minimum length.  A length of 96 bits allows on the order of
   2^{40} RTCP CNAMEs globally before there is a large chance of
   collision (there is about a 50% chance of one collision after 2^{48}
   RTCP CNAMEs).

6.2.  Session Correlation Based on RTCP CNAMEs

   Earlier recommendations for RTCP CNAME generation allowed a fixed
   RTCP CNAME value, which allows an attacker to easily link separate
   RTP sessions, eliminating the obfuscation provided by IPv6 privacy
   addresses [RFC4941] or IPv4 Network Address Port Translation (NAPT)
   [RFC3022].

   This specification no longer describes a procedure to generate fixed
   RTCP CNAME values, so RTCP CNAME values no longer provide such
   linkage between RTP sessions.  This was necessary to eliminate such
   linking by an attacker, but of course complicates linking by traffic
   analysis devices (e.g., devices that are looking for dropped or
   delayed packets).

7.  IANA Considerations

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   No IANA actions are required.

8.  Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Marc Petit-Huguenin, who suggested using UUIDs in
   generating RTCP CNAMEs.  Also, thanks to David McGrew for providing
   text for the Security Considerations section in RFC 6222.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC3550]  Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
              Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
              Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, July 2003.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4122]  Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
              Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, July
              2005.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.

   [RFC5342]  Eastlake, D., "IANA Considerations and IETF Protocol Usage
              for IEEE 802 Parameters", BCP 141, RFC 5342, September
              2008.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC6222]  Begen, A., Perkins, C., and D. Wing, "Guidelines for
              Choosing RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) Canonical Names
              (CNAMEs)", RFC 6222, April 2011.

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
              E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP
              5, RFC 1918, February 1996.

   [RFC3022]  Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network
              Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022, January
              2001.

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   [RFC3711]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
              Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
              RFC 3711, March 2004.

   [RFC4941]  Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
              Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
              IPv6", RFC 4941, September 2007.

   [RFC5245]  Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
              (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT)
              Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245, April
              2010.

   [RFC5764]  McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure
              Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 5764, May 2010.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch]
              Rescorla, E., "RTCWEB Security Architecture", draft-ietf-
              rtcweb-security-arch-06 (work in progress), January 2013.

   [I-D.rescorla-avtcore-random-cname]
              Rescorla, E., "Random algorithm for RTP CNAME generation",
              draft-rescorla-avtcore-random-cname-00 (work in progress),
              July 2012.

Authors' Addresses

   Ali Begen
   Cisco
   181 Bay Street
   Toronto, ON  M5J 2T3
   CANADA

   EMail: abegen@cisco.com

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   Colin Perkins
   University of Glasgow
   School of Computing Science
   Glasgow  G12 8QQ
   UK

   EMail: csp@csperkins.org

   Dan Wing
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, California  95134
   USA

   EMail: dwing@cisco.com

   Eric Rescorla
   RTFM, Inc.
   2064 Edgewood Drive
   Palo Alto, CA  94303
   USA

   Phone: +1 650 678 2350
   EMail: ekr@rtfm.com

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