Mitigating Teredo Rooting Loop Attacks
draft-gont-teredo-loops-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Fernando Gont | ||
| Last updated | 2012-07-13 (Latest revision 2012-01-10) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Recently, a number of routing loop vulnerabilities were discovered in the Teredo mechanism, which typically result in a Denial of Service of the involved systems, possibly also affecting the intervening networks. This document describes a number of security checks that can be performed by Teredo hosts and Teredo servers such that these vulnerabilities are eliminated.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)