Requirements for In-situ OAM
draft-brockners-inband-oam-requirements-02
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| Authors | Frank Brockners , Shwetha Bhandari , Sashank Dara , Carlos Pignataro , Hannes Gredler , John Leddy , Stephen Youell , David Mozes , Tal Mizrahi , Petr Lapukhov <>, remy@barefootnetworks.com | ||
| Last updated | 2016-10-31 | ||
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draft-brockners-inband-oam-requirements-02
Network Working Group F. Brockners
Internet-Draft S. Bhandari
Intended status: Informational S. Dara
Expires: May 3, 2017 C. Pignataro
Cisco
H. Gredler
RtBrick Inc.
J. Leddy
Comcast
S. Youell
JMPC
D. Mozes
Mellanox Technologies Ltd.
T. Mizrahi
Marvell
P. Lapukhov
Facebook
R. Chang
Barefoot Networks
October 30, 2016
Requirements for In-situ OAM
draft-brockners-inband-oam-requirements-02
Abstract
This document discusses the motivation and requirements for including
specific operational and telemetry information into data packets
while the data packet traverses a path between two points in the
network. This method is referred to as "in-situ" Operations,
Administration, and Maintenance (OAM), given that the OAM information
is carried with the data packets as opposed to in "out-of-band"
packets dedicated to OAM. In situ OAM complements other OAM
mechanisms which use dedicated probe packets to convey OAM
information.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Motivation for in-situ OAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Path Congruency Issues with Dedicated OAM Packets . . . . 5
3.2. Results Sent to a System Other Than the Sender . . . . . 6
3.3. Overlay and Underlay Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. SLA Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Analytics and Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.6. Frame Replication/Elimination Decision for Bi-casting
/Active-active Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.7. Proof of Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.8. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Considerations for In-situ OAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Type of Information to Be Recorded . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. MTU and Packet Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. Administrative Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4. Selective Enablement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.5. Optimization of Node and Interface Identifiers . . . . . 13
4.6. Loop Communication Path (IPv6-specifics) . . . . . . . . 14
5. Requirements for In-situ OAM Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. Generic Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. In-situ OAM Data with Per-hop Scope . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.3. In-situ OAM with Selected Hop Scope . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.4. In-situ OAM with End-to-end Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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6. Security Considerations and Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1. General considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2. Proof of Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
This document discusses requirements for "in-situ" Operations,
Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) mechanisms. In this context,
"in-situ OAM" refers to the concept of directly encoding telemetry
information within the data packet as it traverses the network or
telemetry domain. Mechanisms which add tracing or other types of
telemetry information to the regular data traffic, sometimes also
referred to as "in-band" OAM can complement active, probe-based
mechanisms such as ping or traceroute, which are sometimes considered
as "out-of-band", because the messages are transported independently
from regular data traffic. In terms of "active" or "passive" OAM,
"in-situ" OAM can be considered a hybrid OAM type. While no extra
packets are sent, in-situ OAM adds information to the packets
therefore cannot be considered passive. In terms of the
classification given in [RFC7799] in-situ OAM could be portrayed as
"hybrid OAM, type 1". "In-situ" mechanisms do not require extra
packets to be sent and hence don't change the packet traffic mix
within the network. Traceroute and ping for example use ICMP
messages: New packets are injected to get tracing information. Those
add to the number of messages in a network, which already might be
highly loaded or suffering performance issues for a particular path
or traffic type.
A number of in-situ as well as in-band OAM mechanisms have been
discussed, such as the INT spec for the P4 programming language [P4]
or the SPUD prototype [I-D.hildebrand-spud-prototype]. The SPUD
prototype uses a similar logic that allows network devices on the
path between endpoints to participate explicitly in the tube outside
the end-to-end context. Even the IPv4 route-record option defined in
[RFC0791] can be considered an in-situ OAM mechanism. Per what was
already stated, in-situ OAM complements "out-of-band" mechanisms such
as ping or traceroute, or more recent active probing mechanisms, as
described in [I-D.lapukhov-dataplane-probe]. In-situ OAM mechanisms
can be leveraged where current out-of-band mechanisms do not apply or
do not offer the desired characteristics or requirements, such as
proving that a certain set of traffic takes a pre-defined path,
strict congruency between overlay and underlay transports is in
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place, checking service level agreements for the live data traffic,
detailed statistics or verification of path selections within a
domain, or scenarios where probe traffic is potentially handled
differently from regular data traffic by the network devices.
[RFC7276] presents an overview of OAM tools.
Compared to probably the most basic example of "in-situ OAM" which is
IPv4 route recording [RFC0791], an in-situ OAM approach has the
following capabilities:
a. A flexible data format to allow different types of information to
be captured as part of an in-situ OAM operation, including but
not limited to path tracing information, operational and
telemetry information such as timestamps, sequence numbers, or
even generic data such as queue size, geo-location of the node
that forwarded the packet, etc.
b. A data format to express node as well as link identifiers to
record the path a packet takes with a fixed amount of added data.
c. The ability to determine whether any nodes were skipped while
recording in-situ OAM information (i.e., in-situ OAM is not
supported or not enabled on those nodes).
d. The ability to actively process information in the packet, for
example to prove in a cryptographically secure way that a packet
really took a pre-defined path using some traffic steering method
such as service chaining or traffic engineering.
e. The ability to include OAM data beyond simple path information,
such as timestamps or even generic data of a particular use case.
f. The ability to carry in-situ OAM data in various different
transport protocols.
2. Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Abbreviations used in this document:
ECMP: Equal Cost Multi-Path
LISP: Locator/ID Separation Protocol
MTU: Maximum Transmit Unit
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NSH: Network Service Header
NFV: Network Function Virtualization
OAM: Operations, Administration, and Maintenance
PMTU: Path MTU
SFC: Service Function Chain
SLA: Service Level Agreement
SR: Segment Routing
This document defines in-situ Operations, Administration, and
Maintenance (in-situ OAM), as the subset in which OAM information is
carried along with data packets. This is as opposed to "out-of-band
OAM", where specific packets are dedicated to carrying OAM
information.
3. Motivation for in-situ OAM
In several scenarios it is beneficial to make information about the
path a packet took through the network or through a network device as
well as associated telemetry information available to the operator.
This includes not only tasks like debugging, troubleshooting, as well
as network planning and network optimization but also policy or
service level agreement compliance checks. This section discusses
the motivation to introduce new methods for enhanced in-situ network
diagnostics.
3.1. Path Congruency Issues with Dedicated OAM Packets
Packet scheduling algorithms, especially for balancing traffic across
equal cost paths or links, often leverage information contained
within the packet, such as protocol number, IP-address or MAC-
address. Probe packets would thus either need to be sent from the
exact same endpoints with the exact same parameters, or probe packets
would need to be artificially constructed as "fake" packets and
inserted along the path. Both approaches are often not feasible from
an operational perspective, be it that access to the end-system is
not feasible, or that the diversity of parameters and associated
probe packets to be created is simply too large. An in-situ
mechanism is an alternative in those cases.
In-situ mechanisms are not impacted by differences in the handling of
probe traffic compared to other data packets, where probe traffic is
handled differently (and potentially forwarded differently) by a
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router than regular data traffic. This obviously assumes that the
addition of in-situ information does not change the forwarding
behavior of the packet. Note that in certain implementations, the
addition information to a transport protocol changes the forwarding
behavior. IPv6 extension header processing is one example. Some
implementations process IPv6 packets with extension headers in the
"slow" path of a router, as opposed to the "fast" path.
3.2. Results Sent to a System Other Than the Sender
Traditional ping and traceroute tools return the OAM results to the
sender of the probe. Even when the ICMP messages that are used with
these tools are enhanced, and additional telemetry is collected
(e.g., ICMP Multi-Part [RFC4884] supporting MPLS information
[RFC4950], Interface and Next-Hop Identification [RFC5837], etc.), it
would be advantageous to separate the sending of an OAM probe from
the receiving of the telemetry data. In this context, it is helpful
to eliminate the requirement that there be a working bidirectional
path.
3.3. Overlay and Underlay Correlation
Several network deployments leverage tunneling mechanisms to create
overlay or service-layer networks. Examples include VXLAN-GPE, GRE,
or LISP. One often observed attribute of overlay networks is that
they do not offer the user of the overlay any insight into the
underlay network. This means that the path that a particular
tunneled packet takes, nor other operational details such as the per-
hop delay/jitter in the underlay are visible to the user of the
overlay network, giving rise to diagnosis and debugging challenges in
case of connectivity or performance issues. The scope of OAM tools
like ping or traceroute is limited to either the overlay or the
underlay which means that the user of the overlay has typically no
access to OAM in the underlay, unless specific operational procedures
are put in place. With in-situ OAM the operator of the underlay can
offer details of the connectivity in the underlay to the user of the
overlay. This could include the ability to find out which underlay
elements are shared by overlays and ability to know which overlays
are mapped to the same underlay elements. Deployment dependent
underlay transit nodes can be configured to update OAM information in
the overlay transport encapsulation. The operator of the egress
tunnel router could choose to share the recorded information about
the path with the user of the overlay.
Coupled with mechanisms such as Segment Routing (SR)
[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing], overlay network and underlay
network can be more tightly coupled: The user of the overlay has
detailed diagnostic information available in case of failure
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conditions. The user of the overlay can also use the path recording
information as input to traffic steering or traffic engineering
mechanisms, to for example achieve path symmetry for the traffic
between two endpoints. [I-D.brockners-lisp-sr] is an example for how
these methods can be applied to LISP.
3.4. SLA Verification
In-situ OAM can help users of an overlay-service to verify that
negotiated SLAs for the real traffic are met by the underlay network
provider. Different from solutions which rely on active probes to
test an SLA, in-situ OAM based mechanisms avoid wrong interpretations
and "cheating", which can happen if the probe traffic that is used to
perform SLA-check is prioritized by the network provider of the
underlay. In active/standby deployments in-situ OAM would only allow
for SLA verification of the active path.
3.5. Analytics and Diagnostics
Network planners and operators benefit from knowledge of the actual
traffic distribution in the network. When deriving an overall
network connectivity traffic matrix one typically needs to correlate
data gathered from each individual device in the network. If the
path of a packet is recorded while the packet is forwarded, the
entire path that a packet took through the network is available to
the egress system. This obviates the need to retrieve individual
traffic statistics from every device in the network and correlate
those statistics, or employ other mechanisms such as leveraging
traffic engineering with null-bandwidth tunnels just to retrieve the
appropriate statistics to generate the traffic matrix.
In addition, with individual path tracing, information is available
at packet level granularity, rather than only at aggregate level - as
is usually the case with IPFIX-style methods which employ flow-
filters at the network elements. Data-center networks which use
equal-cost multipath (ECMP) forwarding are one example where detailed
statistics on flow distribution in the network are highly desired.
If a network supports ECMP, one can create detailed statistics for
the different paths packets take through the network at the egress
system, without a need to correlate/aggregate statistics from every
router in the system. Transit devices are off-loaded from the task
of gathering packet statistics.
In high-speed networks one can leverage and benefit from packet-
accurate measurements with for example hardware-accurate timestamping
(i.e., nanosecond-level verification) to support optimized packet
scheduling and queuing mechanisms.
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3.6. Frame Replication/Elimination Decision for Bi-casting/Active-
active Networks
Bandwidth- and power-constrained, time-sensitive, or loss-intolerant
networks (e.g., networks for industry automation/control, health
care) require efficient OAM methods to decide when to replicate
packets to a secondary path in order to keep the loss/error-rate for
the receiver at a tolerable level - and also when to stop replication
and eliminate the redundant flow. Many Internet of Things (IoT)
networks are time sensitive and cannot leverage automatic
retransmission requests (ARQ) to cope with transmission errors or
lost packets. Transmitting the data over multiple disparate paths
(often called bi-casting or live-live) is a method used to reduce the
error rate observed by the receiver. Time sensitive networks (TSN)
receive a lot of attention from the manufacturing industry as shown
by a various standardization activities and industry forums being
formed (see e.g., IETF 6TiSCH, IEEE P802.1CB, AVnu).
3.7. Proof of Transit
Several deployments use traffic engineering, policy routing, segment
routing or Service Function Chaining (SFC) [RFC7665] to steer packets
through a specific set of nodes. In certain cases regulatory
obligations or a compliance policy require to prove that all packets
that are supposed to follow a specific path are indeed being
forwarded across the exact set of nodes specified. If a packet flow
is supposed to go through a series of service functions or network
nodes, it has to be proven that all packets of the flow actually went
through the service chain or collection of nodes specified by the
policy. In case the packets of a flow weren't appropriately
processed, a verification device would be required to identify the
policy violation and take corresponding actions (e.g., drop or
redirect the packet, send an alert etc.) corresponding to the policy.
In today's deployments, the proof that a packet traversed a
particular service chain is typically delivered in an indirect way:
Service appliances and network forwarding are in different trust
domains. Physical hand-off-points are defined between these trust
domains (i.e., physical interfaces). Or in other terms, in the
"network forwarding domain" things are wired up in a way that traffic
is delivered to the ingress interface of a service appliance and
received back from an egress interface of a service appliance. This
"wiring" is verified and trusted. The evolution to Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) and modern service chaining concepts (using
technologies such as Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP), Network
Service Header (NSH), Segment Routing (SR), etc.) blurs the line
between the different trust domains, because the hand-off-points are
no longer clearly defined physical interfaces, but are virtual
interfaces. Because of that very reason, networks operators require
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that different trust layers not to be mixed in the same device. For
an NFV scenario a different proof is required. Offering a proof that
a packet traversed a specific set of service functions would allow
network operators to move away from the above described indirect
methods of proving that a service chain is in place for a particular
application.
Deployed service chains without the presence of a "proof of transit"
mechanism are typically operated as fail-open system: The packets
that arrive at the end of a service chain are processed. Adding
"proof of transit" capabilities to a service chain allows an operator
to turn a fail-open system into a fail-close system, i.e. packets
that did not properly traverse the service chain can be blocked.
A solution approach could be based on OAM data which is added to
every packet for achieving Proof Of Transit (POT).The OAM data is
updated at every hop and is used to verify whether a packet traversed
all required nodes. When the verifier receives each packet, it can
validate whether the packet traversed the service chain correctly.
The detailed mechanisms used for path verification along with the
procedures applied to the OAM data carried in the packet for path
verification are beyond the scope of this document. Details are
addressed in [I-D.brockners-proof-of-transit]. In this document the
term "proof" refers to a discrete set of bits that represents an
integer or string carried as OAM data. The OAM data is used to
verify whether a packet traversed the nodes it is supposed to
traverse.
3.8. Use Cases
In-situ OAM could be leveraged for several use cases, including:
o Traffic Matrix: Derive the network traffic matrix: Traffic for a
given time interval between any two edge nodes of a given domain.
Could be performed for all traffic or on a per Quality of Service
(QoS) class.
o Flow Debugging: Discover which path(s) a particular set of traffic
(identified by an n-tuple) takes in the network. Such a procedure
is particularly useful in case traffic is balanced across multiple
paths, like with link aggregation (LACP) or equal cost multi-
pathing (ECMP).
o Loss Statistics per Path: Retrieve loss statistics per flow and
path in the network.
o Path Heat Maps: Discover highly utilized links in the network.
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o Trend Analysis on Traffic Patterns: Analyze if (and if so how) the
forwarding path for a specific set of traffic changes over time
(can give hints to routing issues, unstable links etc.)
o Network Delay Distribution: Show delay distribution across network
by node or links. If enabled per application or for a specific
flow then display the path taken along with the delay incurred at
every hop.
o SLA Verification: Verify that a negotiated service level agreement
(SLA), e.g., for packet drop rates or delay/jitter is conformed to
by the actual traffic.
o Low-power Networks: Include application level OAM information
(e.g., battery charge level, cache or buffer fill level) into data
traffic to avoid sending extra OAM traffic which incur an extra
cost on the devices. Using the battery charge level as example,
one could avoid sending extra OAM packets just to communicate
battery health, and as such would save battery on sensors.
o Path Verification or Service Function Path Verification: Proof and
verification of packets traversing check points in the network,
where check points can be nodes in the network or service
functions.
o Geo-location Policy: Network policy implemented based on which
path packets took. Example: Only if packets originated and stayed
within the trading-floor department, access to specific
applications or servers is granted.
o Device-level Troubleshooting and Optimization: In many cases,
network operators could benefit from information specific to a
single device. A non-exhaustive list of useful information
includes: queue-depths, buffer utilization (either shared or per-
port), packet latency measured from a known starting point, packet
latency introduced by a single device, and resource utilization
(CPU, memory, link bandwidth) of a given device or link. In some
cases, this information changes over per-packet timescales (i.e.,
nanoseconds) and as such it is extremely challenging to collect
and report this info in an accurate and scalable manner. By
encoding the information from the forwarding element directly
within a data packet (i.e., within the 'fast-path') this
information can be added to some or all data packets and then
collected and analyzed by human or machine tools. This type of
information is particularly valuable for troubleshooting low-level
device errors as well as providing a knowledge feedback loop for
network and device optimization.
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o Custom Network Probing: Active network probing and in-situ OAM can
be combined for customized and efficient network probing. This
could for example be a customized traceroute.
4. Considerations for In-situ OAM
The implementation of an in-situ OAM mechanism needs to take several
considerations into account, including administrative boundaries, how
information is recorded, Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU), Path MTU
Discovery (PMTUD) and packet size, etc.
4.1. Type of Information to Be Recorded
The information gathered for in-situ OAM can be categorized into
three main categories: Information with a per-hop scope, such as path
tracing; information which applies to a specific set of hops, such as
path or service chain verification; information which only applies to
the edges of a domain, such as sequence numbers. Note that a single
network device could comprise several in-situ OAM hops, for example
in case one wants to trace the path of a packet through that device.
o "edge to edge": Information that needs to be shared between
network edges (the "edge" of a network could either be a host or a
domain edge device): Edge to edge data e.g., packet and octet
count of data entering a well-defined domain and leaving it is
helpful in building traffic matrix, sequence number (also called
"path packet counters") is useful for the flow to detect packet
loss.
o "selected hops": Information that applies to a specific set of
nodes only. In case of path verification, only the nodes which
are "check points" are required to interpret and update the
information in the packet.
o "per hop": Information that is gathered at every hop along the
path a packet traverses within an administrative domain:
* Hop by Hop information e.g., Nodes visited for path tracing,
Timestamps at each hop to find delays along the path
* Stats collection at each hop to optimize communication in
resource constrained networks e.g., battery, CPU, memory status
of each node piggy backed in a data packet is useful in low
power lossy networks where network nodes are mostly asleep and
communication is expensive
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4.2. MTU and Packet Size
The recorded data at every hop might lead to packet size exceeding
the Maximum Transmit Unit (MTU). A detailed discussion of the
implications of oversized IPv6 header chains is found in [RFC7112].
The Path MTU restricts the amount of data that can be recorded for
purpose of OAM within a data packet.
If in-situ OAM data is inserted at the edge of the domain (e.g., by
intermediate routers) then the MTU on all interfaces with the domain
(MTU_INT) MUST be >= the maximum MTU on any "external" facing
interfaces (MTU_EXT) and the total size of in-situ OAM data to be
recorded MUST be <= (MTU_INT - MTU_EXT).
In-situ OAM comprises two approaches to insert OAM data-records in
the packets:
o Pre-allocated: In this case, the encapsulating node inserts empty
data records into the packet to cover the entire domain. The data
records will be incrementally updated/filled as the packet
progresses through the network. With pre-allocation the packet
size is only changed at the encapsulating node and is kept
constant throughout the domain. The pre-allocated approach is
beneficial for software data-plane implementations where
allocating the required space only once and index into the array
to populate the data during transit avoids copy operations at
every hop.
o Incremental: Every node that desires to include in-situ OAM
information extends the packet as needed. The incremental
approach is beneficial for hardware data-plane implementations as
it eliminates the need for the transit nodes to read the full
array and lookup the pointer in the option prior to updating the
data record contents.
The "incremental" or the "pre-allocated" approaches could even be
combined in the same deployment - in which case two in-situ OAM
headers would be present in the packet: One for the incremental
approach and one for the pre-allocated approach. In such a case one
would expect that nodes with a hardware data-plane would update the
incremental header, whereas nodes with a software data-plane would
process the pre-allocated header.
4.3. Administrative Boundaries
There are several challenges in enabling in-situ OAM in the public
Internet as well as in corporate/enterprise networks across
administrative domains, which include but are not limited to:
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o Deployment dependent, the data fields that in-situ OAM requires as
part of a specific transport protocol may not be supported across
administrative boundaries.
o Current OAM implementations are often done in the slow path, i.e.,
OAM packets are punted to router's CPU for processing. This leads
to performance and scaling issues and opens up routers for attacks
such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
o Discovery of network topology and details of the network devices
across administrative boundaries may open up attack vectors
compromising network security.
o Specifically on IPv6: At the administrative boundaries IPv6
packets with extension headers are dropped for several reasons
described in [RFC7872].
The following considerations will be discussed in a future version of
this document: If the packet is dropped due to the presence of the
in-situ OAM; If the policy failure is treated as feature disablement
and any further recording is stopped but the packet itself is not
dropped, it may lead to every node in the path to make this policy
decision.
4.4. Selective Enablement
The ability to selectively enable in-situ OAM is valuable. While it
may be desirable to enable data collection on all traffic or devices,
this may not always be feasible. In-situ OAM collection may also
come with a performance impact to forwarding rates or feature
capabilities, which may be acceptable in only some locations. For
example, the SPUD prototype uses the notion of "pipes" to describe
the portion of the traffic that could be subject to in-path
inspection. Mechanisms to decide which traffic would be subject to
in-situ OAM are outside the scope of this document.
4.5. Optimization of Node and Interface Identifiers
Since packets have a finite maximum size, the data recording or
carrying capacity of one packet in which the in-situ OAM metadata is
present is limited. In-situ OAM should use its own dedicated
namespace (confined to the domain in-situ OAM operates in) to
represent node and interface IDs to save space in the header.
Generic representations of node and interface identifiers which are
globally unique (such as a UUID) would consume significantly more
bits of in-situ OAM data.
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4.6. Loop Communication Path (IPv6-specifics)
When recorded data is required to be analyzed on a source node that
issues a packet and inserts in-situ OAM data, the recorded data needs
to be carried back to the source node.
One way to carry the in-situ OAM data back to the source is to
utilize an ICMP Echo Request/Reply (ping) or ICMPv6 Echo Request/
Reply (ping6) mechanism. In order to run the in-situ OAM mechanism
appropriately on the ping/ping6 mechanism, the following two
operations should be implemented by the ping/ping6 target node:
1. All of the in-situ OAM fields would be copied from an Echo
Request message to an Echo Reply message.
2. The Hop Limit field of the IPv6 header of these messages would be
copied as a continuous sequence. Further considerations are
addressed in a future version of this document.
5. Requirements for In-situ OAM Data Types
The above discussed use cases require different types of in-situ OAM
data. This section details requirements for in-situ OAM derived from
the discussion above.
5.1. Generic Requirements
REQ-G1: Classification: It should be possible to enable in-situ OAM
on a selected set of traffic (e.g., per interface, based on
an access control list specifying a specific set of traffic,
etc.) The selected set of traffic can also be all traffic.
REQ-G2: Scope: If in-situ OAM is used only within a specific domain,
provisions need to be put in place to ensure that in-situ
OAM data stays within the specific domain only.
REQ-G3: Transport independence: Data formats for in-situ OAM shall
be defined in a transport independent way. In-situ OAM
applies to a variety of transport protocols. Encapsulations
should be defined how the generic data formats are carried
by a specific protocol.
REQ-G4: Layering: It should be possible to have in-situ OAM
information for different transport protocol layers be
present in several fields within a single packet. This
could for example be the case when tunnels are employed and
in-situ OAM information is to be gathered for both the
underlay as well as the overlay network. Layering support
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should not be limited to just underlay and overlay, but
include more than two layers.
REQ-G5: MTU size: With in-situ OAM information added, packets MUST
NOT become larger than the path MTU.
REQ-G5.1: If due to some reason a packet which contains in
situ OAM data record cannot be forwarded due to
the presence of in-situ OAM data records, the
node SHOULD remove the in situ OAM data records
and forward the packet, rather than drop the
entire packet.
REQ-G5.2: If the encapsulating router is unable to insert
in-situ OAM data records into a packet, e.g., due
to MTU issues, even though it is configured to do
so, it should use some operational means to
inform the operator (e.g., syslog) about the
inability to add in-situ OAM data records. Even
if the in-situ OAM encapsulating node fails to
add in-situ OAM data records, it should forward
the packet normally.
REQ-G5.3: MTU size consideration for in-situ OAM MUST take
domain specifics into account, e.g., changes of
the domain topology due to path protection
mechanisms might extend the hop count of a path
etc.
REQ-G6: Data structure reuse: The data types and data formats
defined and used for in-situ OAM ought to be reusable for
out-of-band OAM telemetry as well.
REQ-G7: Data records format: It is desirable that the format of in-
situ OAM data-records leverages already defined data formats
for OAM as much as feasible.
REQ-G8: Combination with active OAM mechanisms: In-situ OAM should
be useable for active network probing, like for example a
customized version of traceroute. Decapsulating in-situ OAM
nodes may have an ability to send the in-situ OAM
information retrieved from the packet back to the source
address of the packet or to the encapsulating node.
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5.2. In-situ OAM Data with Per-hop Scope
REQ-H1: Missing nodes detection: Data shall be present that allows a
node to detect whether all nodes that might participate in
in-situ OAM operations have indeed participated.
REQ-H2: Node, instance or device identifier: Data shall be present
that allows to retrieve the identity of the entity reporting
telemetry information. The entity can be a device, or a
subsystem/component within a device. The latter will allow
for packet tracing within a device in much the same way as
between devices.
REQ-H3: Ingress interface identifier: Data shall be present that
allows the identification of the interface a particular
packet was received from. The interface can be a logical
and/or physical entity.
REQ-H4: Egress interface identifier: Data shall be present that
allows the identification of the interface a particular
packet was forwarded to. Interface can be a logical or
physical entity.
REQ-H5: Time-related requirements
REQ-H5.1: Delay: Data shall be present that allows to
retrieve the delay between two or more points of
interest within the system. Those points can be
within the same device or on different devices.
REQ-H5.2: Jitter: Data shall be present that allows to
retrieve the jitter between two or more points of
interest within the system. Those points can be
within the same device or on different devices.
Jitter can be derived from the different
timestamps gathered and does not necessarily need
to be an explicit data record.
REQ-H5.3: Wall-clock time: Data shall be present that
allows to retrieve the wall-clock time visited a
particular point of interest in the system.
REQ-H5.4: Time precision: Time with different precision
should be supported. Use-case dependent, the
required precision could e.g., be nanoseconds,
microseconds, milliseconds, or seconds.
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REQ-H6: Generic data records (like e.g., GPS/Geo-location
information): It should be possible to add user-defined OAM
data at select hops to the packet. The semantics of the
data are defined by the user.
5.3. In-situ OAM with Selected Hop Scope
REQ-S1: Proof of transit: Data shall be present which allows to
securely prove that a packet has visited or ore several
particular points of interest (i.e., a particular set of
nodes).
REQ-S1.1: In case "Shamir's secret sharing scheme" is used
for proof of transit, two data records, "random"
and "cumulative" shall be present. The number of
bits used for "random" and "cumulative" data
records can vary between deployments and should
thus be configurable.
REQ-S1.2: Enable a fail-open service chaining system to be
converted into a fail-closed service chaining
system.
5.4. In-situ OAM with End-to-end Scope
REQ-E1: Sequence numbering:
REQ-E1.1: Reordering detection: It should be possible to
detect whether packets have been reordered while
traversing an in situ OAM domain.
REQ-E1.2: Duplicates detection: It should be possible to
detect whether packets have been duplicated while
traversing an in situ OAM domain.
REQ-E1.3: Detection of packet drops: It should be possible
to detect whether packets have been dropped while
traversing an in-situ OAM domain.
6. Security Considerations and Requirements
6.1. General considerations
General Security considerations will be expanded on in a later
version of this document.
In-situ OAM is considered a "per domain" feature, where one or
several operators decide on leveraging and configuring in-situ OAM
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according to their needs. Still operators need to properly secure
the in-situ OAM domain to avoid malicious configuration and use,
which could include injecting malicious in-situ OAM packets into a
domain.
6.2. Proof of Transit
Threat Model: Attacks on the deployments could be due to malicious
administrators or accidental misconfiguration resulting in bypassing
of certain nodes. The solution approach should meet the following
requirements:
REQ-SEC1: Sound Proof of Transit: A valid and verifiable proof that
the packet definitively traversed through all the nodes as
expected. Probabilistic methods to achieve this should be
avoided, as the same could be exploited by an attacker.
REQ-SEC2: Tampering of meta data: An active attacker should not be
able to insert or modify or delete meta data in whole or
in parts and bypass few (or all) nodes. Any deviation
from the expected path should be accurately determined.
REQ-SEC3: Replay Attacks: A attacker (active/passive) should not be
able to reuse the POT bits in the packet by observing the
OAM data in the packet, packet characteristics (like IP
addresses, octets transferred, timestamps) or even the
proof bits themselves. The solution approach should
consider usage of these parameters for deriving any
secrets cautiously. Mitigating replay attacks beyond a
window of longer duration could be intractable to achieve
with fixed number of bits allocated for proof.
REQ-SEC4: Pre-play Attacks: A active attacker should not be able to
generate or reuse valid POT bits from legitimate packets,
in order to prove to the verifier as valid packets. This
slight variant of replay attacks. The attacker extracts
POT bits from legitimate packets and ensure they do not
reach the verifier. Subsequently reuse those POT bits in
crafted packets.
REQ-SEC5: Recycle Secrets: Any configuration of the secrets (like
cryptographic keys, initialization vectors etc.) either in
the controller or service functions should be re-
configurable. Solution approach should enable controls,
API calls etc. needed in order to perform such recycling.
It is desirable to provide recommendations on the duration
of rotation cycles needed for the secure functioning of
the overall system.
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REQ-SEC6: Secret storage and distribution: Secrets should be shared
with the devices over secure channels. Methods should be
put in place so that secrets cannot be retrieved by non-
authorized personnel from the devices.
7. IANA Considerations
[RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to publication.]
This document has no IANA actions.
8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Jen Linkova, LJ Wobker, Eric Vyncke,
Nalini Elkins, Srihari Raghavan, Ranganathan T S, Karthik Babu
Harichandra Babu, Akshaya Nadahalli, Ignas Bagdonas, LJ Wobker, Erik
Nordmark, and Andrew Yourtchenko for the comments and advice. This
document leverages and builds on top of several concepts described in
[I-D.kitamura-ipv6-record-route]. The authors would like to
acknowledge the work done by the author Hiroshi Kitamura and people
involved in writing it.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.brockners-lisp-sr]
Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., Maino, F., and D. Lewis,
"LISP Extensions for Segment Routing", draft-brockners-
lisp-sr-01 (work in progress), February 2014.
[I-D.brockners-proof-of-transit]
Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., Dara, S., Pignataro, C.,
Leddy, J., and S. Youell, "Proof of Transit", draft-
brockners-proof-of-transit-01 (work in progress), July
2016.
[I-D.hildebrand-spud-prototype]
Hildebrand, J. and B. Trammell, "Substrate Protocol for
User Datagrams (SPUD) Prototype", draft-hildebrand-spud-
prototype-03 (work in progress), March 2015.
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[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing]
Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Decraene, B., Litkowski, S.,
and R. Shakir, "Segment Routing Architecture", draft-ietf-
spring-segment-routing-09 (work in progress), July 2016.
[I-D.kitamura-ipv6-record-route]
Kitamura, H., "Record Route for IPv6 (PR6) Hop-by-Hop
Option Extension", draft-kitamura-ipv6-record-route-00
(work in progress), November 2000.
[I-D.lapukhov-dataplane-probe]
Lapukhov, P. and r. remy@barefootnetworks.com, "Data-plane
probe for in-band telemetry collection", draft-lapukhov-
dataplane-probe-01 (work in progress), June 2016.
[P4] Kim, , "P4: In-band Network Telemetry (INT)", September
2015.
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, DOI
10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.
[RFC4884] Bonica, R., Gan, D., Tappan, D., and C. Pignataro,
"Extended ICMP to Support Multi-Part Messages", RFC 4884,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4884, April 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4884>.
[RFC4950] Bonica, R., Gan, D., Tappan, D., and C. Pignataro, "ICMP
Extensions for Multiprotocol Label Switching", RFC 4950,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4950, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4950>.
[RFC5837] Atlas, A., Ed., Bonica, R., Ed., Pignataro, C., Ed., Shen,
N., and JR. Rivers, "Extending ICMP for Interface and
Next-Hop Identification", RFC 5837, DOI 10.17487/RFC5837,
April 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5837>.
[RFC7112] Gont, F., Manral, V., and R. Bonica, "Implications of
Oversized IPv6 Header Chains", RFC 7112, DOI 10.17487/
RFC7112, January 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7112>.
[RFC7276] Mizrahi, T., Sprecher, N., Bellagamba, E., and Y.
Weingarten, "An Overview of Operations, Administration,
and Maintenance (OAM) Tools", RFC 7276, DOI 10.17487/
RFC7276, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7276>.
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[RFC7665] Halpern, J., Ed. and C. Pignataro, Ed., "Service Function
Chaining (SFC) Architecture", RFC 7665, DOI 10.17487/
RFC7665, October 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7665>.
[RFC7799] Morton, A., "Active and Passive Metrics and Methods (with
Hybrid Types In-Between)", RFC 7799, DOI 10.17487/RFC7799,
May 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7799>.
[RFC7872] Gont, F., Linkova, J., Chown, T., and W. Liu,
"Observations on the Dropping of Packets with IPv6
Extension Headers in the Real World", RFC 7872, DOI
10.17487/RFC7872, June 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7872>.
Authors' Addresses
Frank Brockners
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Hansaallee 249, 3rd Floor
DUESSELDORF, NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN 40549
Germany
Email: fbrockne@cisco.com
Shwetha Bhandari
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cessna Business Park, Sarjapura Marathalli Outer Ring Road
Bangalore, KARNATAKA 560 087
India
Email: shwethab@cisco.com
Sashank Dara
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cessna Business Park, Sarjapura Marathalli Outer Ring Road
Bangalore, KARNATAKA 560 087
India
Email: sadara@cisco.com
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Carlos Pignataro
Cisco Systems, Inc.
7200-11 Kit Creek Road
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
United States
Email: cpignata@cisco.com
Hannes Gredler
RtBrick Inc.
Email: hannes@rtbrick.com
John Leddy
Comcast
Email: John_Leddy@cable.comcast.com
Stephen Youell
JP Morgan Chase
25 Bank Street
London E14 5JP
United Kingdom
Email: stephen.youell@jpmorgan.com
David Mozes
Mellanox Technologies Ltd.
Email: davidm@mellanox.com
Tal Mizrahi
Marvell
6 Hamada St.
Yokneam 20692
Israel
Email: talmi@marvell.com
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Petr Lapukhov
Facebook
1 Hacker Way
Menlo Park, CA 94025
USA
URI: petr@fb.com
Remy Chang
Barefoot Networks
Email: remy@barefootnetworks.com
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