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Constrained Voucher Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols
draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-00

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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
Authors Michael Richardson , Peter Van der Stok , Panos Kampanakis
Last updated 2018-05-23
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draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-00
6tisch Working Group                                       M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                  Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Informational                           P. van der Stok
Expires: November 24, 2018                        vanderstok consultancy
                                                           P. Kampanakis
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                            May 23, 2018

       Constrained Voucher Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols
                draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-00

Abstract

   This document defines a strategy to securely assign a pledge to an
   owner, using an artifact signed, directly or indirectly, by the
   pledge's manufacturer.  This artifact is known as a "voucher".

   This document builds upon the work in [RFC8366], encoding the
   resulting artifact in CBOR.  Use with two signature technologies are
   described.

   Additionally, this document explains how constrained vouchers may be
   transported in the [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] protocol.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 24, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Survey of Voucher Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Discovery and URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.1.  Voucher Request artifact  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       6.1.1.  Tree Diagram  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       6.1.2.  SID values  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       6.1.3.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       6.1.4.  Example voucher request artifacts . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.2.  Voucher artifact  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.2.1.  Tree Diagram  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.2.2.  SID values  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       6.2.3.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       6.2.4.  Example voucher artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.3.  Signing of voucher and voucher-request artifacts  . . . .  12
       6.3.1.  CMS signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       6.3.2.  COSE signing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.1.  Clock Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.2.  Protect Voucher PKI in HSM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.3.  Test Domain Certificate Validity when Signing . . . . . .  14
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.1.  The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.2.  The YANG Module Names Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.3.  The SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry . .  15
     9.4.  The SID registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     9.5.  Media-Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       9.5.1.  application/voucher-cms+cbor  . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       9.5.2.  application/voucher-cose+cbor . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     9.6.  CoAP Content-Format Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   11. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

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     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Appendix A.  EST messages to EST-coaps  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     A.1.  enrollstatus  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     A.2.  voucher_status  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     A.3.  requestvoucher  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     A.4.  requestauditing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22

1.  Introduction

   Enrollment of new nodes into constrained networks with constrained
   nodes present unique challenges.

   There are bandwidth and code space issues to contend.  A solution
   such as [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] may be too large in
   terms of code space or bandwidth required.

   This document defines a constrained version of [RFC8366].  Rather
   than serializing the YANG definition in JSON, it is serialized into
   CBOR ([RFC7049]).

   This document follows a similar, but not identical structure as
   [RFC8366].  Some sections are left out entirely.  Additional sections
   have been added concerning:

   1.  Addition of voucher-request specification as defined in
       [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra],

   2.  Addition to [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] of voucher transport requests
       over coap.

   The CBOR definitions for this constrained voucher format are defined
   using the mechanism describe in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] using the
   SID mechanism explained in [I-D.ietf-core-sid].  As the tooling to
   convert YANG documents into an list of SID keys is still in its
   infancy, the table of SID values presented here should be considered
   normative rather than the output of the pyang tool.

   Two methods of signing the resulting CBOR object are described in
   this document:

   1.  One is CMS [RFC5652].

   2.  The other is COSE [RFC8152] signatures.

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2.  Terminology

   The following terms are defined in [RFC8366], and are used
   identically as in that document: artifact, imprint, domain, Join
   Registrar/Coordinator (JRC), Manufacturer Authorized Signing
   Authority (MASA), pledge, Trust of First Use (TOFU), and Voucher.

3.  Requirements Language

   In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
   "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
   and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
   [RFC2119] and indicate requirement levels for compliant STuPiD
   implementations.

4.  Survey of Voucher Types

   [RFC8366] provides for vouchers that assert proximity, that
   authenticate the registrar and that include different amounts of
   anti-replay protection.

   This document does not make any extensions to the types of vouchers.

   Time based vouchers are included in this definition, but given that
   constrained devices are extremely unlikely to know the correct time,
   their use is very unlikely.  Most users of these constrained vouchers
   will be online and will use live nonces to provide anti-replay
   protection.

   [RFC8366] defined only the voucher artifact, and not the Voucher
   Request artifact, which was defined in
   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].

   This document defines both a constrained voucher and a constrained
   voucher-request.  They are presented in the order voucher-request,
   followed by voucher response as this is the time order that they
   occur.

5.  Discovery and URI

   This section describes the BRSKI extensions to EST-coaps
   [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] to transport the voucher between registrar,
   proxy and pledge over CoAP.

   The extension is targeted to low-resource networks with small
   packets.  Saving header space is important and the EST-coaps URI is
   shorter than the EST URI.

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   The presence and location of (path to) the management data are
   discovered by sending a GET request to "/.well-known/core" including
   a resource type (RT) parameter with the value "ace.est" [RFC6690].
   Upon success, the return payload will contain the root resource of
   the EST resources.  It is up to the implementation to choose its root
   resource; throughout this document the example root resource /est is
   used.

   The EST-coaps server URIs differ from the EST URI by replacing the
   scheme https by coaps and by specifying shorter resource path names:

     coaps://www.example.com/est/short-name

   Figure 5 in section 3.2.2 of [RFC7030] enumerates the operations and
   corresponding paths which are supported by EST.  Table 1 provides the
   mapping from the BRSKI extension URI path to the EST-coaps URI path.

                     +------------------+-----------+
                     | BRSKI            | EST-coaps |
                     +------------------+-----------+
                     | /requestvoucher  | /rv       |
                     |                  |           |
                     | /voucher-status  | /vs       |
                     |                  |           |
                     | /enrollstatus    | /es       |
                     |                  |           |
                     | /requestauditlog | /ra       |
                     +------------------+-----------+

                   Table 1: BRSKI path to EST-coaps path

   /requestvoucher and /enrollstatus are needed between pledge and
   Registrar.

   When discovering the root path for the EST resources, the server MAY
   return the full resource paths and the used content types.  This is
   useful when multiple content types are specified for EST-coaps
   server.  The example below shows the discovery of the presence and
   the location of voucher resources.

     REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est

     RES: 2.05 Content
     </est>; rt="ace.est"
     </est/rv>; ct=50 TBD2 TBD3 16
     </est/vs>; ct=50
     </est/es>; ct=50
     </est/ra>; ct=TBD2 TBD3 16

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   The first line MUST be returned in response to the GET, The following
   four lines MAY be returned to show the supported Content-Formats.
   The return of the content-types allows the client to choose the most
   appropriate one from multiple content types.

   ct=50 stands for the Content-Format "application/json", ct=16 stands
   for the Content-Format "application/cose; cose-type="cose-encrypt0",
   ct=TBD2 stands for Content-Format "application/voucher-cms+cbor,
   ct=TBD3 stands for Content-Format "application/voucher-cose+cbor;
   cose-type="cose-sign1.  The latter two are defined in this document.

6.  Artifacts

   This section describes the abstract (tree) definition as explained in
   [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams] first.  This provides a high-
   level view of the contents of each artifact.

   Then the assigned SID values are presented.  These have been assigned
   using the rules in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor], with an allocation that
   was made via the http://comi.space service.

   ((EDNOTE: it is unclear if there is further IANA work))

6.1.  Voucher Request artifact

6.1.1.  Tree Diagram

   module: ietf-cwt-voucher-request

     grouping voucher-request-cwt-grouping
       +---- voucher
          +---- created-on
          |       yang:date-and-time
          +---- expires-on?
          |       yang:date-and-time
          +---- assertion
          |       enumeration
          +---- serial-number                                  string
          +---- idevid-issuer?                                 binary
          +---- pinned-domain-cert                             binary
          +---- domain-cert-revocation-checks?                 boolean
          +---- nonce?                                         binary
          +---- last-renewal-date?
          |       yang:date-and-time
          +---- proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info?   binary

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6.1.2.  SID values

         SID Assigned to
   --------- --------------------------------------------------
     1001150 module ietf-cwt-voucher-request
     1001151 module ietf-restconf
     1001152 module ietf-voucher
     1001153 module ietf-yang-types
     1001154 data .../ietf-cwt-voucher-request:voucher
     1001155 data .../assertion
     1001156 data .../created-on
     1001157 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks
     1001158 data .../expires-on
     1001159 data .../idevid-issuer
     1001160 data .../last-renewal-date
     1001161 data .../nonce
     1001162 data .../pinned-domain-cert
     1001163 data .../proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info
     1001164 data .../serial-number

6.1.3.  YANG Module

   In the cwt-voucher-request YANG module, the voucher is "used" and not
   "augmented" such that one continuous set of SID values is generated
   for the cwt-voucher-request module name, all voucher attributes, and
   the cwt-voucher-request attribute.

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-cwt-voucher-request@2018-02-07.yang"
/* -*- c -*- */
module ietf-cwt-voucher-request {
  yang-version 1.1;

  namespace
    "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-cwt-voucher-request";
  prefix "vcwt";

  import ietf-voucher {
    prefix "v";
  }

  organization
   "IETF 6tisch Working Group";

  contact
   "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/6tisch/>
    WG List:  <mailto:6tisch@ietf.org>
    Author:   Michael Richardson

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              <mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>";

  description
   "This module defines the format for a voucher, which is produced by
    a pledge's manufacturer or delegate (MASA) to securely assign one
    or more pledges to an 'owner', so that the pledges may establish a
    secure connection to the owner's network infrastructure.

    This version provides a very restricted subset appropriate
    for very constrained devices.
    In particular, it assumes that nonce-ful operation is
    always required, that expiration dates are rather weak, as no
    clocks can be assumed, and that the Registrar is identified
    by a pinned Raw Public Key.

    The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
    'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in
    the module text are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.";

  revision "2018-02-07" {
    description
     "Initial version";
    reference
     "RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Constrained Devices";
  }

  // Grouping defined for future usage
  grouping voucher-request-cwt-grouping {
    description
      "Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";

    uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping {
      augment "voucher" {
        description "Base the CWT voucher-request upon the regular one";
        leaf proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info {
          type binary;
          description
            "The proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info replaces
         the proximit-registrar-cert in constrained uses of
         the voucher-request.
         The proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info is the
         Raw Public Key of the Registrar. This field is encoded
         as specified in RFC7250, section 3.
         The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.
         The EdDSA algorithm as specified in
         draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.
         Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.
         Support for the RSA algorithm is a MAY.";

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        }
      }
    }
  }
}
<CODE ENDS>

6.1.4.  Example voucher request artifacts

   TBD

6.2.  Voucher artifact

   The voucher's primary purpose is to securely assign a pledge to an
   owner.  The voucher informs the pledge which entity it should
   consider to be its owner.

   This document defines a voucher that is a CBOR encoded instance of
   the YANG module defined in Section 5.3 that has been signed with CMS
   or with COSE.

6.2.1.  Tree Diagram

   module: ietf-cwt-voucher

     grouping voucher-cwt-grouping
       +---- voucher
          +---- created-on
          |       yang:date-and-time
          +---- expires-on?
          |       yang:date-and-time
          +---- assertion                                enumeration
          +---- serial-number                            string
          +---- idevid-issuer?                           binary
          +---- pinned-domain-cert                       binary
          +---- domain-cert-revocation-checks?           boolean
          +---- nonce?                                   binary
          +---- last-renewal-date?
          |       yang:date-and-time
          +---- pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info?   binary

6.2.2.  SID values

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         SID Assigned to
   --------- --------------------------------------------------
     1001100 module ietf-cwt-voucher
     1001101 module ietf-restconf
     1001102 module ietf-voucher
     1001103 module ietf-yang-types
     1001104 data .../ietf-cwt-voucher:voucher
     1001105 data .../assertion
     1001106 data .../created-on
     1001107 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks
     1001108 data .../expires-on
     1001109 data .../idevid-issuer
     1001110 data .../last-renewal-date
     1001111 data .../nonce
     1001112 data .../pinned-domain-cert
     1001113 data .../pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info
     1001114 data .../serial-number

6.2.3.  YANG Module

   In the cwt-voucher YANG module, the voucher is "used" and not
   "augmented" such that one continuous set of SID values is generated
   for the cwt-voucher module name, all voucher attributes, and the cwt-
   voucher attribute.

 <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-cwt-voucher@2018-02-07.yang"
 /* -*- c -*- */
 module ietf-cwt-voucher {
   yang-version 1.1;

   namespace
     "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-cwt-voucher";
   prefix "vcwt";

   import ietf-voucher {
     prefix "v";
   }

   organization
    "IETF 6tisch Working Group";

   contact
    "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/6tisch/>
     WG List:  <mailto:6tisch@ietf.org>
     Author:   Michael Richardson
               <mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>";

   description

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    "This module defines the format for a voucher, which is produced by
     a pledge's manufacturer or delegate (MASA) to securely assign one
     or more pledges to an 'owner', so that the pledges may establish a
     secure connection to the owner's network infrastructure.

     This version provides a very restricted subset appropriate
     for very constrained devices.
     In particular, it assumes that nonce-ful operation is
     always required, that expiration dates are rather weak, as no
     clocks can be assumed, and that the Registrar is identified
     by a pinned Raw Public Key.

     The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
     'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in
     the module text are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.";

   revision "2018-02-07" {
     description
      "Initial version";
     reference
      "RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Constrained Devices";
   }

   // Grouping defined for future usage
   grouping voucher-cwt-grouping {
     description
       "Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";

     uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping {
       augment "voucher" {
         description "Base the CWT voucher upon the regular one";
         leaf pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info {
           type binary;
           description
             "The pinned-domain-subject replaces the
          pinned-domain-certificate in constrained uses of
          the voucher.  The pinned-domain-public-key-info is the
          Raw Public Key of the Registrar. This field is encoded
          as specified in RFC7250, section 3.
          The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.
          The EdDSA algorithm as specified in
          draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.
          Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.
          Support for the RSA algorithm is a MAY.";
         }
       }
     }
   }

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 }
 <CODE ENDS>

6.2.4.  Example voucher artifacts

   Below a the CBOR serialization of the the cwt-voucher and cwt-
   voucher-request are shown in diagnostic CBOR notation.

6.2.4.1.  CBOR serialization of cwt-voucher

{
  1001051: {
    +2 : "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",  / SID = 1001053, created-on /
    +4 : "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z",  / SID = 1001055, expires-on /
    +1 : "verified",              / SID = 1001052, assertion /
    +11: "JADA123456789",         / SID = 1001062, serial-number /
    +5 : h'01020D0F',             / SID = 1001056, idevid-issuer /
    +8 : h'01020D0F',             / SID = 1001059, pinned-domain-cert /
    +3 : true,                    / SID = 1001054, domain-cert-revocation-checks /
    +6 : "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z",  / SID = 1001057, last-renewal-date /
    +9 : h'01020D0F'              / SID = 1001060, pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info /
  }
}

6.2.4.2.  CBOR serialization of cwt-voucher-request

{
  1001101: {
    +2 : "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",  / SID = 1001103, created-on /
    +4 : "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z",  / SID = 1001105, expires-on /
    +1 : "verified",              / SID = 1001102, assertion /
    +11: "JADA123456789",         / SID = 1001112, serial-number /
    +5 : h'01020D0F',             / SID = 1001106, idevid-issuer /
    +8 : h'01020D0F',             / SID = 1001109, pinned-domain-cert /
    +3 : true,                    / SID = 1001104, domain-cert-revocation-checks /
    +6 : "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z",  / SID = 1001107, last-renewal-date /
    +10: h'01020D0F'              / SID = 1001111, proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info /
  }
}

6.3.  Signing of voucher and voucher-request artifacts

   The IETF evolution of PKCS#7 is CMS [RFC5652].  The CMS signed
   voucher is much like the equivalent voucher defined in [RFC8366].

   A different eContentType of TBD1 is used to indicate that the
   contents are in a different format than in [RFC8366].

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   The ContentInfo structure contains a payload consisting of the CBOR
   encoded voucher.  The [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] use of delta encoding
   creates a canonical ordering for the keys on the wire.  This
   canonical ordering is not important as there is no expectation that
   the content will be reproduced during the validation process.

   Normally the recipient is the pledge and the signer is the MASA.

   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] supports both signed and
   unsigned voucher requests from the pledge to the JRC.  In this
   specification, voucher-request artifact is not signed from the pledge
   to the registrar.  From the JRC to the MASA, the voucher-request
   artifact MUST be signed by the domain owner key which is requesting
   ownership.

6.3.1.  CMS signing

   The considerations of [RFC5652] section 5.1, concerning validating
   CMS objects which are really PKCS7 objects (cmsVersion=1) applies.

   The CMS structure SHOULD also contain all the certificates leading up
   to and including the signer's trust anchor certificate known to the
   recipient.  The inclusion of the trust anchor is unusual in many
   applications, but without it third parties can not accurately audit
   the transaction.

   The CMS structure MAY also contain revocation objects for any
   intermediate certificate authorities (CAs) between the voucher-issuer
   and the trust anchor known to the recipient.  However, the use of
   CRLs and other validity mechanisms is discouraged, as the pledge is
   unlikely to be able to perform online checks, and is unlikely to have
   a trusted clock source.  As described below, the use of short-lived
   vouchers and/or pledge provided nonce provides a freshness guarantee.

6.3.2.  COSE signing

   The COSE-Sign1 structure discussed in section 4.2 of [RFC8152].  The
   CBOR object that carries the body, the signature, and the information
   about the body and signature is called the COSE_Sign1 structure.  It
   is used when only one signature is used on the body.  The signature
   algorithm is ECSDA with three curves P-256, P-384, and P-512.

   Support for EdDSA is encouraged

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7.  Design Considerations

   The design considerations for the CBOR encoding of vouchers is much
   the same as for [RFC8366].

   One key difference is that the names of the leaves in the YANG does
   not have a material effect on the size of the resulting CBOR, as the
   SID translation process assigns integers to the names.

8.  Security Considerations

8.1.  Clock Sensitivity

   TBD.

8.2.  Protect Voucher PKI in HSM

   TBD.

8.3.  Test Domain Certificate Validity when Signing

   TBD.

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  The IETF XML Registry

   This document registers two URIs in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688].
   Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is
   requested:

     URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-cwt-voucher
     Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF.
     XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

     URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-cwt-voucher-request
     Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF.
     XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

9.2.  The YANG Module Names Registry

   This document registers two YANG modules in the YANG Module Names
   registry [RFC6020].  Following the format defined in [RFC6020], the
   the following registration is requested:

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     name:         ietf-cwt-voucher
     namespace:    urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-cwt-voucher
     prefix:       vch
     reference:    RFC XXXX

     name:         ietf-cwt-voucher-request
     namespace:    urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-cwt-voucher-request
     prefix:       vch
     reference:    RFC XXXX

9.3.  The SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry

   This document registers an OID in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS
   Content Type" registry (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1), with the value:

     Decimal  Description                             References
     -------  --------------------------------------  ----------
     TBD1      id-ct-animaCBORVoucher                 [ThisRFC]

   EDNOTE: should a separate value be used for Voucher Requests?

9.4.  The SID registry

   The SID range 1001100 was allocated by comi.space to the IETF-CWT-
   VOUCHER yang module.

   The SID range 1001150 was allocated by comi.space to the IETF-CWT-
   VOUCHER-REQUEST yang module.

   EDNOTE: it is unclear if there is further IANA work required.

9.5.  Media-Type Registry

   This section registers the 'application/voucher-cms+cbor' media type
   and the 'application/voucher-cose+cbor'in the "Media Types" registry.
   These media types are used to indicate that the content is a CBOR
   voucher either signed with a cms structure or a COSE_Sign1 structure
   [RFC8152].

9.5.1.  application/voucher-cms+cbor

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   Type name:  application
   Subtype name:  voucher-cms+cbor
   Required parameters:  none
   Optional parameters:  none
   Encoding considerations:  CMS-signed CBOR vouchers are CBOR
     encoded.
   Security considerations:  See Security Considerations, Section
   Interoperability considerations:  The format is designed to be
     broadly interoperable.
   Published specification:  THIS RFC.
   Applications that use this media type:  ANIMA, 6tisch, and other
     zero-touch imprinting systems
   Additional information:
     Magic number(s):  None
     File extension(s):  .cbor
     Macintosh file type code(s):  none
   Person & email address to contact for further information:  IETF
     ANIMA WG
   Intended usage:  LIMITED
   Restrictions on usage:  NONE
   Author:  ANIMA WG
   Change controller:  IETF
   Provisional registration? (standards tree only):  NO

9.5.2.  application/voucher-cose+cbor

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   Type name:  application
   Subtype name:  voucher-cose+cbor
   Required parameters:  none
   Optional parameters:  cose-type
   Encoding considerations:  COSE_Sign1 CBOR vouchers are COSE objects
                             signed with one signer.
   Security considerations:  See Security Considerations, Section
   Interoperability considerations:  The format is designed to be
     broadly interoperable.
   Published specification:  THIS RFC.
   Applications that use this media type:  ANIMA, 6tisch, and other
     zero-touch imprinting systems
   Additional information:
     Magic number(s):  None
     File extension(s):  .cbor
     Macintosh file type code(s):  none
   Person & email address to contact for further information:  IETF
     ANIMA WG
   Intended usage:  LIMITED
   Restrictions on usage:  NONE
   Author:  ANIMA WG
   Change controller:  IETF
   Provisional registration? (standards tree only):  NO

9.6.  CoAP Content-Format Registry

   Additions to the sub-registry "CoAP Content-Formats", within the
   "CoRE Parameters" registry are needed for the below media types.
   These can be registered either in the Expert Review range (0-255) or
   IETF Review range (256-9999).

   Addition1:

   Type name: application
   Subtype name: voucher-cms+cbor
   ID: TBD2
   Required parameters: None
   Optional parameters: None
   Encoding considerations: CBOR
   Security considerations: As defined in this specification
   Published specification: this document
   Applications that use this media type: ANIMA bootstrap (BRSKI)

   Addition2:

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   Type name: application
   Subtype name: voucher-cose+cbor
   ID: TBD3
   Required parameters: cose-type="COSE-Sign1"
   Optional parameters: none
   Encoding considerations: CBOR
   Security considerations: As defined in this specification
   Published specification: this document
   Applications that use this media type: ANIMA bootstrap (BRSKI)

10.  Acknowledgements

   We are very grateful to Jim Schaad for explaining COSE and CMS
   choices.

11.  Changelog

   -03

   Cms and cose mediatypes are introduced

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token]
              Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
              "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-token-15
              (work in progress), March 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]
              Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., Kumar, S., Richardson, M.,
              Furuhed, M., and S. Raza, "EST over secure CoAP (EST-
              coaps)", draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-00 (work in progress),
              February 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
              Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., Bjarnason,
              S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
              keyinfra-15 (work in progress), April 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
              Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
              "Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
              (OSCORE)", draft-ietf-core-object-security-12 (work in
              progress), March 2018.

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   [I-D.ietf-core-sid]
              Veillette, M. and A. Pelov, "YANG Schema Item iDentifier
              (SID)", draft-ietf-core-sid-03 (work in progress),
              December 2017.

   [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor]
              Veillette, M., Pelov, A., Somaraju, A., Turner, R., and A.
              Minaburo, "CBOR Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
              draft-ietf-core-yang-cbor-06 (work in progress), February
              2018.

   [ieee802-1AR]
              IEEE Standard, ., "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
              2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC7049]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
              October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.

   [RFC7250]  Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
              Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
              Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
              Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
              June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.

   [RFC8152]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.

   [RFC8366]  Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
              "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
              RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>.

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12.2.  Informative References

   [duckling]
              Stajano, F. and R. Anderson, "The resurrecting duckling:
              security issues for ad-hoc wireless networks", 1999,
              <https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~fms27/papers/1999-StajanoAnd-
              duckling.pdf>.

   [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams]
              Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, "YANG Tree Diagrams", draft-
              ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams-06 (work in progress),
              February 2018.

   [pledge]   Dictionary.com, ., "Dictionary.com Unabridged", 2015,
              <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pledge>.

   [RFC6690]  Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
              Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.

   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

Appendix A.  EST messages to EST-coaps

   This section extends the examples from Appendix A of
   [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est].  The CoAP headers are only worked out for
   the enrollstatus example.

A.1.  enrollstatus

   A coaps enrollstatus message can be :

       GET coaps://[192.0.2.1:8085]/est/es

   The corresponding coap header fields are shown below.

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     Ver = 1
     T = 0 (CON)
     Code = 0x01 (0.01 is GET)
     Options
      Option1 (Uri-Host)
        Option Delta = 0x3  (option nr = 3)
        Option Length = 0x9
        Option Value = 192.0.2.1
      Option2 (Uri-Port)
        Option Delta = 0x4  (option nr = 4+3=7)
        Option Length = 0x4
        Option Value = 8085
      Option3 (Uri-Path)
        Option Delta = 0x4   (option nr = 7+4= 11)
        Option Length = 0x7
        Option Value = /est/es
     Payload = [Empty]

   A 2.05 Content response with an unsigned JSON voucher (ct=50) will
   then be:

      2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/json)
        {payload}

   With CoAP fields and payload:

      Ver=1
      T=2 (ACK)
      Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
      Options
        Option1 (Content-Format)
        Option Delta = 0xC  (option nr 12)
        Option Length = 0x2
        Option Value = 0x32 (application/json)

        Payload =
       [EDNOTE: put here voucher payload ]

A.2.  voucher_status

   A coaps voucher_status message can be :

      GET coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616]/est/vs

   A 2.05 Content response with a non signed JSON voucher (ct=50) will
   then be:

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       2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/json)
       Payload =
       [EDNOTE: put here voucher payload ]

A.3.  requestvoucher

   A coaps requestvoucher message can be :

       GET coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616]/est/rv

   A 2.05 Content response returning CBOR voucher signed with a cms
   structure(ct=TBD2) will then be:

       2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/voucher-cms+cbor)
       Payload =
       [EDNOTE: put here CMS signed voucher payload ]

A.4.  requestauditing

   A coaps requestauditing message can be :

       GET coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616]/est/ra

   A 2.05 Content response returning a COSE_Sign1 object (ct=TBD3) will
   then be:

       2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/voucher-cose+cbor)
       Payload =
       [EDNOTE: put here COSE_Sign1 voucher payload ]

Authors' Addresses

   Michael Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works

   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca

   Peter van der Stok
   vanderstok consultancy

   Email: consultancy@vanderstok.org

   Panos Kamapanakis
   Cisco Systems

   Email: pkampana@cisco.com

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